Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/3786½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation¹⁶

February 1, 1932, 12:30 p.m.

Sir John: Is that you, Mr. Secretary, it is nice to hear your voice.

Secretary: It is nice to hear you too.

Sir John: I am fully in touch with your conversations this afternoon with the Prime Minister and he asked me to ring you up now about these proposed terms by the Powers. May I just make one or two verbal suggestions first?

Secretary: I should welcome them.

Sir John: I will then tell you what our time table will be to carry them out.

First, probably number one would run better if we added at the end “forthwith on the following terms” so that one would read “cessation of all active violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms”.

Secretary: Then it modifies the following points. There is one error there from the telephone message. Our proposal says “all acts of violence”.

Sir John: We got your words wrong. I have got it right now. “Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms.” We thought you would want to say that the cessation of all acts of violence was to be stipulated for on the following terms.

Secretary: Go on, Sir John, I see your point.

Sir John: No further mobilization or preparation for further hostilities.

Secretary: Between the two nations.

Sir John: As you like.

Secretary: Those words had this import that they were intended to be general and not applied to the Shanghai area alone.

Sir John: That is just what we wanted to raise. Then you are stipulating for everything in Manchuria?

Secretary: No, I meant any mobilization or preparation outside of Shanghai or the forces there.

Sir John: It would be very difficult to stipulate in this connection, would it not, that there is to be a complete hold-up of all movement in Manchuria?

Secretary: I think that would be true.

Sir John: Well then, how do you propose to limit that?

Secretary: I do think this should cover any preparation or mobilization for further hostilities no matter where that mobilization or further hostilities took place. I mean there should be a stoppage at once of any expeditionary force from Japan and a stoppage of the Chinese further movements from Nanking.

Sir John: Do you insert the words at the end “between the two nations”?

Secretary: That was intended for that purpose.

Sir John: You see it appears to us that if the whole thing is described as terms proposed by the Powers for cessation then your second point will mean what you intend it to mean and it won’t be understood to apply to Manchuria.

Secretary: I get your point and I would like to consider that. I think that perhaps by putting in the words “no further mobilization or preparation whatever for further hostilities”—

Sir John: Put in the word “whatever” after [“]preparation[”]?

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: In three, we don’t want to alter it at all. I will read my words here as taken from yours. Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area.” That means either Japanese or Chinese irregulars.

Secretary: I mean all combatant forces. That is a good correction.

Sir John: That would include the irregulars.

Secretary: Yes, that would include the irregulars but I want to be sure that it does.

Sir John: For the moment I suggest this. Number Four. The Prime Minister spoke to you about where the neutral zones were to be. We have had a great deal of consultation about that during the last two days with people who know Shanghai very well; some of our soldiers know the city of Shanghai very well and we understand your meaning quite clearly. We suggest it be put like this.

Secretary: I will take it down.

Sir John: Number Four. Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants. This will cover the point mentioned this afternoon that may be just outside the International Settlement or possibly the neutral zone may run along the boundary, but we can’t decide these details ourselves.

Secretary: I approve that, but you have not yet covered the defense of those neutral zones.

Sir John: The arrangements are to be left to the Consular authorities.

Secretary: I don’t care to go into the details necessarily of that, except those zones are to be policed by neutrals, thereby excluding both the Japanese and Chinese.

Sir John: Yes, the arrangements can be set up by the Consular authorities.

Secretary: I don’t insist on those last words but I am thinking them over afterwards; those were made in a hurry. It may be not only by the Consular authorities but by the military commanders of those neutral zones.

Sir John: I thought of the same thing; that our own Consul General will know what has been done and he has been in consultation with your man and they have been in consultation with the General commanding all the way through.

Secretary: I suggest in view of that, that the last sentence read like this. “These zones to be policed by neutrals.”

Sir John: Don’t you think we could make some indication that the plan is to be worked out locally and then it seems to me, if I may suggest it, that you might send instructions in connection with this to your Consul General to consult with the other Consuls and the local commanders.

Secretary: Then you are willing so far as you are concerned to leave it as it was.

Sir John: I am perfectly willing to leave it as it was.

Number Five is necessarily a little vague but I don’t think we can improve it and we accept your five as it stands. We think it is very good.

Secretary: It was intended to cover both the Pact of Paris and also not to give offense or to seem to supersede the League by leaving in the resolution of December 9.

Sir John: I think it is very good.

Secretary: You can act on it.

Sir John: May I just read to you, for safety’s sake, how I have it now? “Terms proposed by the Powers for cessation of conflict at Shanghai.”

Secretary: Will you now read the five points as they now stand?

Sir John: Number One. “Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms.”

Number Two. “No further mobilization or preparation whatever for further hostilities between the two nations.”

Number Three. “Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area.”

Number Four. “Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants; these zones to be policed by neutrals; the arrangements to be set up by the Consular authorities.”

Number Five. “Upon acceptance of these conditions prompt advances to be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the resolution of the League of Nations of December 9, without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers or participants.”

(The President and the Secretary confer with each other here and are overheard by Sir John.)

Sir John: May I tell you my suggestion, kind people, what we should do?

Secretary: Wait a moment before we go any further, Sir John. We have some news that there has been firing at Nanking.

Sir John: We have the same news now.

