793.94/4131½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation3

Secretary: Hello, is that you, Sir John?

Sir John: Hello, Mr. Stimson.

Secretary: I have a good deal to say to you if I may.

Sir John: Yes, I will just repeat it to be sure I get it right.

Secretary: I will go back to our last conversation last Saturday4 when there was being proposed or suggested that the Japanese had a proposal for us. I heard of that from Tokyo as I told you. Apparently that has not eventualized.

Sir John: No, I made inquiries and we didn’t receive at London anything such as you had spoken of.

Secretary: The occurrences since have indicated that no such suggestion is being made or likely to be made. In fact, the Japanese have made a suggestion which would be contrary to an ordinary truce. They have made a suggestion that the Chinese should retire twenty miles while they stood still.

Sir John: I will tell you about my information. I heard the same suggestion and I told the Japanese delegate here, who is the Japanese Ambassador in London, an hour ago that it appeared to me that that was not a reasonable proposal at all.

Secretary: We have so telegraphed our representatives in China—in Shanghai.

Sir John: The American Consul General?

Secretary: Yes, telling him that that was so far from a fair proposal that we could not afford to participate in it or in urging it upon the Chinese.

Sir John: Yes, I think so too.

The Japanese Ambassador an hour ago, when I said that I thought it was rather unreasonable, suggested to me that possibly the representatives of the powers in Shanghai would themselves make a suggestion as to what would be reasonable.

Secretary: For my part, I should be unwilling to do so. I do not [Page 279] think that the actual occurrences in Shanghai indicate that any such proposal is being asked for by the Japanese Government or is desired by it in good faith.

Sir John: You don’t think they are in good faith?

Secretary: They are making all arrangements for a large battle.

Sir John: Your idea is like mine, that they had a quite unexpected set back.

Secretary: Yes, and they are landing a large expeditionary force and are making every evidence of an intention to go through with it. I have come to the conclusion, reluctantly, that there is no further opportunity—

Sir John: Up to the present, they have landed four thousand military forces—soldiers—at Woosung. They are not making much progress.

Secretary: No, but the evidence is pretty clear that a very large force is on its way from Japan.

Sir John: Having put their marines into this difficulty and being held up by the Chinese, I have no doubt that the Japanese feel that they can’t leave things as they are.

Secretary: I think that is the case and they have made up their minds to go on and punish the Chinese until they recover their prestige.

Sir John: It would be very dangerous for a settlement if the Chinese came rushing after them.

Secretary: Yes, but there are other ways of stopping the Chinese, provided the Japanese did not provoke them, but let us not go into that.

Sir John: Yes, I see what you mean.

Secretary: That situation, in my opinion, no longer exists. I think there is no further opportunity for conciliation. I think that a battle is going on. That, I think, is probably the situation in the very immediate future.

Sir John: Well, of course, your inference is right about the truce and I certainly believe with you that Japan would never leave things as they are. Probably it would not be safe for her to do so for her marines are not in a very good situation, don’t you think so?

Secretary: Yes, I do. I think she has, however, shown herself in the wrong in doing so.

Sir John: She is in the wrong in putting herself in that position. Her first step was wrong and, the taking of a second step on the other hand, I am advised from Shanghai that certainly if the Chinese would push these Japanese back there might be a very grave situation in the Settlement.

Secretary: I think that is probably under the influence of local conditions. There is a very difficult situation there, I think.

[Page 280]

Sir John: Have you any information from your man there?

Secretary: No, I have not heard any evidences of cold feet from our people. They recognize that there is a difficult situation, a very difficult one full of danger.

Sir John: Now, how many American marines are there at Shanghai?

Secretary: About three thousand.

Sir John: Yes, I see. We have got a very considerable force there and there is ten thousand—

Secretary: What’s that?

Sir John: I think our international force is about ten thousand; the French have at least five thousand and the Italians have a few, but I should say it was a little over ten thousand.

