793.94/4306a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton)
70. I have revised the draft Nine-Power proposal previously sent to Sir John Simon63 so that I believe it conforms entirely with his suggestions. I give you below the draft as it now stands. I send it to you in order that you may have it available in case I should hereafter ask you to deliver it or in case the occasion should arise when you in your own discretion decide that it would be useful to give it to Simon or Vansittart.
In case you should deliver it please tell them that my reasons for thinking that it is vital for them to join us in this document are as follows:
- First, the Nine-Power Treaty was a definite pledge in respect to China, setting forth a policy specifically applicable to that country and undertaken after full consideration of all the peculiarities of China’s position. In this respect it is far more potent and applicable than Article X of the Covenant of the League. It can not be brushed aside as inapplicable in the way in which Japan is already attempting to brush aside Article X.
- Second, it has been adopted by the Powers which have important specific interests in their relations to China and is not a mere covenant of general application to the world. Japan will necessarily recognize that when the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty speak, particularly in the case of Britain and America, they are not indulging in generalizations but have the intention of protecting vital specific interests. The Nine-Power Treaty will therefore obtain an attention from Japan which an invocation of Article X will not obtain.
- Third, for the same reason, the Nine-Power Treaty holds a special historical sanctity for China. The Chinese regard the Nine-Power Treaty as a codification of the principles of the Open Door policy in respect to her shelter and protection. The insistence with which her spokesmen during the past months have referred to this treaty and urged its invocation prove this. The reports which I get from our Minister to China accentuate this and make me believe that an invocation of this treaty will be the surest and perhaps the only way of making Chinese people believe in our good faith and preventing the hostile action of Japan from being followed by indiscriminate reprisals against all foreigners in China. In short, I believe that this treaty is by far our most effective weapon, both to compel the attention of [Page 384] the reckless elements in Japan, and also to protect our nationals against possible reckless manifestations of misguided nationalism in China. For the same reason, it is equally clear that an invocation of this treaty must be made by at least two of the dominant powers interested in the Yangtze Valley, namely, Britain and America.
Finally, the British Foreign Minister has repeatedly reiterated the desire of his Government to go step by step with our Government in this question. The two treaties on which this proposal is based, namely, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris are the logical and appropriate link for common action between us and Great Britain. Of these two, of course, the Nine-Power Treaty is the dominant and peculiarly pertinent one. Unless his Government is willing to walk in step with us on this proposal, all the effectiveness of his suggestion is lost.
The draft as it now stands corrected is as follows:
Introduction and Article I, no change.
Article II, second sentence, fifth word, delete “successive” and substitute words “independent but harmonious.” Otherwise Article II unchanged.
Cancel present Article III and substitute as Article III the following:
“III. The (blank) governments have already respectively made known to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments their views as to the relation between these treaties and the events which have occurred in that portion of China known as Manchuria since September 18, 1931. It is unnecessary to repeat them in this communication.”
Article IV change to read as follows:
“IV. The recent events in Shanghai seem to the (blank) governments to give full cause for the deepest apprehension of all nations which have been interested in the policy of the two treaties to which we have referred. It is unnecessary now to attempt to analyze the origin of the controversy or to apportion the blame between the two nations which unhappily are involved. For it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the covenants and the obligations of these two treaties and which is wholly abhorrent to the enlightened purpose for which they were conceived. There is now assembled in the port of Shanghai a Japanese force including over 40 vessels of war and reinforced by a large expeditionary force of land troops. The very size of such an expedition would seem not only disproportionate to its avowed objective of protecting life and property in the city of Shanghai but in itself likely to be provocative of counter-violence. Military airplanes have been bombing areas densely populated by helpless civilians of a nation with whom their operators are not ostensibly at war. Many miles away from the city where the alleged provocative violence against Japanese nationals occurred, the Japanese [Page 385] Government is now engaged in military operations on a large scale. It is inconceivable that if the spirit and purpose of these two treaties had been kept in mind and the available machinery for the peaceful solution of controversies used such a situation as now exists could have developed.”
Cancel present Article V and substitute as Article V the following:
“V. The perils to which these hostilities and violence have subjected their nationals at Shanghai have made very clear the direct and special interest of the (blank) governments and their fellow signatories and adherents in the inviolability of these treaties. In the Shanghai area, and in particular within the International Settlement, their nationals and the nationals of many nations reside and carry on their legitimate pursuits in conformity with their recognized rights. By many years of effort, acting in common cause, and under the authority of treaties and agreements with China the first of which were made nearly a century ago, they have developed a well ordered community in which they and their families could safely make their homes and carry on their affairs. They are in no way responsible for the perilous situation which has arisen. Their Governments are at peace with China. Nevertheless and in spite of repeated protests, the International Settlement has been used as a base for the furtherance of these hostilities against China; large numbers of troops and munitions of war have been landed in the Settlement for use in extensive military operations; and serious destruction to life and property has occurred within the Settlements as a result of violent encounters in the streets, bombs dropped from aeroplanes, falling shells and fires ignited in the course of operations.”
Article VI change to read as follows:
“VI. The (blank) governments avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the terms of Article VII of the Nine-Power Treaty to express frankly and without reserve their views upon these occurrences in China in order that there may be no misunderstanding. They do not believe that such a situation as has arisen is unavoidable, provided the covenants of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris are faithfully observed by those who have covenanted to observe them. They are unwilling to consent that the enlightened policy which has heretofore marked the efforts of the nations of the earth towards China and towards each other should be repudiated or be abandoned. They have a legitimate concern, in view of their treaty rights and obligations, in any negotiations whereby those rights and obligations and the policies which they represent may be affected. It is their belief that if the covenants and policies of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris be allowed to be set at naught the loss to all the nations of the world will be immeasurable. For this reason they notify their fellow signatories and adherents to those treaties that they for themselves and each of them do not propose to recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, arrangement or situation which may be entered into or created in China by means of acts or policies which are in violation of the covenants of those treaties.”
- See telegram No. 11, February 12, 1932, 2 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 80.↩