793.94/2510
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a
Conversation With the French Ambassador (Claudel), November 4, 1931
November 4, 1931
I had requested the French Ambassador to come in; when he came, I told
him that yesterday I had made representations, through my Embassy at
Tokyo, to the Japanese Government in regard to the situation
[Page 369]
in Manchuria and I handed the
French Ambassador the annexed aide-mémoire to
explain to him what had been done. He read it over and as I found there
was some danger of him misunderstanding exactly the nature of the
representations which had been made in Tokyo, I read to him in full the
memorandum which had been sent to Tokyo to be made the basis of its
representations. I told the French Ambassador when he read this
memorandum that it was to be given to the Japanese Government; after he
read it he said he thought it was a strong memorandum. I told him that I
had spent many days in trying to soften this language so as not to be
deemed harsh. I explained to Mr. Claudel particularly that I had not
made to the Japanese the suggestion which is contained on the third page
of the aide-mémoire as to the presence of neutral
observers in the negotiations. I explained to him that I had refrained
from making any such suggestion because I wished to leave it to Monsieur
Briand and not in any way to cross wires with him. I explained to Mr.
Claudel several times so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding of
the gist of the representations which were made to Japan. He noted that
we had not mentioned the time limit. I said we had not done so because
we had doubts as to whether it was wise on the part of the Council to
impose any time limit. He seemed to feel himself the same doubt. I
pointed out, however, that we had taken no position in our
representations one way or the other on that point. I emphasized to him
verbally the importance that a ladder should be found for the Japanese
to climb down on in case of a deadlock on the point which we emphasized
in our memorandum and he asked me whether we had any precedents for this
suggestion of a ladder. I told him that the presence of neutral
observers had been very useful in the case of the negotiations between
China and Japan over Shantung. He asked me what nationality the
observers were. I told him that I believed that one observer had been an
American; I was not sure of the others but thought that one had been
British and possibly one French.
[Annex]
Aide-Mémoire Handed to the French
Ambassador (Claudel), November 4, 1931
I have directed the American Ambassador at Tokyo to make
representations to the Foreign Minister intended to show the
concurrence of the American Government with the position of the
Council of the League of Nations with respect to the point which we
deem to be most essential in the present situation, namely, that the
Japanese Government should not make its withdrawal into the railway
zone
[Page 370]
contingent upon the
prior negotiations with China as to the mutual treaty rights of
China and Japan in Southern Manchuria and in the Southern Manchurian
Railway. We feel that should Japan persist in its contention, which
its representative made at the Council in respect of this matter, it
might well be deemed to be equivalent to the use of military
pressure by Japan in order to force a solution of certain
longstanding controversies which have no immediate relation to the
present situation in Manchuria. If this course were persisted in, it
might well be deemed to be a violation of the covenant of the
Briand-Kellogg Pact to seek the solution of controversies only by
pacific means and it might also possibly become a violation of the
covenant of the Nine Power Treaty to respect the integrity of the
administration of China in Manchuria.
It seems to us that this point constituted the most important
question in the recent discussion before the Council over the
resolution of October 24 and we have therefore concentrated our
attention on this point.
I fear that Japan will not withdraw her forces before the 16th of
November, the day set by the Council, and from some of the reports
sent me by my own observers, I am inclined to believe that in case
of certain towns in Manchuria now occupied by Japanese troops, it
might well be impossible to withdraw those troops at so early a date
without the likelihood of serious disorders. It may even be that
Japan will not yield on the point which we have stressed in our
recommendations. She may not be willing to withdraw her troops
entirely before negotiations on the broader questions are actually
entered into. Should this unfortunate situation arise, we have been
earnestly considering what steps might be taken to furnish an
alternative suggestion which might accomplish ostensibly the
necessary result of preserving these negotiations from military
pressure. It has seemed to us, that in case the League is faced with
such a deadlock, Monsieur Briand might well resort to the suggestion
that the direct negotiations between China and Japan should be
conducted in the presence of neutral observers taken from one or
more of the other nations. Such a method was adopted in the
negotiation between China and Japan in respect to the evacuation of
Shantung with success. I have made no such suggestion to the Chinese
or Japanese in this case because I have deemed it most important not
to run any risk of conflicting with the negotiations which have been
conducted so skilfully by Monsieur Briand. Now having made the
effort to support the position and the negotiations conducted by
Monsieur Briand and the Council, I venture to make to Monsieur
Briand this suggestion as a compromise for him to use in case of
ultimate deadlock.