Secretary: There must be a provision in here that makes it perfectly clear that the acts of violence include such matters as that as well as—

Sir John: I am afraid I think there is a deliberate plan on foot.

Secretary: What I mean is this. If you exclude Manchuria you must make sure you do not exclude the Upper Yangtze River.

Sir John: I think that is perfectly true.

Secretary: The trouble comes mainly from the heading that you have just read to me. “Terms proposed by the Powers for the cessation of conflict at Shanghai.” Leave off the words “at Shanghai”.

Sir John: “For the cessation of conflict.”

Secretary: Yes.

Sir John: We decided to strike out the name of Shanghai or [and not?] put in extra words like [“]the Upper Yangtze Valley[”] because of Chefoo, Swatow and other coast cities. We can’t negotiate a truce for only a part of it.

Secretary: I am inclined to think you are right in excluding Manchuria where there is a special situation but in other respects it must be general.

Sir John: We better not particularize too much as to place.

Secretary: I don’t think you can particularize; I think you have to leave it as general and I think we have to modify our immediate insistence. I have already acted in regard to the Nanking incident here through the Japanese Ambassador and I have sent word to-Tokyo that if they wish us to take seriously the suggestion they made yesterday they must stop it at once.¹⁷

Sir John: Having heard the news from Nanking you have taken it up with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and told him if he wanted the American Government to take seriously what the Japanese Foreign Minister said, they must stop this Nanking business at once. I quite agree with this but it looks like a very concerted plan on foot.

Secretary: There is another explanation. It is becoming very evident that the local commanders of the Japanese forces cannot be trusted to keep their heads, and it may come from that. They have done things that look to me more like the losing of the head than a concerted plan. It is just as bad one way as another.

Sir John: On these five points you notice, don’t you, Mr. Secretary, that you have the Shanghai area mentioned in point three. I suppose you want to leave it?

Secretary: Yes, because that applies to a specific condition there.

Sir John: May I tell you my suggestion? Here is what I propose to do if it agrees with you. I propose at once to telegraph these terms to our Ambassador in Tokyo and instruct him to act on them within twenty-four hours, both with the man in Tokyo and our man in China in twenty-four hours, and also to communicate them to France and Italy. Then we propose to tell our Ambassadors that they should act, if possible, with the United States and French and Italian colleagues. We shall tell our Ambassadors that we are in complete agreement with you and ask the other two Governments to agree also and, whether the other Governments agree or not, he should act with the United States colleague twenty-four hours from now. From our time it will be six o’clock in the afternoon. We propose immediately to repeat the text of what you and I have just agreed to. We understand the thing to be quite secret, as far as we are concerned, until tomorrow night at this time so that it will appear on Wednesday morning¹⁸ in the press. It would not do for it to come out before we get the answer from France and Italy.

Secretary: That would make it public Wednesday morning at your time.

Sir John: We won’t publish it until Wednesday morning and we will deliver it in Tokyo and Nanking, or wherever the Government is, twenty-four hours from now.¹⁹

Secretary: Just let me ask you a question or two about what this means at Tokyo. This means that your Ambassador and ours make representation in the same form.

Sir John: To make representation in the same form and at the same time, that is twenty-four hours from now.

Secretary: That does not mean technically joint action?

Sir John: No.

Secretary: It means concurrent action and taking it together at the same time; what we call concurrent action rather than joint action. I think that is perfectly clear, Sir John.

Sir John: I hope some good will come of it.

Secretary: I am very much obliged to you for your promptness in answering.

Sir John: At Nanking a Japanese cruiser opened fire on the City at midnight and caused great damage.

Secretary: I got word a few minutes ago, which of course is this coming night, that the Japanese vessel was continuing fire and that our own vessel there had moved to get out of the line of fire and no warning was given.

Sir John: You have a destroyer there?

Secretary: We have a destroyer there and we moved to get out of the line of fire and no warning was given of the firing.

Sir John: I have another telegram which is not official but which I think is pretty good, that the Japanese Government has indicated in Tokyo an immediate despatch of Army units to Shanghai. I am afraid I am becoming quite convinced that the Japanese Foreign Minister is impotent to control the situation and that is one of the reasons why he has asked the Powers to do what they can. Our view is, and I think it is your view too, that it is better for us to do it, to make these united appeals quickly.

Secretary: I think I agree with you. This last news about the moving of the Army units is very serious.

Sir John: Have you any news as to when your additional forces will reach Shanghai?

Secretary: No, I can’t give you our time table now, but I could get it. They have sailed and the destroyers must be there now. The cruiser was to sail yesterday, our time, and I think I have seen a cable to the effect that she has started.

Sir John: We have another battalion there now.

Secretary: It will take the Regiment two days to reach Shanghai.

Sir John: It will take the Regiment two days to reach Shanghai, I see. It looks pretty bad but let us cooperate and do the best we can.

Secretary: We will go over it and do the best we can and I am very glad that there is such good cooperation between us.

Sir John: All right, thank you very much.

Secretary: Good-bye.

16. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Sir John Simon in London, February 1, 1932, 12:30 p.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.
17. See memorandum of February 1, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 173.
18. February 3.
19. As this would be in the middle of the night in Tokyo and Nanking, Mr. Stimson called Sir John Simon again at 12:50 p.m., to change the time for representations to February 2, 6 p.m., Tokyo time (793.94/37862¾).