793.94/2322: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
247. The Council met in public session this morning at 10. The Japanese representative opened on [sic] the discussion by defining the “fundamental principles” referred to in the Japanese counterproposal (Consulate’s 246, October 23, 10 p.m.) as questions only intended to bring about pacification and “upon which agreement can be easily reached before withdrawal of troops.” Matters pending agreement over a long period of time were not fundamental principles requiring immediate settlement but appropriate subjects for subsequent negotiation. He added that paragraph 7 of the Council draft resolution could be easily substituted for paragraph 8 of his counterproposal if the Council so desired.
Cecil then inquired why, if the same interpretation was to be given to “fundamental principles” in both draft resolutions, Japan could not accept the first proposal. He then asked the Japanese representative to comment upon a newspaper statement to the effect that what Japan really demanded was a final acceptance by China of existing treaty provisions.
The Japanese representative replied that his Government has a “certain idea” respecting fundamental principles which he was not authorized to communicate but which nevertheless pertained to the safeguarding of Japanese nationals in Manchuria.
[Page 308]Madariaga asked what importance Japan attached to the substitution of paragraph 3 of its counterproposal of the words “spirit of the Covenant” for “terms of the Covenant”. He was of the opinion that troops of occupation tended to increase insecurity rather than allay it and was apprehensive lest the desire for security be indefinitely expanded to cover “pacification” which again might be made to depend on [settlement of questions?] as [sic] having nothing to do with security or evacuation.
Cecil next read a Reuter despatch from Tokyo stating that Japanese official circles appeared to hold the view that inasmuch as the League had declined to recognize the sacredness of the treaties Japan should not be forced to change its stand. Cecil pointed out that no reflection had ever been cast upon the sacredness of the treaty obligations but that to the contrary the Covenant under whose terms the Council was acting reenforced such recognition. The meaning and validity of treaties was not always clear, he explained, but the settlement of these on something [questions?] was the function of the Permanent Court and could hardly be made the condition of evacuation.
In reply to Madariaga the Japanese representative stated that with respect to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution he had no objection to reverting to the original wording whereby the word “terms” would be restored in place of the word “spirit”. In reply to the other arguments of the Spanish representative, namely those regarding the “fundamental principles” referred to and which must be considered in the questions of security and evacuation, the Japanese representative said that “it is the view of my Government that it is absolutely necessary for it to reach an agreement in order to ensure security and as soon as that has been done our troops will be withdrawn immediately.”
In answering Lord Cecil the Japanese delegate asserted that he had never informed Tokyo to the effect that “the Council rejected the contention of our delegation concerning the upholding of the sanctity of treaties.” He regarded the sending of any such press despatch as deplorable and wished to assure Cecil that he would send a telegram to Tokyo on the subject immediately following this morning’s session.
Briand followed by analyzing the discussion which had taken place and appealed to the Japanese representative to be more conciliatory. His remarks may be summarized as follows: Between the two proposals before the Council “there is a fundamental difference regarding what are the subject matters to be contemplated in connection with the safeguarding of the persons and property of Japanese nationals outside the zone, wherby the Japanese Government would be enabled to effect a withdrawal.” With respect to the Council’s proposal he was [Page 309] of the opinion that it had the merit of being absolutely clear, whereas the text of the Japanese counterproposal had certainly given rise to uncertainty and to difficulty of [sic] ipso facto. He felt sure that Japan would never take shelter behind an ambiguity and thought such a consideration alone recommended the Council’s text. The latter he stated is based on obligations of both parties and is inspired by the statement made at the very beginning of the dispute by the Japanese representative, when he said his Government “would proceed as rapidly as possible with the withdrawal of troops (which had already begun) into the railway zone in proportion as the protection of lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively assured, and that it hoped to carry out its intention in full as speedily as possible.” In view of this declaration Briand drew the inference that “precautions required for security are precautions that can be taken in a very short time.” Otherwise a promise could not be given to carry out evacuation in the shortest possible time. It was therefore clear that if negotiations must be undertaken with reference to treaties, to railways or to other questions it is obvious that such negotiations cannot be accomplished within a short period. Referring to the League Covenant he stated that under article 10 the member states agree to respect each other’s territorial integrity and political independence. He also referred to the terms of article 2 of the Pact of Paris whereby all disputes of whatever nature shall