Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2318: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, October 23, 1931—10 p.m.
[Received October 24—3:20 a.m.²¹]

246. The Council convened in public session at 6:30 p.m. today. There was immediately communicated to it the response of the Japanese Government to the telegram sent by the signatories of the Pact of Paris to Japan. As this reply has undoubtedly been received in Washington, I am not transmitting it here.^21a

After a brief opening statement by Briand announcing the two disputants were prepared to comment on the draft resolution presented in yesterday’s session, the Chinese delegate made a carefully prepared statement, pertinent portions of which are quoted or summarized as follows:

“The Chinese Government had hoped that [by] this time the Council would have found it possible to settle the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory speedily and completely. Today it is more than a month since large areas of Manchuria were occupied and these areas are still occupied in spite of Council’s continuous deliberations on this matter from September 22 to September 30, and again from October 13 to this day, in spite of the cooperation of the United States as symbolized in a [the] presence here of a representative of the United States and expressed in the note of that Government to the Council in which it urged the League ‘in no way to relax its vigilance and in no way to fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence’, and for its part promised to act independently through its diplomatic channels ‘to try to reenforce League action’ and to ‘make it evident that it has not lost interest in the question and is not oblivious to the obligations which Japanese and Chinese have assumed to other signatories of the Pact of Paris as well as the Nine-Power Treaty’.

Public opinion is often unfortunately impatient and ill informed and I cannot conceal from my colleagues here my fear lest public opinion may be tempted to draw the conclusion from the events of the last 5 weeks and the position reached today that if the joint efforts of the United States and Members of the League do not after 5 weeks suffice to free the territory of one member of the League and signatory of the Peace Pact from the technical [an unlawful] invasion of the army of a second member of the League the [and] fellow-signatory of the Peace Pact, there may be some hitherto unsuspected flaw in the machinery of peace or lack of determination on the part of the civilized nations to make that machinery work effectively. I need not point out, Mr. President, that if such a suspicion were to take root it would have consequences for the prospects of disarmament and American cooperation within the League that we should all deplore.

That is why I wish to make it perfectly clear that in my view these delays and this appearance of hesitation, which I join with my colleagues on the Council in regretting, seem perfectly intelligible, even natural; precisely because this is admittedly the gravest issue that has confronted the League since its foundation, precisely because it may ultimately involve stretching and testing to the utmost the authority of the competence [and confidence] of the League, the willingness of the United States to reenforce its action and the readiness of world public opinion to support any wise the [and] effectual action to safeguard the peace of nations, precisely for these reasons it is inevitable that our proceedings should be tentative and groping and proceed step by step. The peace machinery of the world is slow and cumbrous. Some of its parts are yet untried but it is powerful and comprehensive and its effects are cumulative.

For this reason, although I regret that [the] further delay, I bow to the Council’s view of its necessity. For this reason too—and to show its unswervingly conciliatory spirit—the Chinese Government authorizes me to accept the resolution before us, although it appears to my Government to fail to grapple with some of the most urgent necessities and pressing dangers of the present situation. We accept it as a bare minimum, as marking merely the power [present] stage in the League’s handling of this problem and as a proposal which, because it is put before us publicly by all the Members of the Council, except the parties, as the outcome of their prolonged discussions, must be regarded as fixed in its main lines and subject to amendment only on minor details.”

Sze then went on to cite what the Chinese Government considered the most important provisions of the draft resolution, namely, section 4. He considered that the delay provided in this proposal was very long and expressed the concern of his Government as to the grave danger that some incident might seriously compromise the peaceful settlement of the problem. He nevertheless declared that the Chinese Government accepts the proposal and expresses its readiness to carry out in full all of the obligations it imposes upon China. Moreover his Government was willing to go further by examining “in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers, or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the reoccupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehension the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council’s resolution”. With regard to the terms of “evacuation” and “taking over of evacuated territory” in the resolution, Sze stated that he interpreted these to mean in short so far as possible the status quo ante shall be reestablished.

The concluding portions of his speech follow.

“I have the honor herewith to request the members of the Council and the representative of the United States to be good enough to signify their readiness to accept an invitation from the Chinese Government, which will be forthcoming without delay, to designate representatives to be associated with the Chinese authorities, under paragraph 4 (b) of the Council’s resolution.

And now I come to one more point which the Chinese Government regards as crucial. Paragraph 6 [of the] resolution before us makes it clear that withdrawal is the only subject before the Council at present and that until withdrawal has been completed no other issue arises. But I should like to make it quite plain that in the view of the Chinese Government the only immediate issue arising out of the present situation besides withdrawal is the question of responsibility and assessing damages for the events that have occurred since September 18th. The Chinese Government is willing, nay anxious, and has been from the beginning, to submit to any form of neutral third-party judgment on this issue, in accordance with League principles and precedents and in conformity with elements of justice.

But any attempt to make the military invasion of Manchuria the occasion tor pressing for the solution of the other claims would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and a violation of article 2 of the Peace Pact. China will not discuss any subject with any power under the pressure of military occupation of her territory nor, what amounts to the same thing, under the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation. This point is vital and goes to the root of the whole controversy before the Council; is indeed the basic principle on which the Covenant and the Peace Pact are founded. It is because in the view of the Chinese Government this point is vital and fundamental that I have stressed it and it is for the same reason I add that the Chinese Government is assured that in adopting this attitude it has as a matter of fact the full and unqualified moral support of every Member of the League and signatory of the Peace Pact.

