Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/44655

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation¹⁵

February 28. 1932, 1:40 p.m.

Mr. Wilson: Hello, Mr. Secretary, have you received my telegram No. 51 [41?]?¹⁶

Secretary: I have your 41, yes, but not 51.

Mr. Wilson: The draft proposal—

Secretary: Well, now, wait a moment. Let me say something to you first. In the first place, I want to caution you against too much telephoning. Send what you can by cable. It is much more satisfactory. The connections are not good enough.

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: Now, the next thing, I want to give you the three points that I have had to consider in regard to the thing you telephoned me yesterday from Simon and also your reports before you give me the new matter. I want to give you these points. Simon’s letter does not cover the details of the cessation of hostilities and it does not cover matters which will be the points on which there will be differences and trouble. I understand from that that he intends to leave those matters to be settled in Shanghai. Is that right? Have you got your proposed Simon letter again before you?

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: Well, now, No. 1 point reads as follows: “An immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrangements made between the commanders in consultation with the military and naval authorities—.” I suggest that you put in there “the military, naval and civilian authorities”.

Mr. Wilson: Quite right.

Secretary: Now I understand that that leaves such details as the extent of the withdrawal of the Chinese to be arranged there.

Mr. Wilson: Correct. Yes, sir.

Secretary: Subject to such instruction as may be given to our Minister there. Now I want to make this clear. You must be very careful and tell Sir John that we are unwilling to put ourselves in a position of bringing pressure upon the Chinese by the four powers to accept a manifestly unfair settlement in these respects. Do you see what I mean?

Mr. Wilson: I understand that perfectly.

Secretary: The two powers—China and Japan—have been quarreling over how much each one shall withdraw. Each power is trying to save its face at the expense of the other. Now our people must be extremely careful not to bring the pressure of the four powers behind Japan and against China or vice versa. That arrangement must be manifestly fair on its face. Do you see?

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: Because that is the thing that is going to make more trouble than anything else. Now turn to No. 3 of Simon’s draft. Have you got that?

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: “A declaration by China that she would enter into negotiations on the basis that the International Settlement must be preserved intact.” I am afraid that that will look to the Chinese as if the four powers were trying to take advantage of the Japanese attack on Shanghai to settle up some old scores of their own against China.

Mr. Wilson: Yes, I understand.

Secretary: I don’t like the word “intact”. If Sir John means merely that China will make a declaration that she will enter into negotiations on the basis of securing life and property in the Settlement, preserving them from danger, that would be different. But I am afraid that as he has drawn it, China will think that we are trying to force a settlement in our favor on the extraterritoriality system.

Mr. Wilson: I see. I hadn’t thought of that.

Secretary: Well, you must think of it and tell Simon he must think of it. Now, in the next place, get this. I don’t want anything in this proposed truce or settlement—there must be no understanding that this settlement which we are trying to make between China and Japan will by implication promise that the Assembly will not act in the way of giving notice that they will not recognize any settlement in violation of treaties. In other words, there must be no implication in this settlement that we agree that the Assembly shall not follow the suggestion that I made in my letter to Borah. Is that understood?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, sir.

Secretary: Well, now, in the fourth place, after consideration of it, I rather like Sir John’s original No. 4 about the other powers associating themselves with Great Britain better than the one which you proposed. I want to throw all the initiative upon Great Britain. You see?

Mr. Wilson: Yes. Mr. Secretary, do you mind the initiative coming from the Council as I told you in my 41?

Secretary: No, if I understand it correctly. I understand from your 41 that the Council will simply express its willingness or its invitation to have the four powers act.

Mr. Wilson: That it does. I have the draft of their proposal here.

Secretary: Read it to me slowly so that the stenographer can get it.

Mr. Wilson: This is proposed to be read at a meeting of the Council tomorrow by the President of the Council.

“The imminence of hostilities lies still in the Shanghai region between Chinese and Japanese forces and its inevitable. consequence, heavy loss of life and further embitterment of feeling, makes it at this critical moment the duty of all of us to lose no opportunity of seeking means by which this armed conflict by two members of the League may be suspended and a way to peace may be found and followed.