Secretary: I have heard of the advice that you received from your local authorities and I have been rather inclined to think it was a little bit influenced either by pro-Japanese argument or by a little timidity of the situation which was confronting them.

Sir John: You may be right. We have our Ambassador going down to Shanghai as I want to have the best man on the spot.

Secretary: Mine arrives there from Nanking. He is arriving at the same time that Lampson is.

Sir John: That is good. I am sending a message to our Ambassador to give me an explanation of the situation at Shanghai as soon as he gets there and I will communicate with you in order to give you his views so that we can both deal with them.

Secretary: Well, now, I am very anxious to communicate with you and see how our minds are working now. We think there is no use of any further steps for immediate peace making, so far as we can see, between the two forces. Therefore, if anybody else wants to go ahead on that line we don’t want to interfere with them.

Sir John: But you don’t think there is much opportunity now.

Secretary: Well, what I was going on to say is that I think it is time to think very carefully about the long distant future.

Sir John: I quite agree with you; I have been thinking about it all the time.

Secretary: That is exactly what I want to see whether your opinion is along the same line as mine. Our view now is that there is being made a very serious attack upon the treaty policy in respect to China, which we all agreed upon ten years ago in the Nine-Power Treaty. We think that not only are the present acts which are taking place in Shanghai a direct attack on Chinese sovereignty and that they create a situation of very great danger in China by that attack, but there have been—

[Page 281]

Sir John: Are you thinking of Article 7?

Secretary: Yes, but let me go on. In addition to these acts of force, there have come from the Japanese Foreign Office direct suggestions that the treaty is obsolete and should be amended or abolished, and that China should be begun to be dismembered again by creating demilitarized zones, as they call it, around all of the commercial cities of China.

Sir John: Let me see if I got that right. You say there has come to your ears—

Secretary: It has come directly from the Foreign Office in Tokyo by a statement made to the press from that office.

Sir John: You regard that as indicating that Japan desires to change the régime.

Secretary: He said so to me. Now one further thing. The refusal of our point five in our good offices to allow any neutral nation to participate in any matter concerning Manchuria, even if that nation was a member of the Five-Power Treaty, is in itself a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty which gives to all of the nine powers a right to communicate and to discuss matters of that sort which relate to China. I mean, in other words, all of these points do not stand alone, but they indicate a consecutive and deliberate purpose which is in direct contradiction with the purpose of the Nine-Power Treaty.

Sir John: Yes.

Secretary: Now, I am considering carefully and I want you to consider carefully, because as we have said right along we want to act step by step with you, whether the time hasn’t come for your nation and mine, and such others as may wish to join us, to make a record of these facts and make a frank statement in the language of Article 7 of that Treaty, and our idea would be to wind up by a statement somewhat such as I made in regard to Manchuria on January 7th, that, for ourselves, we do not propose to recognize or rather to change our view as to the treaty or to recognize any steps which are an infringement on the policy which we then agreed to.

Sir John: I see. I have heard from London that Sir Ronald Lindsay told our people that you had this in mind but, of course, I did not get it so fully as I have it in mind now with reference to the present proceedings at Shanghai.

Secretary: I can perhaps make it clearer to you by telling you what I am hearing from our Minister in Nanking, on the way to Shanghai now. Our Minister has telegraphed me very fully about the effect which this whole situation, including the purpose for these demilitarized zones,—this dismemberment proposition which I call it—is having in China.

Sir John: That is your Minister, is it?

[Page 282]

Secretary: That is our Minister in China. I will read you a couple of sentences from what he has cabled me. Will you listen? He said that the situation of Americans in China would be made dangerous in the extreme should the Chinese army get it into their heads that we were assisting the Japanese in their attacks upon it.

Sir John: Would you mind repeating that?

