793.94/3503: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 13—12:25 p.m.]
65. The newspapers indicate that General McCoy has agreed to serve on the committee which the League is sending to Manchuria to make an investigation. I desire to place in the hands of the Department the following appreciation of the situation for such use as the Department cares to make of it.
The Japanese by force of arms have now occupied all important places in Manchuria and are in control of all means of communications. They have also obtained control over the administration of Manchuria which is being maintained through Chinese organizations almost completely in the hands of Japanese advisers. So far as I know there is no communication between authorities in China south of the Wall and authorities in Manchuria. It is still uncertain whether the Japanese will push their line as far west as Jehol. To all intents and purposes Manchuria, from Shanhaikwan to Tsitsihar, and from Tsitsihar to Harbin, and from Harbin to Tumen, and the area bounded by these places, is as separated from China and Chinese control as is Formosa.
This occupation began on September 18th when the Japanese announced that it was necessary to obtain a settlement of outstanding questions with China and to secure protection for Japanese interests and property.
I am more and more convinced that Japanese activities in Manchuria must be viewed in the light of Russo-Japanese relations rather than Sino-Japanese relations. It would appear that the Japanese Government made a careful survey of conditions in China last summer and reached the conclusion that China was disintegrating, that Chinese leadership was losing its prestige, and that the Kuomintang was no longer powerful. The Japanese Government apparently believed that Chang Hsueh-liang would not receive support from the government south of the Wall if attacked. With this knowledge and the belief that the powers were preoccupied with domestic troubles due to world-wide depression and that Soviet Russia was in no position to take action, the higher military authorities of Japan concluded that it was their opportunity to act in Manchuria and push Japan’s strategic [Page 27] boundary further west in preparation for the clash with Soviet Russia which they considered inevitable.
I am convinced there can be no settlement of the questions which have arisen in Manchuria that does not take into consideration the interests of China, Russia and Japan. China is too weak to maintain her sovereignty in Manchuria and is unable to maintain, as between Russia and Japan, the neutrality of Manchuria which lies between these two countries, both vitally interested in that area. No solution which does not take into consideration the interests of all three can be permanent. Unfortunately there is no government in China or group of leaders willing to face these problems honestly and take responsibility for their settlement for, being unable to maintain her position in Manchuria by force, China would have to accept a settlement which must impair her sovereignty there.
Nothing short of outside force or an economic collapse at home will persuade Japan to retire from her present position, it is my conviction.
It seems to me that the above considerations must be taken into account in connection with any investigation by the commission which is about to visit Manchuria or when considering the advisability of calling a conference under the Nine-Power Treaty for the purpose of finding a settlement of the Manchurian problem.