Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/4192½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁴³

February 15, 1932, 11 a.m.

Sir John: Hello, Mr. Stimson, this is Sir John speaking from London.

Secretary: Hello, Sir John.

Sir John: I saw the Prime Minister this morning. I sent him your document⁴⁴ and he studied it. As I told you when I spoke last with you we want to keep step by step with you all the time.

Secretary: This document was intended merely to indicate to you how our minds were working on this Nine-Power Pact.

Sir John: I want to say this first. I am going to see the Prime Minister again this afternoon, after this first talk, with several others of our Cabinet and I rang you up tonight to learn your present view so that I might, if you agreed, have another talk with you later in the day because we want to report to you our own view after we have heard your view.

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: There is just this I might say at once. We are quite resolved to go hand in hand with you if you take this step but we rather think that the best hope will be for us to get the League of Nations to take a similar sort of step at about the same time.

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: Because that will make a world statement.

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: This is how we feel about it at the moment. Would you like to tell me your present state of mind?

Secretary: I would like to know first, if I may, when you say this step——you are speaking now of the lines which we suggested in this paper which I sent you.

Sir John: Yes. Recalling the nature of the international obligations as time goes on and putting on record that we will not accept changes which are brought about in defiance of those obligations.

Secretary: This is precisely what I wanted to know. That is what the President and I and all my staff here think that it is very important that such a notice should be given that we do not accept these changes. The President feels very strongly that that is a significant advance in the international situation made by our new peace treaties. That it is, in other words, one of the best things that we can do in the absence of force. Do you see?

Sir John: That is right.

Secretary: And he regards it, that particular point, namely, the giving notice that we shall not accept in the future changes which come from a violation of that treaty or of the treaties in question, the two treaties in this case.

Sir John: The Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact.

Secretary: He thinks that is of great importance.

Sir John: Might I break in here? I can take the same line as a member of the League under Article X. Article X says that every member of the League undertakes to preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other members of the League. So in the same way we can say that it is our friendly right to direct attention to that Article, and the territorial integrity or no change in the political independence of any member of the League, ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by the League of Nations.

Secretary: That would not prevent you from taking the same position under the Nine-Power Pact and the Pact of Paris.

Sir John: The Council of the League has something such as I suggested to you—it is side by side with what you are saying.

Secretary: But you can also join with what we are saying.

Sir John: That is what I would like to do if it is about the same time.

Secretary: I see, but what I mean is your protest or declaration will be based upon the same legal treaties that ours will.

Sir John: Exactly.

Secretary: However, you will, either in your paper or in another one which you execute with the League, take the additional position in regard to Article X.

Sir John: That is the idea.

Secretary: I see no objection to that.

Sir John: Whether or not we actually join you in your declaration or press on the members of the League to make a League declaration won’t matter so much as long as we do it together.

Secretary: So long as in your declaration you also cover the Nine-Power Treaty.

Sir John: I don’t mind doing that at all.

Secretary: Well, may I just say one thing. I think that my own first reaction to this is that it would be better for you to join in the two separate actions taken at the same time.

Sir John: To do both.

Secretary: To do both, provided we do it at the same time.

Sir John: I will discuss that with my colleagues later in the day.

Secretary: I think there is a great advantage in having you side by side with us as well as side by side with the League.

Sir John: The only thing I have to be careful of is I must not seem to desert the Council of the League, but I don’t mind doing it so far as I am concerned.

Secretary: That is exactly what I am driving at and on my part I don’t mind holding back a little while in order to give you time to get the League in action with us.

Sir John: That is what I was going to say next. Of course, I have to see what my colleagues have to say about it.

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: I will go back to Geneva quite soon to try and get this done if our general arrangements were agreed.

Secretary: The only danger that I see is in the length of time that it might take to get it through the League.

Sir John: I don’t think it would take very long after I got there. It is very probable that we could get something done this week.

Secretary: You think you could?

Sir John: I think I could, yes.

Secretary: Well, I think it is very important.

Sir John: So do I because my information is, since the landing of these additional troops in the Settlement, the situation is distinctly hard.

Secretary: It has hardened here in that respect and I was going to speak to you about that. I was going to suggest an additional point to the declaration which we made and of which I send you a draft. I was going to suggest that we might insert in that in addition to the general interest in [sic] which we all have in the Nine-Power Pact and the Pact of Paris which is set out in the present paper. We might add a paragraph showing how we have a special interest which is being violated at the present time as a result of the violation of the other two treaties, namely, the war measures which have been produced during the present Shanghai trouble has [have] resulted in bringing into danger all our special rights and interests in the International Settlement by the fact that that has been used as a base.

Sir John: There is one point I would like you, if you will, to keep just a little open because I am not sure that we think the method is quite the same as you do.

Secretary: I am ready to keep an open mind on that.