Secretary: Well, I shall give you the sense of it. He telegraphed me that the situation of Americans in China is being made very dangerous by the fear that America may be joining with Japan in these attacks and he says he thinks the time is getting ripe for another disaster like the Boxer Rebellion, unless we go very carefully in regard to the situation, and he points out these suggestions coming from Japan in regard to the Nine-Power Treaty as conditions which are making trouble in China. Do you see?

Sir John: I haven’t quite got that last?

Secretary: Our Minister suggests that all of these successive steps which Japan has taken are producing a very dubious frame of mind on the part of the Chinese people and that if we should not protest against it and should do anything which led the Chinese to think we were in sympathy with Japan, it would be likely to make a rebellion in China against all foreigners, like the Boxer Rebellion. Therefore, there is that direct advice as to the propriety of taking such steps as I have brought to your consideration.

Sir John: I see that.

Secretary: Now, when are you going to London?

Sir John: I am not going to London until Saturday.5 Lampson will be in Shanghai tomorrow.

As you agree, I will communicate that in principle to London, Mr. Stimson, subject to thinking it over. You will find, I believe, that the British Government will be glad to stand side by side with you. Our interests are essentially the same and—

Secretary: Yes, our interests are essentially the same and, in any case, we desire to remain firm on the Nine-Power Treaty. That is the situation. That is my first impression, you understand?

Sir John: I understand and I am not asking for any more than your first impression because that is the point I am interested in. The reason I am really anxious is because the first step taken by Japan in Shanghai ought to be called a wrong step and I really can’t see, now that she has taken it, how she can avoid taking the second step and, at present, I don’t believe she is in a position to take any other course than to bring in troops in order to correct the very bad mistake she has made.

[Page 283]

Secretary: Yes. Well, now, just let me make a suggestion to think over in consideration with that. Before you decide that that is really so, remember that China accepted our offer of good offices entirely and we have no evidence to make us believe that, if Japan had accepted it also, we could not have produced a cessation of hostilities at that time and place which would have extricated Japanese marines.

Sir John: I am particularly anxious, for many reasons, that our two Governments should go hand in hand about this. I am very anxious that it be so. I will, therefore, communicate as I told you. Shall I ring you up or will you ring me up?

Secretary: Suppose you ring me up. We are here altogether and we will be going on with our views. As soon as you make up your mind in regard to it, if you look upon it favorably, we can go into the details and telegraph the details on paper.

Sir John: You see here, at Geneva, the Council of the League is very much concerned as to what to do. There was a meeting of the Council yesterday, when the Chinese and Japanese first made statements. There is no point in going on adjourning and adjourning, and I have told the Council that effort was being made by the British Government to take action to stop this and that we have tried, as far as we could, in the Shanghai business to act with America. It is, of course, a very grave situation to the Council there because they have not got America in their discussions.

Secretary: That is the reason, Sir John, I told you in the very beginning that I had reached the conclusion that every step that we have taken towards conciliation is ended now and I cannot see any particular use in taking any new one, but I did not want to be in any way intentionally or unintentionally a stumbling block in the path of anybody else, like the League, who might want to do something else.

Sir John: I understand perfectly and I shall let you know what takes place. It is an extremely anxious situation from the foreign point of view to British interests because the main British interest in the East is peace.

Secretary: The step which I am now thinking of, and which I have brought to your consideration, is a step which in no way would interfere with any proceeding by the Council of the League.

Sir John: They, on the contrary, would be extremely grateful I am sure.

Secretary: It would not interfere in any way at all so far as I can see.

Sir John: I shall communicate with my own people in London and will ring you up. Shall I ring you up at this time tomorrow?

Secretary: Yes, this is a good time.

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Sir John: It is five o’clock here but I suppose it is about eleven or twelve your time.6

Secretary: Either hour is a perfectly good time.

Sir John: Supposing I say I will call you up at five o’clock tomorrow?

Secretary: All right.

  1. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Sir John Simon in Geneva, February 11, 1932, 10:45 a.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.
  2. February 6.
  3. February 13.
  4. See memorandum of telephone conversation, February 12, 11 a.m., p. 294.