793.94/3757½
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation1
Secretary. Hello, Mr. Prime Minister.
MacDonald. We have had a terribly full day today. We are getting news from hour to hour of the drive from Shanghai.
[Page 137]Secretary. Yes, I imagine so. Atherton called me a few hours ago2 and told me of the situation as you gave it to him and we have acted accordingly. I am sending up the whole Asiatic Squadron from Manila, consisting of one cruiser and the rest of the destroyers. That will reinforce the landing party by about a thousand men, and I got your message about the neutral zone and I have authorized the American forces there to assist in the defense of that zone. I have no information of the agreement except through this telephone message and of course I made it conditional upon that being confirmed by our own people.
MacDonald. We are still watching it and we have just had another message within the hour saying that there is some difficulty about the neutral zone.
Secretary. Well, it occurred to me that it is absolutely necessary that on the one hand the Japanese must agree not to use the Settlement and on the other hand the consent of the Chinese must be obtained to this neutral zone before we put our people out of it … We must be very careful.
MacDonald. Yes, that is a very grave situation. We are keeping our eye upon that. We are trying to avoid it. One of our latest despatches which just came in is that the neutral zone system was warmly supported by the Chinese. The proposition was on the grounds that conditions in that area were so dangerous that they could not use joint protection of the many neutrals there.
Secretary. You must be sure that the Chinese agree. You must be sure that the Japanese agree. Both of them.
MacDonald. Both of them, yes.
Secretary. Well, I understand that this conference was participated in by the Commander of the Chinese forces and that he agreed to the neutral zone.
MacDonald. I understand that the Japanese Consul General has referred to his Government the proposal that the Japanese should evacuate all that area outside the Settlement limits in favor of the neutral forces. That is how it stands at the moment. Just a minute or two ago we addressed a message to Tokyo presenting to the Japanese Government what the present situation means to all the nations interested in the International Settlement.
Secretary. Well, what does that despatch say to Japan?
MacDonald. It just emphasizes the fact that all this action of theirs is giving us great trouble, great anxiety, putting us to great expense [Page 138] and is putting our people and the other people in the International Settlement to great anxiety and impressing upon the Japanese Government its responsibilities to remove all this from us by coming to an agreement which will finish the fighting, and to be settled by negotiation.
Secretary. Have you taken the position perfectly flat that they must stop using the Settlement as a base?
MacDonald. Perfectly clear. It is as clear as English words can make it. Yes, sir, that is so. As a matter of fact, they have promised to do it.
Secretary. I have no promise myself to that effect.
MacDonald. We had that promise two, maybe three, days ago, certainly two days ago.…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary.… There is this to be said on the other side of the general proposition. Here is coming a very possible deadlock. The situation is getting very serious. There is, however, a breathing spell before Japan sends a large expeditionary force. She is worrying over that. She does not want to do it. There is a better chance now of her welcoming such a suggestion after this reverse than at any other time. Now, if there is any better way by which a suggestion coming from our two countries would do it—
MacDonald. If, on further consideration, you think that the President could address this message to the Emperor, I would be perfectly willing to address a similar message or one along the same lines, to our own Minister, and that would not have quite the same effect, but it would [be?] much more than a message from the Foreign Office to an Ambassador to be communicated through the Ambassador to a Foreign Secretary. The message I have in mind would be a message I would write with my own hand and address it to the Prime Minister of Japan, and I would say that the effect would be an immediate effect, and I am willing to do it alone. I have a perfect mind to do it tomorrow, in support of you in every way.
Secretary. I did not mean to indicate that we would only do it in case the King did it, but we are simply turning the whole matter over in our own minds, and we realized the difficulties arising from your constitutional situation. And for that reason, I put it up to you to think it over and let me know your feeling. From our standpoint here, there are great advantages in having the President do it rather than the Secretary of State, because he speaks in a peculiar way for the people and under no constitutional disabilities, such as the King.
MacDonald. Yes, the President is much freer, and if you still decide to do it and if you think it advisable that I should address the [Page 139] Prime Minister on the same lines, I am quite willing to do it, but only to help the situation and the United States policy.
Secretary. I will talk that over with the President. He has called a conference this afternoon on the general situation with me. Of course, this immediate situation in Shanghai has occupied our whole attention as it has yours, and it occurs to me that it may seem to be opportune before Japan becomes embarked on a major effort like an expeditionary force, that they be given an opportunity to graciously withdraw.
MacDonald. Well, that is what we have been trying to do today, and it is a little bit easier, although I would not like to commit myself to that. However, if they would take that neutral section, then we can have a little breathing spell.
Secretary: Well, was there any agreement of a truce at all?
MacDonald. There is.
Secretary. That is a more difficult thing. We are working away at it. What I mean is, in case this neutral zone is agreed upon, have you any idea where the Japanese will move to make their base.
MacDonald. No. That is one of the things we have been working at on a very big scale. We may be work [ing?] on it all night, but it is impossible to say at the moment. They have agreed not to fight at the present moment, but how long that will last, I do not know.
Secretary. Both sides, China and Japan?
MacDonald. Both. If the Japanese Consul General receives an unfavorable report, the Chinese General would then refer to his Government a set of instructions and then send a letter to continue.
Secretary. Let me repeat that. If the Japanese Consul General receives a favorable report—
MacDonald. An unfavorable report—
Secretary. If the Japanese Consul General receives an unfavorable report, the Chinese General would then refer to his Government a set of instructions and then send a letter to continue, and this proposition which has been referred to Japan, which you speak of, is the proposition for a truce or for a neutral zone?
MacDonald. The proposition is for a neutral zone. There has been a truce now for about 24 hours.
Secretary. Thank you very much. I understand that now.
MacDonald. I think that is about all we know at the moment. Now when will you let me know your President’s reaction to the suggestion I made?
Secretary. Well, I can let you know after the conference this afternoon, probably about ten o’clock by your time, about five o’clock here. In case the decision is unfavorable about going on with that, perhaps I had just better cable you, not telephone. If anything brings up the [Page 140] necessity of a further telephone message, it would be in the neighborhood of nine or ten o’clock tonight. Is that all right? How is that for you?
MacDonald. I will not be in here between nine and ten, but I could give you a number, or if you would prefer, you could speak direct to Sir John Simon, either Simon or myself.
Secretary. Yes, I see. Can you leave word with the telephone people so that if I should call then I could get one or the other of you two.
MacDonald. I will give you my number. It is Grosvenor 1616, and if you want to ring up Simon, his is Park 8877.
Secretary. All right. Thank you very much.
MacDonald. My kindest regards to Mrs. Stimson and yourself.
Secretary. Thank you very much. The same to you and Ishbel.
- Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. MacDonald in London, January 31, 1932, 12:15 p.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.↩
- For substance of telephone message, see telegram No. 86, January 31, noon, infra; also telegram No. 37, January 31, 3 p.m., p. 142.↩