793.94/4514: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 1—11:30 a.m.]
47. Sweetser reports as follows concerning the meeting of the Twelve yesterday before the public session of the Council:
“At a meeting of the Twelve today preparatory to the public session Simon explained the Shanghai negotiations and the suggested program. [Page 485] After stating that Britain and France had agreed to cooperate he said that what was of greater interest was the attitude of the United States. He had taken the liberty of discussing the matter in great detail with some of the representatives of the United States in Geneva who were in close touch with Washington. America had shown the greatest interest in all the details, in fact the plan respecting the position already taken by the League or by any government had been worked out by Mr. Stimson, and felt that this would result in a united front.
Boncour after expressions of appreciation by himself and others expressed disquietude lest after tonight’s meeting hostilities might still continue tomorrow and felt that in order to avoid another unpleasant surprise more formal assurance should be secured as to their termination. Simon, fully sharing this anxiety, urged that the Council must run a certain risk and take a step even if a bold one rather than merely wait on events. If the United States could be brought to cooperate with the nations around the table he thought it would greatly increase the influence of the Council with Japan.
Madariaga agreeing as to the risk felt that the best aspect of the situation was that the United States would cooperate more fully with the League than hitherto. He had always felt that the absence of the United States made a huge gap in the peace procedure. He wondered, however, if the Council could strengthen the League of Nations’ aspect, (1st), by specifically stating that the conference be held under the League; (2d), by opening it to all the powers on the original Shanghai Commission rather than to the great powers only; (3d), by entrusting the arrangements to the Secretariat as previously done and, (4th), by assuring that the conference report to the Assembly.
Simon emphasized that he had set himself the object of associating the United States in the Shanghai work. The present arrangement gives closer association by the United States than ever before. The only difficulty about accepting the above proposals was that Washington had already accepted the original text; indeed he had just had a message from Mr. Wilson that the Secretary of State had agreed by telephone to the text as it stood. He was afraid now to ask for any change in the text, given the physical difficulty of negotiating with the United States at such great distance. For himself he would be glad to state that Great Britain was acting on behalf of the League and suggested that the French and Italian representatives might do the same for their countries. It was very difficult, however, to ask America to act on behalf of the League and he consequently urged leaving the text as it was. Drummond added as regards the Assembly that any report from the conference was sure to come before the body as part of its information and documentation and that therefore it was unnecessary as well as unwise to make a special point of it.
Boncour, fully agreeing as to the necessity of proceeding with all prudence and not embarrassing the United States, asked if it would not be possible to emphasize the armistice more by putting it in the opening paragraph. Simon replied that his first draft had done exactly that but had been altered in order to avoid the appearance of two rival efforts going on from opposite ends of the world. He did not want to take any step which would encourage either China or [Page 486] Japan to procrastinate nor, having secured American acceptance to the text, would he want to create new difficulties there. Madariaga expressed the view that one of the heavy sacrifices caused by American cooperation was that the Council was confronted with texts which it could not change. This had happened not once but several times; it was a difficulty which the Council must accept in order to secure a larger agreement. Simon appreciated this objection but urged that pressure of time and the extreme difficulty of the long-range negotiations with America justified an action which in no way could constitute a precedent.”