only be settled by peaceful means. He thought that public opinion would find it difficult to admit that “military occupation could be assigned to the category of peaceable means.” A prolongation of such occupation also means the prolongation of a feeling of uneasiness which has already lasted too long. This uneasiness is felt because at any moment something might happen “which would make it impossible for this problem to be solved either under the terms of the Covenant or under those of article 2 of the Pact of Paris.” He would therefore appeal to the Japanese representative to make a sign of conciliation. He understood quite easily that the Japanese Government may desire to enter into negotiations concerning general issues between the two countries but he considered “if that were to be involved before evacuation takes place, then it is perfectly clear that we shall not be able to succeed.” He understood that the Japanese representative had stated that this was not the case and that the Japanese were willing to negotiate on long-standing issues immediately after evacuation. In this regard he agreed with the Spanish representative as to the desirability of beginning negotiations on the very day on which evacuation is completed. It was his understanding that when the Japanese representative spoke of “fundamental principles” that they did not mean to extend these fundamental principles into wider questions but that they should be limited to the question [Page 310] of security proper. However, he felt, in spite of the explanations which had been made, there was still uncertainty and that it would be preferable to have a clearer text.
Briand then went on to say that the Chinese Government has declared itself willing to accord the necessary protection and has further said that it is ready to discuss at once arrangements for the evacuation and taking over of the territory. It was his opinion that the arrangements could be made very quickly and this was the sort of thing which had been visualized when the Council considered the declaration made on September 30 by the Japanese representative. He admitted that Japan would be justified in making a reservation to the effect that this pledge of evacuation should be carried out providing the Chinese Government shows that it is really prepared to grant those conditions of security. He therefore thought announcement that military pressure was about to cease would have considerable effect in improving the situation in regard to security and that relations would at once be better. He therefore appealed to the Japanese representative to accept the draft resolution proposed by the Council after further explanations if necessary.
The Japanese representative replied:
“To my great regret I am unable to accept the draft resolution which has been submitted by the President because as I have already explained, it does not in our view adequately safeguard the lives and property of Japanese nationals for which the Japanese Government is responsible.
May I be allowed to suggest again as representative of Japan that the Japanese Government has no intention of settling the present difficulties by military forces. Its only desire is to make certain that protection [of its nationals] is effective.”
The Spanish representative then made a final effort to secure some concession from the Japanese. He declared that the debates had been rendered difficult by the fact that the phrase “fundamental principles” had neither been explained nor revealed to the Council. He quoted a passage from the preamble of the Covenant regarding open relations between the nations and expressed himself as greatly disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese Government in not revealing exactly what it desired. After reviewing the Japanese thesis regarding security he would ask whether the Japanese delegate would not be prepared to withdraw his proposal “if it were provided that both parties would give a solemn undertaking that on the very day that evacuation was concluded negotiations would be opened on all questions which are pending and at issue between the two countries”. In his opinion the effect of such a declaration would be only of such a kind that “security would be adequately assured and that evacuation would thereby become possible”.
[Page 311]Yoshizawa responded:
“In the view of my Government the fundamental principles mentioned in our counterproposal should not be set forth in the resolution; nor in our view should the details of these fundamental principles be discussed at the Council table. These are matters which should be discussed between the two countries.
The Spanish representative said that these principles do not appear to link up directly with evacuation or security. That view unfortunately is not the view of my Government which regards it as absolutely necessary to obtain an agreement beforehand in which these fundamental principles will be set forth.
I therefore regret that I am unable to withdraw the words ‘fundamental principles’ as contained in our counterproposal.”
In conclusion Briand drew the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that “it is a delicate matter, even an impossibility, for the members of the Council to accept the inclusion in a draft resolution of a reference to fundamental principles which they do not know, without having the right to formulate those principles or to discuss them. It is really asking them to make a sacrifice which goes beyond the bounds of the possible. I do not think that there is any member of the Council that could agree to this without [knowing?] what are those fundamental principles.”
The Council then adjourned until 4 this afternoon.
- Telegram in three sections.↩