The President called together his colleagues on the Council for the purpose of laying before them a proposal which might serve to this end. For its effective execution, this proposal will require [not?] solely acceptance of the Governments of China and Japan by the [but later] cooperation on the spot of the other Governments who have special interests in the Shanghai settlement and whose representatives are therefore thoroughly available to make the local contribution of their friendly aid which is no less necessary than the positive and sincere agreement of the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the plans proposed.

It is as follows: An immediate cessation of hostilities consolidated by arrangements made between the commanders in consultation with the military and naval authorities—[”]

Secretary: Put in there [“]civilian[”].

Mr. Wilson: Yes.—[“]of the other principal powers represented in Shanghai who would render all possible assistance. 2. A conference to be immediately set up in Shanghai composed of representatives of China and Japan, together with representatives of the powers above referred to for the purpose of bringing about a final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area. 3. The conference to be undertaken on the basis (a) that Japan has no political or territorial designs in this region and no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or of otherwise advancing exclusive interests of the Japanese and (b) that China enter the conference on the basis that the¹⁷ International and French Settlements must be¹⁸ preserved intact under arrangements which will secure these areas and their residents from future danger.”

Now I will make a note of your suggestion which will apply to that.

“Now this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area without prejudice to or qualification of the position previously taken up by any power in relation to Sino-Japanese affairs, the President desires in the name of himself and his colleagues to invite the adherence and cooperation both of China and Japan and of the other powers referred to whose local position enables them to make a special contribution to the common purpose of stopping armed conflict and to restoring peace.”

That is the end of that document. Now we have been thinking here that Sir John Simon in supporting that document and seconding the proposal of the President, Paul-Boncour, makes it clear that he has been in consultation with the American Government and is glad to be able to communicate the assurance that the American Government is prepared to associate itself with this step and to instruct its representatives in the Shanghai area to cooperate with the other interested powers. We have also drafted a letter which I might give to Drummond after the proposal has been accepted by the Council. Of course I will give it to him when the whole Council has adjourned—nothing public about it.

“My dear Sir Eric:

In reply to your letter of today’s date in which you inform me of the proposal made by the Council [(]which the Chinese and Japanese representatives have promised to transmit immediately to their respective Governments[)] concerning the cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai area and a conference for the restoration of peace within that zone, I have to inform you that the Government of the United States is happy to associate itself with this effort [for] the reestablishment of peace.

The [My] Government will instruct its representatives in Shanghai in the event that this offer is acceptable to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, to cooperate with the representatives of the other powers.”

Now that is the whole program, Mr. Secretary. See if you don’t think that paragraph No. 4—my last paragraph on the draft proposal—takes care of your preoccupation regarding the excluding of the Manchurian matter.

Secretary: Well, I thought it was rather weak as you read it.

Mr. Wilson: May I read it again to you? “Now this proposal, which is aimed at the immediate reestablishment of peace in the Shanghai area without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken up by any power—[”]

Secretary: No, no. There is a weakness right there because the Council of the League has taken up just as strong a position on Manchuria as we have and I will not let them duck out of it.

Mr. Wilson: “Previously taken up by the Council or any powers”?

Secretary: Yes, “by the Council of the League of Nations or any power”.

Mr. Wilson: “previously taken up by the Council of the League of Nations or any power”. Yes, that strengthens it.

Secretary: You bet. You have got to watch that every time. The other would be too weak. I would not accept it. Well, now, I think you have got to let me have time to think this over, and I would like to know what answer they make to my suggestions that I read to you first.

Mr. Wilson: I am almost certain that they will accept those, Mr. Secretary. There won’t be any difficulty about that.

Secretary: Well, I will look over it with every effort to agree. I may have one or two suggestions that I can cable you.

Mr. Wilson: Mr. Secretary, can’t you telephone again because it is acting tomorrow morning.

