793.94/4567
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 4.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that recent Japanese naval (and military) action at Shanghai would seem to differ radically in certain aspects from the Japanese military action in Manchuria since September 18th and that this difference appears to be reflected in the attitude of the Japanese public.
For some days following reports of Sino-Japanese fighting at Shanghai, many Japanese and foreigners at Tokyo were apprehensive that the Japanese navy had embarked on an ambitious offensive in China Proper comparable in scale to and perhaps imitative of the comprehensive strategy of the Japanese military in Manchuria. It is not unnatural that the combination of lack of adequate information and the recent example of the Japanese military in Manchuria should create the fear that the navy had been infected by the military’s enthusiasm for conquest, despite the fact that it had always been regarded as the more tactful of the two. With recent comprehension that the civil government can be disregarded with impunity, the fear was not uncommon that the Navy, perhaps instigated by the ambitious army, would not stop short of aggression which might precipitate an international conflict. The appointment of Prince Fushimi, of the Imperial Family,—following closely the appointment of Prince Kanin as Chief of the Army General Staff—seemed to give another reason for such fear.
Within the last few days, however, apprehension seems distinctly to have lessened. The feeling seems to be that the Navy has not “broken loose”, as did the army; that the navy was more or less forced upon its present course of action by insistence on the part of the Japanese civilian population at Shanghai, supported—some think—by important traders of the Osaka district who have been gravely affected by the boycott. It is more widely felt now that the real object of the navy has been the separation of Chinese officials from this boycott movement [Page 326] and an improvement of the situation of Japanese residents in the Shanghai area. If there are other aims, resembling in character those of the army in Manchuria, they are not yet evident here. There is apparently no parallel in the navy to the usurpation of control in the army by junior officers; naval affairs, it is believed, are directed by those officers invested with the right of direction of operations. The first fear that the action of the navy resulted from pressure brought to bear upon it by the army seems now to have been dissipated. The appointment of Prince Fushimi as Chief of the Navy General Staff may have had no more significance than preparation for possible eventualities which might arise but for which the navy did not plot, whereas the appointment of Prince Kanin seems to have been in preparation for eventualities which the army was determined to effect, the first of these having been the occupation of Chinchow.
There are a number of reasons why the action of the Navy at Shanghai has not aroused as widespread enthusiasm as the Manchurian adventure did and has seemed to create misgiving in a larger section of the Japanese public. The peculiar traditional attitude of the Japanese toward Manchuria as of vital economic importance to Japan’s very existence does not extend to China Proper. A growing realization of the financial obligations, which military action in Manchuria has entailed, may have brought quicker realization to a part of the public that the Shanghai situation is adding to the financial burden. The Manchurian affair evoked in a large section of the public a pleasant dream of empire which is absent from the Shanghai incident. Belief in any permanent success in China Proper—other than what may affect Japanese residents there and trade—is much less widespread in the present instance. The initial absence of understanding of the reasons for the naval action at Shanghai, as well as some realization of possible international implications, may also have had its effect. A clearer understanding seems to have been largely brought about by the official explanation published in the press on February 8th, a copy of which is enclosed.39
The editorials of the press reflect the comparative lack of enthusiasm on the part of the public. For a period of ten days, from February third, only eighteen editorials on the subject of the Shanghai situation have appeared in the fifty editions published during that time by the five leading Japanese Tokyo dailies. One third of this number appeared in the Tokyo Asahi, which may be due to the fact that this paper is under the same management as the Osaka Asahi, a large part [Page 327] of whose readers are vitally interested in trade with China. The tone of the editorials is more moderate than might have been expected.
Brief résumés of these editorials were transmitted to the Department in my telegrams Nos. 38, 40, 45, 52, and 60.40
Respectfully yours,
- For text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 186.↩
- None printed.↩