Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/4425½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁹⁹

February 24, 1932, 3:30 p.m.

Sir John: Hello, is that you Mr. Stimson?

Secretary: Yes, this is Stimson.

Sir John: This is Simon here, how are you?

Secretary: I am all right, thank you.

Sir John: I am speaking from Geneva. I wanted to report to you this. We have got a message from Shanghai which says that several of the Consuls there, yours and mine and the Italian and the French are all suggesting to their Governments that we might ask the Japanese to move their ships of war further down the River and not keep them right opposite the British and American Sectors.

Secretary: Yes, I know all about that.

Sir John: I thought you would like to know that we are making representations to that effect to Tokyo because if you were doing the same thing we could all be doing it together.

Secretary: Well, I am willing to do it provided it is made a joint matter and all of the Ambassadors go together.

Sir John: The French have already given instructions that their man is to do it when our man does it. I sent a message tonight to our Ambassador at Tokyo asking him to do it and I am just going to see Grandi and I feel pretty sure that he will also agree to give instructions.

Secretary: I do not care to do it unless you also do it and unless your Ambassador and my Ambassador do it at the same time.

Sir John: I quite see that, so if you are disposed to give instructions to your Ambassador to do it with our Ambassador why then I think it would be all right.

Secretary: Yes, I am willing to do that.

Sir John: I will tell you exactly what I have asked. I have asked first of all that they should move their men-of-war, to avoid Chinese firing into our Sectors, further down towards the other end of the Settlement because at present you see Chinese fire aimed at the Japanese ships might hit our ships and an Italian cruiser has already been hit. I don’t suggest that they should move away from the Settlement but only move from our end.

Secretary: Yes, I think that is only reasonable.

Sir John: Another thing I am asking is that if the Japanese have resolved to send any reinforcements that they should try not to land them in the Settlement but land them at the East end because the Chinese will certainly fire at any troops if they land and they really hit a lot of American buildings and women and children and men, so I sent a message which said that we have acknowledged the efforts which they have made to keep the firing away from the Settlement—we recognize that. I said that there is not any question at all of landing any further Japanese troops—we have that information—only that they land them further down.

Secretary: Are you going to make that in the form of a memorandum?

Sir John: I am merely asking my Ambassador to make representations in that sense.

Secretary: Don’t you think it would be better to have him leave a memorandum?

Sir John: Our Ambassador will get in touch with your Ambassador and will show him the form of suggestion. It is quite clear, you know, and it is really common sense.

Secretary: I have no doubt about that and I make a further suggestion, that is, that both our Ambassadors put their suggestions in the form of a memorandum. I have been much impressed by the fact that we have had a great many protests made and we have not yet had any record proof of any one of them. They have all been verbal and in case of an arbitration hereafter of any claims for damages which have been caused by the fire of the different contestants we would have no documentary proof of our protests.

Sir John: Yes.

Secretary: Do you understand that?

Sir John: We have locally delivered something in writing but I see what you mean. We will send a message to our man in Tokyo to consult with your Ambassador.

Secretary: And to leave a memorandum of it with the Foreign Office.

Sir John: I will inform him that it was your suggestion and to cooperate with your man as far as he can.

Secretary: I think it would be advisable if you made it quite clear that that is your view too.

Sir John: Of course, there is this to be borne in mind, Mr. Stimson, which is very important. I gather that there are going to be more Japanese troops landing so I am sure you will agree with me that I hope very much that if that is so that as soon as the prestige of both sides is clear we may have an opportunity jointly with the other powers of offering our good offices to stop this awful business.

Secretary: Well, Sir John, that will depend in large part upon the concerted attitude of your Government and mine and the French.

Sir John: I quite agree with you.

Secretary: And I have been rather sorry that the apparently good concert that we had in the beginning does not seem to be quite as easy now.

Sir John: I am very sorry about that too. I was hoping that you would understand that from Geneva and at your end we should be able to do something together, but never mind about that, another opportunity may arise now to do that.

Secretary: I agree with you and I will do my best to accomplish it and I suggest in this protest that there be a memorandum left by both of our Ambassadors. You can very well see that I should hardly like to leave one in writing when you did not.

Sir John: Oh, no. I will send a telegram to our man that before making representations I would be glad if he would consult your representatives and that I understand that your suggestion would be that it would be better to deliver a note from all the four powers, assuming all four can agree.

