Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/3161

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) of a Conversation With the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Shidehara), November 5, 1931⁵⁶

November 5, 1931

After a few exchanges of greetings I read very carefully and slowly, emphasizing the telling phrases, the whole memorandum of Secretary Stimson of November 3, 1931, to Baron Shidehara,⁵⁷ informing him that I was instructed to read it aloud to him and that a copy of it had already been handed to Ambassador Debuchi in Washington, He gave no expression of surprise upon receiving it, but later he asked me whether it had been given to the public or was to be published. I replied that we in Tokyo should certainly not give it to the public, and that I assumed Mr. Debuchi would not, but could not answer for the State Department.

The first point that Baron Shidehara raised was asking exactly what was meant by the words “integrity of government”. I told him that in my opinion it involved completeness of the exercise of sovereignty, that the integrity of government was impaired where control of the civil administration was discontinued or interfered with. I suggested we look up the exact meaning of the word; which we did. And I found, in the Standard dictionary which he had there in the office, under the second classification, the exact support of what I think it means, and pointed it out.

Baron Shidehara then stated the Japanese were not exercising control of the civil administration of the occupied areas—that was being conducted by the Chinese themselves who had organized defense committees and were administering their government locally. He said most of the civil officials of Manchuria had moved out. He commented that many of the civil functions were being performed by men who were also military commanders.

Baron Shidehara then laid stress upon the attitude of Japan toward China in the days of early treaties (I think probably one by Secretary Hay), in which Japan had opposed the partition of China and had recently stood and continued to stand for the integrity of China. He was very definite about not wanting to do anything that would impair the sovereignty of China in Manchuria or in any other Chinese possessions. Passing on, he said that the position of Japan was that they wanted China to agree to five main points, which he described as being fundamental principles; and when these were agreed upon Japan was perfectly ready to withdraw their troops. He made it very clear that there were several hundred points at issue between Japan and China, questions involving injuries and damages to individuals and property, invasion, violation of treaty rights, etc., etc. Sometimes several hundred were under one heading, which he intimated it might take years to determine. He said they had not the least idea of retaining their troops there until those points were settled.

The five things that he said should be settled before the withdrawal of troops were as follows, and suggested a mutual agreement binding upon both China and Japan:

(1) Agreement against any aggression on either side against the other.

(2) Preservation and guarantee of integrity of the territory pertaining to each one.

(3) Discontinuance of government sanction of boycotts, discrimination against Japanese merchants, or other economic action injurious to the interests of Japan. (In this connection it was pointed out to him that many of these acts were due to the manner in which the Japanese had pressed their claims, the fact that Japan had taken so aggressive a position, and that it was absolutely out of the power of any government to compel people to begin buying again from Japanese merchants, that where it was an act of individuals it was entirely within their rights. He said: “Yes, but this has gone further”. People, he said, had been ordered under threat of being killed not to deal with the Japanese. It was pointed out to him that this boycott was widespread and in a sense world-wide. I told him of a bank in Seattle, Japanese owned, that had to close its doors because of the withdrawal of deposits of Chinese, and that no government could make their people buy Japanese goods or from Japanese merchants if they did not want to do so. He said he understood that completely and that he recognized that Japan had to recognize the right of people to express their disapproval of a course adopted by a country, by declining to deal with its merchants or buying its merchandise. But he said again that this had gone farther, and that societies of Chinese were actually operating, threatening violence and practising violence, undeterred by their government, upon people desirous of trading in Japanese goods or with Japanese citizens. He insisted on protection, so that people in Chinese territory should have freedom of action in this respect.[)]

(4) They demanded protection of lives and property of Japanese and Koreans. He assured me that were Japanese troops withdrawn from Manchuria there would immediately be acts of violence against the lives and property of Japanese and Koreans resident in Manchuria, and that assurance of the protection of these was essential. This seems to me to be the real crux of the entire proposition and the one vital thing requiring some sort of adequate assurance. I did not, however, say that to him.

(5) The fifth point he mentioned was the recognition of treaty obligations, which also would be mutually agreed to both by Japan and China. I asked him if he had reference among other things to the Chinese levy duties on coal, contrary to the treaty agreement. He said: “No”, and that that had already been settled by adjustment and compromise. He cited a controversy between China and Japan concerning a certain tract of land claimed by Manchuria and Korea which had been settled by compromise, the land being granted as pertaining to Korea, and that the Chinese had agreed to build a certain railroad to the Korean frontier, which would add greatly to the prosperity and value of the Korean territory tributary to this region. Years had gone by, he said, and nothing had been done by the Chinese to complete their share of the bargain, namely, the construction of this railroad, and all that the Japanese had been able to get were evasions.