Sir John: This is the point on which I should like you to reserve your judgment a bit. We want to produce the maximum influence on Japan to get the best results. Some of my colleagues think we might produce very great results if we direct ourselves to the Shanghai and Yangtze Valley question but if we tie this all up with Manchuria we shall get no satisfaction in Shanghai because of the view of Japan about Manchuria. I am not overlooking Manchuria as we have made protests to Japan the same as you, only in a different way, but if we want to produce the best results quickly in Shanghai, is it not [sic] a good plan to tell them that it depends on Manchuria?

Secretary: I didn’t intend to tell them that. What I wanted to do was to take a position which would not waive Manchuria. I don’t think we ought to allow ourselves to get into a position which would give anybody the right to say that we had accepted the Japanese contention that Manchuria was entirely different from the Nine-Power Treaty.

Sir John: American [America?] has already made reservations about that and I have already spoken to the Japanese Ambassador in the same sense. I suggest making the present document one which deals especially with the developments which have followed not excepting the other, but especially directed to the Shanghai situation.

Secretary: All I can say is that I will approach with a perfectly fair and open mind whatever you want to suggest on that.

Sir John: I see. We have been in touch with Atherton. Will you send to him any revised draft?

Secretary: Not yet, I wanted your reaction on that.

Sir John: I will see the Prime Minister and my colleagues in about an hour’s time. When may I ring up again conveniently for you? How many hours from now? Would it be convenient if I rang you up two hours and a quarter from now, about 6:30?

Secretary: I will make it convenient, it will be 1:30 here.

Sir John: I will ring you up and tell you what is the result of our consultation and if you think it a good plan, I am quite prepared to try to arrange to go back to Geneva say on Wednesday and get hold of these people and try to carry something on by the end of the week.

Secretary: The only things that occur to me are these that I would like you to consider. These people are on the brink, the possible brink, of a big battle.

Sir John: That is a good reason for getting it out quickly.

Secretary: Yes, that battle is going to be fought from the International Settlement as a base.

Sir John: I am afraid so.

Secretary: And if there is, there will be a great possibility of trouble both during the battle and in the after effects. Do you think that our legal position as to protest is sufficiently clear now?

Sir John: I don’t quite get that.

Secretary: I mean that protests have been made. I am just thinking aloud. Now we have made a protest in Shanghai, several of them,⁴⁵ and a long time ago in the very beginning you made a protest in Tokyo and we followed it up.

Sir John: Three times.

Secretary: Yes, three times. I think that so far as the legal point is concerned it is clear, but there is no doubt that they have greatly accentuated the situation by their disregard of our protests since. They have been as flagrantly violative of our rights as they very well could be.

Sir John: They have not paid the slightest attention to them. But I feel with you that there is going to be more trouble and perhaps fighting and if we made our protest with the League of Nations and yourself we ought to do it pretty quickly.

Secretary: Well, the only thing that came into my mind while we were speaking was this. You are going to delay for four or five days before anything is done. I wondered whether the situation might not be helped if a joint protest might be made on the subject of the Settlement as a base by the four powers interested there.

Sir John: I am thoroughly prepared, if you like, to go into this.

Secretary: I don’t want to press it myself but I would like to have it considered and I don’t want to take the initiative if it requires much initiative on the part of this country.

Sir John: We have made protests countless times so it would merely be in the nature of a repetition but I am not disagreeing.

Secretary: I suggest you talk that over with your colleagues and report to me two hours from now what you think.

Sir John: What do you think you will do—do you think you will send a revised copy of your document to Atherton?

Secretary: Suppose you send me your views. Take my draft and make a draft of your own upon the lines that you now think and send it to me.

Sir John: Shall I send it to Mr. Atherton and have him send it to you?

Secretary: Either through him or through your Ambassador here.

Sir John: I am extremely pleased that we are in such good touch. The Prime Minister from his bed this morning sent you a message to say how much he appreciated your last letter. He is feeling better but will have to take three weeks complete holiday.

Secretary: Atherton told me about that, and I was very much worried. I am glad to have him have the holiday but I wanted him to feel all right.

Sir John: If you would like to speak to Atherton, he is here at my side.

Secretary: No, that is all right. Is it understood then that you will make a draft indicating your present ideas?

Sir John: That is right, and if we have any comments you will hear the results. If we can get the League of Nations to do the same, I will let you know.

Secretary: You will start this draft before you go away to Geneva Wednesday?

Sir John: Oh, yes.

Secretary: Because I think we ought to work very fast and I hope—let me say this in all the confidence of the telephone—that your draft won’t be too damned friendly.

43. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Sir John Simon in London, February 15, 1932, 11 a.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.
44. The draft quoted in telegram No. 11, February 12, 1932, 2 p.m., to the Minister in Switzerland, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 80.
45. For latest protest, see telegram No. 48, February 14, 1932, noon, from the Consul General at Shanghai, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 192.