793.94/2711a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Shaw)

[Paraphrase]

547. For Ambassador Dawes: I am interested to note in the press your mention of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922. This is a very important treaty. Not only does it include relevant and precise covenants, to which all nine signatories, Japan included, are party, toward a situation such as now exists in Manchuria, but also it represents a crystallization of the traditional policy of the United States toward China, and this we cannot forget. It represents the ultimate successful embodiment in treaty form of the long efforts which were begun by John Hay to prevent China’s dismemberment and to secure the Open Door. The United States is the treaty’s legal custodian and, if occasion arose, would thus be in an appropriate position to invoke its article VII. I have not thought it wise so far to take this step, since the same nations have actually been in conference in the form of meetings of the League of Nations Council. However, it may be helpful for you to keep clearly in mind this treaty, [Page 442] especially its article I, for use with the Japanese should they loosely talk about their “special rights” in Manchuria. To me this treaty appears to be a complete renouncing of any claim to special political rights in Manchuria as distinguished from economic rights (also see the Portsmouth treaty of 1905, articles III and IV17). Consequently, the sole indisputable legal basis of the intervention by Japan in its present form would appear to be the general international right of protection for the lives and property of nationals.

It must be remembered on the other side of the picture that China, by granting to Russia in 1895–1898 the concessions for the Chinese Eastern Railway (the southern portion of which in 1905 became the South Manchuria Railway), made it possible to construct a railway line which, militarily speaking, created for Japan a distinctly menacing situation. The use of this instrument by Russia, in pursuance of its Manchurian and Korean policies, caused Japan to resort to war to destroy the menace, and Japan was successful in this war. Under these circumstances, although it is this Government’s view that the only undisputed legal rights of Japan in Manchuria under the treaties essentially are economic rights, Japan, of necessity, regards its position there as one upon which its national security depends absolutely.

Stimson