As I understood him, what the Japanese wanted now was an affirmation of the intention of the Chinese Government to observe these treaties in principle, not that the evacuation should wait for the completion of the works.

I took occasion to inform the Minister, as I had been instructed to do from Washington, that the United States did not desire to intervene in the terms of settlement, did not expect to act as agent in determining to any degree how these various claims, etc., should be adjudicated, but that our interest was in maintaining friendly relations both with Japan and China; that we entered upon this scene in a spirit of entire friendliness, and that we were very earnest in our desire that the matter should be settled by peaceable means and that we proposed to use the influence of the United States to the fullest extent possible to discourage a resort to acts of war or settlement of any of these problems by violence.

The Minister took the document up and began reading it over and advised me that I could inform my government that it would receive his most earnest consideration and that of his government. He then again commented on some of the details, reading over the two questions outlined in the message, and he stated that he did not see how they could withdraw troops until China and Japan had agreed upon these five general principles. I emphasized the fact that the United States felt, as indicated in the memorandum that military pressure should be not employed to force the acceptance by China of these general terms. And that in the present situation it was clear that military force was being employed. He replied that he entirely agreed that military pressure should not be used to bring about a determination of the various points at issue, but that they simply could not withdraw their troops until they were assured of protection of their citizens.

I did not raise the point, but personally I do not see how, with the present disorganized state of government, they have in China any organization capable of giving adequate protection to Japanese and Korean citizens, even if China did agree to settle the five points; and I see no disadvantage to them in accepting them (the five points).

The conversation then moved to the fighting now going on in connection with the bridge at Nonni. I had previously learned that this Chinese railroad had been built assisted by an issue of bonds which had been taken by the South Manchurian Railway, payment of interest on which was in default. This gives, and with the customary practice prevailing in terms of mortgages—and I do not doubt it is amply provided for in this mortgage, a direct interest and perhaps the right of intervention on the part of the South Manchurian Railway in the affairs of this railroad. The destruction of the bridge in question operates disadvantageously to the South Manchurian Railway from two points of view: First, from the capital point of view, being the destruction of property secured by mortgage held by a Japanese-owned railroad whose interests under the treaty the Chinese are bound to protect. And, secondly, from the operating point of view: that the bridge gives access to a territory that customarily ships a considerable amount of produce out, especially at this harvest time of year, principally, I believe, consisting of soya beans, and which was cut off with the destruction of the bridge, to the disadvantage of the South Manchurian Railway, also in contravention to the treaty. The Japanese claim under the treaty the right to enforce the restoration of the bridge. The Chinese have questioned this right and resisted it by force.

Speaking of young Marshal Chang, Baron Shidehara said he was very clever but at heart bitterly opposed to the Japanese, and that they had received information that satisfied them that he had directed this operation and had instructed Chinese soldiers to perform a number of provocative acts to bring on fighting, in which he had been apparently successful. (Note by W. C[ameron] F[orbes])

Baron Shidehara, in speaking of the South Manchurian Railway, mentioned the construction of competing lines by the Chinese. I immediately parried by saying that to stop unfavorable construction would paralyze the growth of Manchuria; that I had been a witness of the marvelous growth in the United States of the value of land, and of the increase in productivity in our West, by the construction of railroads; and that if every time the Chinese wished to develop a region the Japanese, on the ground that such railroads might take business away from existing railroads, they would be in a position to absolutely block the proper and normal development of the region. I also said that everybody knew that whenever one of these lines developed a region it had to have termini in the largest cities and ports in order to get a market for the produce of the country developed, and that these lines reaching the termini made it possible for these railroads to get through traffic which would in itself compete, of course. I wondered whether the Japanese idea was to impede the normal and proper development of the country in order to enhance the earnings of their roads.

To this Baron Shidehara replied that they realized all that and were perfectly willing to permit the construction of such railroads, but that for through traffic there should be a pooling arrangement and agreements in regard to rates such as was common in similar situations in the United States, so that there would not be ruinous competition and rate cutting. This seems to offer an opportunity for a reasonable solution of one of the major problems which had troubled them.

56. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in covering letter of November 7; received November 23.
57. See telegram No. 217, November 3, 1931, 6 p.m., to the Chargé in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, i, p. 34.