It further goes without saying that any discussions between China and any other power on any subject must take place on the basis of Chinese rights and obligations under the Covenant and Peace Pact and must respect the principles laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922 with regard to relations between China and other powers.”

The President of the Council then submitted a counterproposal presented by the Japanese representative. This counterproposal conforms to the text of the draft resolution presented yesterday and transmitted by Consulate’s 242, October 22, 6 p.m., insofar as the preamble and paragraphs 1 and 2 are concerned. With regard to paragraph 3 the Japanese counterproposal would change the words “in accordance with the terms of the Covenant” to read “in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant”.

The other paragraphs of the counterproposal are worded as follows:

• Paragraph 4. “Takes note again of the statement made by the representative of Japan on October 13, to the effect that the Government of Japan will proceed with the withdrawal into the railway zone of the troops that are still in a few localities outside the said zone as the pacification of public opinion and a détente is brought about by the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments as to the fundamental principles governing normal relations—that is to say, affording an assurance that the life of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property will be safeguarded.”
• Paragraph 5. “Recommends to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they begin forthwith discussions with the object of concluding the agreement mentioned in paragraph 4.”
• Paragraph 6. “Recommends to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they appoint representatives to settle the practical details of evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated localities.”
• Paragraph 7. “Requests the Chinese and Japanese Governments to keep the Council informed of the progress of negotiations between them and of the progress made in carrying the present resolution into effect.”
• Paragraph 8. “Authorizes its President to take, after considering the above-mentioned communications, such measures as he may think useful to insure that the present resolution shall be carried into effect, and to convene the Council at any moment with a view to reexamining the position.”

In his observations on the draft resolution presented yesterday the Japanese representative reiterated the contention that his Government was only taking defensive police and security measures, without aggressive or hostile intention, that it had no territorial designs in Manchuria and would withdraw the troops as soon as circumstances permitted without danger to Japanese nationals and property. He would therefore accept paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the draft resolution but asserted that the Japanese Government under present conditions could not fix a definite date for evacuation. Japan harbors serious misgivings as to the real efficacy of the safeguard proposed in subsection (b) of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution and regards it as first essential that the present disorder in Manchuria should subside. The Japanese Government has carefully thought out what is necessary to bring about such a détente and “has determined a number of fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based”. He asserted that the Japanese Government regarded such an agreement as essential but stated that there was no question of attempting to wrest concessions or privileges from China but wished only to remove the causes of friction.

With respect to direct negotiations, to which reference is made in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, the Japanese delegate expressed the willingness of his Government to begin such negotiations whenever convenient to China.

It was with the above considerations in mind that the Japanese delegation submitted its counterproposal.

Sze thereupon declared that he could not accept the proposals submitted by the Japanese representative.

Cecil enters the debate in an attempt to extract from the Japanese representative an interpretation of the words “the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as to the fundamental principles governing normal relations” employed in paragraph 4 of the Japanese counterproposal. He wished precise information as to what constituted these “fundamental principles”; nothing had been said about that on September 30. Cecil also requested an explanation with regard to paragraph 8 of the Japanese counterproposal. He wished to know if it were correct that the Japanese representative did not propose to fix any date for a future meeting of the Council and he would also inquire exactly what authority would be given to the President of the Council under this paragraph.

In reply the Japanese representative stated that the fundamental principles were “matters which will give us an assurance that the lives and property of Japanese nationals will be effectively safeguarded”. With regard to paragraph 8 he said that the Japanese Government had no objection to the Council meeting of November 16; as to the authority conferred upon the President of the Council, he stated that they “have nothing special in view” under this statement.

In the concluding statement of the meeting Briand said that there was a crucial point in connection with the Japanese counterproposal, which must be cleared up. In making an analysis of the proposal, he considered that the proposed negotiations between the two disputants bear upon two groups of subjects very different in character. There is the first group in which he thought agreement should be comparatively easy and which consists of providing conditions of security which would assure the certainty that Japanese nationals and property will not be subject to reprisals in the area to be evacuated and would thereby enable Japan to withdraw the troops. Briand considered that action to this end would comprise police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures, but measures that can be quickly planned and expeditiously carried out.

If, however, the second group of subjects which comprises matters which have been under dispute for considerable time, is to be discussed before evacuation takes place, the time limit set by the Council for evacuation will be far too short for any effective result and on this point there is complete disagreement between China and Japan. He would therefore ask the Japanese representative whether, when reference is made to “fundamental principles” in paragraph 4 of the Japanese counterproposal, there was an intention of including this second group of subjects and regarding them as an element of security. If such subjects were included the whole problem would arise anew. If on the other hand paragraph 4 of the Japanese counterproposal is intended only to cover conditions on security as embraced in the first group of subjects it was Briand’s opinion that a certain agreement had been effected.

After summarizing the difficulties with which the League was faced in this matter and pointing out the necessity for patience Briand suggested adjourning the discussions to 10 a.m. tomorrow, October 24. This was agreed upon and the Council rose.

Gilbert

21. Telegram in two sections.
22. For text of Japanese reply, see telegram No. 193, October 24, 9 a.m., from the Chargé in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 28.