Secretary: Yes, I think that would be the best way but even if they could not agree upon a joint note if each one left a separate memorandum, provided each memorandum was in writing, it would be much better than to have the protest merely verbal.

Sir John: I told you that I spoke to the Japanese Ambassador here in Geneva, he is the Japanese Ambassador in London, I spoke to him on this and he is sending to his own Government a note about landing more troops in the British or American Sectors and he took it in very good part and is doing his best to help us.

Secretary: Yes, I know Mr. Matsudaira very well.

Sir John: Well you know he is a very good man and he was very nice about it and said he thought it, as far as he could see, a reasonable request.

Secretary: I appreciate his attitude very greatly. It is the same as the Japanese Ambassador’s here. He is very agreeable too but what I am thinking of is the record that is made in the Foreign Office at Tokyo and I think we cannot depend altogether on the attitude of the Ambassadors in London and Washington being shared by their own Government.

Sir John: That is quite true. I don’t believe myself the opportunity for our joint action to stop the thing is going to arise for a few days.

Secretary: No, I don’t think it will.

Sir John: We want to take advantage of the opportunity to keep in touch because when the time comes we want to do it together.

Secretary: May I say one more thing to you?

Sir John: Thank you very much.

Secretary: I have today made public a letter which I have written in answer to an inquiry by Senator Borah of our Senate bearing upon the Nine Power Treaty. A copy of that letter will be in the hands of Mr. Wilson today or tomorrow morning early. It was telegraphed to him this morning and I did not know you were in Geneva or I would have asked him to give you a copy, but if you see him you may ask for a copy and say I told you to over the telephone. I should be very glad to have you see it for it covers the matters I have talked with you over the telephone.

Sir John: Now, Mr. Stimson, because I am so anxious to cooperate I will send the message which I spoke of, mentioning your desire that it be done by note, to Tokyo. But, in any event, I have your authority, have I not, to ask him to get in communication with your Ambassador?

Secretary: I will cable my Ambassador to that effect.

Sir John: If our Ambassador, in view of the local situation, feels that he wants to make verbal representation I don’t think I can forbid him but I can tell him of your preference for a note and the hope that there may be joint action whatever way it is.

Secretary: I agree with that.

Sir John: I am going to be in Geneva now, I think, for quite a long time. There is a very anxious time ahead of us because on March 3rd the Assembly is going to meet, the Assembly of the League, about the Far Eastern matter and I am, of course, anxious, if I can, to get some useful intervention or something doing before that date, but there is no good doing it at the moment because if the Japanese are held up they will want to feel that they have put themselves in the position of equality.

Secretary: Yes, I understand that perfectly. But, Sir John, I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not pressing now the suggestion which I made to you a week ago. I think the occasion for that has momentarily passed by. I am not pressing that at all. I am waiting now to watch what you do. In my letter to Senator Borah I have made public my own country’s position—the position of the American Government has been made clear in this letter so that so far as we are concerned I have no anxiety about the matter that I spoke to you about ten days ago. Do you understand?

Sir John: I am not quite sure that I follow the point you are referring to.

Secretary: I say that my letter to Senator Borah has taken the place of the suggestion which I made to you about ten days ago for the action of our two Governments. My object then was to make the position of our two Governments clear as to the Nine Power Treaty. That has been done now so far as my Government is concerned by my letter to Senator Borah so that I am not pressing the suggestion I made to you at that time.

Sir John: Oh, no, I am not holding you to that at all. At the same time I hope we can keep in as close touch as we can.

Secretary: I have not changed my own position about the desirability of keeping in touch with you.

Sir John: All right, I am very much obliged to you.

Secretary: Just let me say one thing more in regard to the present proposal that you make for this action in Tokyo. I do not propose a formal note necessarily but only that the Ambassadors should leave written memoranda. There is a distinction made, I believe, in diplomatic practice between a note and a memorandum.

Sir John: Yes, I quite follow.

Secretary: I am not suggesting necessarily a formal identic note but I do think it is important that there should be written evidence of exactly what is said and I was suggesting a written memorandum for that purpose.

Sir John: I will cable our Ambassador that I understand that you are agreeable for him and your Ambassador to get in touch about what they are doing and to do it together if they can.

Secretary: That is so and I will do the same to ours.

99. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Sir John Simon in Geneva, February 24, 1932, 3:30 p.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.