Secretary: I know, but if I cable you, won’t my cable get to you for tomorrow morning?

Mr. Wilson: Not in time to take action with all the interested powers. You see, it is now here half-past seven and that means that if I get a telegram from you, I won’t be able to have it until 9 o’clock tomorrow morning, if then, probably 10 o’clock tomorrow morning, and it does not give us time to do anything.

Secretary: What time do they meet?

Mr. Wilson: It is not set definitely. They want to meet at 11, if possible. It is a question of saving hours before the fighting starts again.

Secretary: I know, but they are not going to start in any such hurry as they think. What I mean is that if the Japanese are in the frame of mind which makes this matter a successful possibility and if they know that we are conferring on this subject, I can hardly conceive of their rushing ahead with a new attack. But I will do it as quickly as I can, but I must have time to think and I must have time to confer here.

Mr. Wilson: Yes, sir, of course, but I wonder if you couldn’t telephone me this evening.

Secretary: I will try to telephone this afternoon.

Mr. Wilson: If you could do that, I will stay in any time. I want to see Sir John, of course, tonight.

Secretary: I will try to telephone you before four o’clock this afternoon—that’s ten o’clock your time.

Mr. Wilson: Mr. Secretary, Simon is very anxious to summon Matsudaira and to have me present. He is under the impression that pressure on Japan is apt to be effective and he feels that Matsudaira must be convinced of the unity of purpose of Great Britain and America and of the grave danger to Japan which the Assembly might possess if they have done nothing beforehand. Do you care to have me do that with him?

Secretary: No, I would not. It is enough for Sir John to assure him that he has conferred with us. No, I don’t think you had better go, and I don’t want any implication, as I told you before, that if this thing is done, the Assembly will not act at least to the extent of giving notice that they will not recognize any settlement which is made in the violation of a treaty. That must be absolutely clear, otherwise I won’t go in. I want you to say that to Sir John and watch his reaction.

Mr. Wilson: Just repeat that to me.

Secretary: That in going into these negotiations, there is no implication that if such a settlement is made, the Assembly will not act in respect to making a resolution that they will not recognize any situation or settlement which is in violation of the existing treaties.

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: Well, now, look at my Borah letter. You have got it—you see what the thing is.

Mr. Wilson: There is one other point. Matsudaira has not yet received definite instructions from his Government. There are, therefore, three hypotheses which you might contemplate: (1) that he will be instructed to accept for Japan; (2) that he will be without instructions but will be willing to transmit the proposal; and (3) that he will be instructed to decline the proposal. Under the third assumption, you would not want the United States to be associated?

Secretary: No, no.

Mr. Wilson: Just a minute, sir. Yen called this afternoon to see me, and he told me that he would be entirely satisfied with the proposed arrangement if we expressed ourselves satisfied, I spoke, of course, to Sir John Simon regarding it.

Secretary: We can’t tell until we see what the proposals are.

Mr. Wilson: He is entirely trusting that if we come in with this, he will be reassured.

Secretary: He means any proposals in these original letters that we are discussing now.

Mr. Wilson: No, he means this idea of the Council putting it up.

Secretary: I know what you mean. That is what I mean. But the real trouble will come at Shanghai and I can’t pass on that until that comes. Do you understand?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, I won’t say a word to Yen, of course, until I hear from you again.

Secretary: All that you can assure Yen is that we see no objection to the present proposals so far as they have gone. Do you see that?

Mr. Wilson: Yes.

Secretary: The real danger of the controversy will come in the details which are to be settled at Shanghai.

Mr. Wilson: Of course. All right.

Secretary: All right. Goodbye.

15. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. Wilson in Geneva, February 28, 1932, 1:40 p.m.
16. February 27, midnight, p. 462.
17. At this point in the original memorandum, Mr. Stimson inserted the words, “safety and integrity of the”.
18. Apparently as a possible substitute for the remainder of this clause in the original, Mr. Stimson inserted the following: “maintained under arrangements which will preserve them from further danger”.