Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2987: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 1, 1931—6 p.m.
[Received December 1—4:42 p.m.³³]

826. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:

“The Drafting Committee completed this morning for submission to the Twelve tonight the final text of the resolution taking account to the greatest possible degree of changes suggested by both the Chinese and the Japanese. Two points only need be emphasized before this final text is approved and forwarded tonight. First, there is no mention in it of Japan’s demand for the right to take police measures against bandits. Second, the number of members of the commission as recommended to the Twelve is five.

The Committee also considered both the policy and the actual text of the declaration to be made by the President. After some discussion it was felt best to recommend dividing this declaration into two parts. The first part would be a somewhat formal statement on certain points either included in or excluded from the resolution. This declaration would at least in substance be explained to the parties in advance and certain sections of it especially that inserted for the Japanese regarding police measures before evacuation and that for the Chinese regarding observers might even be given to the Chinese Government [Chinese and Japanese?] in full for advance transmission to their Governments. Having been thus negotiated and presented before the adoption of the resolution this declaration would have a decidedly formal character.

The second declaration would be very much less formal and would be made after the passage of the resolution. It would cover certain broad aspects involved in this dispute such as the use of force in diplomatic negotiations, the general philosophy of peaceful settlement, and possibly specific relation to the three great documents involved in the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and Nine-Power Treaty. The text is now in process of being drafted.

Returning to the first declaration, the most important paragraph is that regarding police measures. It is not yet known whether this will be satisfactory to the Japanese either in being relegated to the declaration or in its actual drafting. That drafting as it stands at present and as it has been informally transmitted to the Japanese is as follows:

‘There is, however, one point which requires elucidation. In the special conditions prevailing at present in Manchuria the administrative machinery of government is seriously compromised. There are districts in which many bandits and lawless bands endanger the lives and property of the inhabitants some of whom are Japanese subjects. In these circumstances it has been strongly pressed upon the Council that it may prove necessary as an exceptional measure for the Japanese Government during the period before evacuation is completed to take, if such a danger renders it necessary, police measures sufficient to provide directly for the safety of its subjects. In the very exceptional conditions that prevail, the Council could not take upon itself to rule out altogether action of that kind. Nevertheless, and even assuming that such action is confined strictly to police purposes, it is liable to lead to grave misconception and the increase of tension between the two countries concerned. I am glad, therefore, to learn that both Governments are ready to give an opportunity to neutral observers to accompany any operation of the kind. This is really only the special application to this case of the general invitation given to neutral observers by both Governments.[’]

The next most important point was the paragraph aiming to give satisfaction to the Chinese that the system of observers as already instituted would be really effective in case of emergency. As the Council resolution requested only its own members to send in information or inferentially to cooperate in this work it was suggested that the declaration might go further and invite other governments to do the same. There was some discussion as to whether it would be wise in this connection to specify by name the United States in view of the fact that its observer was already collaborating fully on the spot. On being asked my personal opinion in the matter I expressed the view that, while this cooperation was in fact effective it might be appreciated if it were not specifically mentioned by name. Drummond also thought it might be better from the Japanese viewpoint to be vague.

Other important provisions are being drafted for this declaration, leading off with a paragraph on evacuation and concluding with a section on the duties and organization of the commission. The Drafting Committee is completing this text at 3:30 for submission to the Twelve at 6, with the hope of sending the final resolution and parts of the declaration to the parties tonight for transmission to their Governments.

Meanwhile the text of the aide-mémoire presented by Yoshizawa to Sze last night on the evacuation of Chinchow and the creation of a neutral zone has been made privately accessible. The aide-mémoire begins by recalling that Yoshizawa had on November 29th requested the President of the Council ‘to be good enough to employ all his efforts in order that an accord may be rapidly concluded’; recalls the discussions of Shidehara with Martel on the basis of Koo proposal; and cites Japan’s four conditions as follows:

(1) Retreat of Chinese forces behind the Great Wall;

(2) Maintenance of Chinese administration in the evacuated zone;

(3) Abstention of the use of all irregular or disorderly elements;

(4) Entering into immediate negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese authorities as regards (a) determination of the zone from which the troops are to be withdrawn; (b) fixation of the number of Chinese troops necessary for order, particularly against bandits; and (c) other details.

In these conditions Japan would be ready to take an engagement that her troops would not enter the evacuated zone except in the unforeseen case of serious and urgent circumstances threatening the security of Japanese subjects and property in the north of China as well as the security of Japanese troops stationed there. The note concludes:

‘The Japanese Government believing that the rapid conclusion of such an agreement is of the highest importance, given the gravity of the present situation, the representative of Japan urgently begs the President of the Council to be good enough to make every effort for the prompt realization of this project.’”

• [Dawes]
• Shaw

33. Telegram in five sections.