793.94/4138
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle)
The Japanese Ambassador came in to say that he was very much disturbed at the reports which were evidently true of the despatch of [Page 218] a division to Shanghai. He said that he had told the Secretary he did not think this would be done57 and intimated that he was afraid we would feel he had been trying to mislead us. I told him that we had no such idea, that we knew that he was not being kept closely informed and that, in any case, military movements were generally kept secret. I told him that, under no circumstances, to get the idea that we thought he was trying intentionally to mislead us.
He then asked if I knew from where the Division was supposed to embark. I told him that apparently it had already embarked as some soldiers, it was reported, had reached Woosung and the rest were to arrive on Saturday morning, that I supposed they had embarked from Kyushu. He said he hoped this was the case as this meant only 24 hours from Shanghai and meant no troops had embarked at the time Mr. Yoshizawa saw the Ambassadors, but that he still found it impossible to believe that his Government would actually have sent troops after asking for good offices. The Ambassador then went on to say that he had seen a story in the evening papers that the Emperor had ordered general mobilization. He asked me whether we had heard anything about this as he had had no suggestion of it. I told him we had not had any definite news, but that we had heard rumors and this disturbed him greatly because he said he could see no possible reason for such a tremendous move. He asked whether I had any idea why if this was being done it should be done. I told him that naturally I had no idea, but that I had been forced to jump to the conclusion that it might mean a very serious condition in Japan and that mobilization was considered necessary to prevent revolution. He said that this had been his own idea and that he was very greatly worried. He said that the situation in Japan was tense, that the elections were coming, that a tremendous amount of propaganda of all kinds was going on and that he felt that such a move could only mean the situation was far more serious than he had thought.
The Ambassador was very pathetic and for the first time spoke of my own interest in Japan and said that he hoped I would not lose all confidence in the people of his country. I told him that I had many friends in Japan, friends for whom I had the highest respect and admiration, that the present situation as it was developing made me very sad in that I felt something must be seriously wrong when the military could be permitted to act in the totally indefensible manner they had been acting recently. He said he knew this must be my answer and that, of course, he had no excuses to offer.
- See memorandum by the Secretary of State, February 3, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 177.↩