Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2235½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁸⁸

October 20, 1931, 12:30 p.m.

Secretary: This is Secretary Stimson. What is it?

Gilbert: I have had your telegram⁸⁹ sent me after your conversation with Lord Reading⁹⁰ and I believe I understand the situation perfectly. They have been discussing this with me all day and I believe you will agree with me that our position in this matter should be in the general terms of your decision. They suggest that in the matter of method, however, we should go to any extreme to satisfy them. I mean in the matter of method.

Secretary: I think we have worked out a very satisfactory method in that telegram.

Gilbert: Yes, sir. But there are one or two details.

Secretary: I thought we had gone into detail sufficiently. If you have anything further regarding details let me know.

(Break in connection)

Secretary: What is it? What are those details?

Gilbert: You sent me a statement which I might make, you know, at my last appearance. Briand is asking that he might make the statement respecting why I will not be there any more and he feels that he should make that in view of his having made the original statement. Is that satisfactory to you?

Secretary: All right. I think so. I think he should let you see in advance what he is going to say. I think our interests are parallel there.

Gilbert: He is going to say something like the following: That certain objections were raised perhaps and were entirely on juridical grounds. Possibly some misunderstanding arose to the effect that I was taking part actively in League matters, which was not true; that in order to allay such misunderstandings——. That is about the line he will take. In order to protect his situation in the League he should be able to do that.

Secretary: Absolutely. That is all right. I want him to understand like the others that the position I am taking is not in the least based upon any desire to change my cooperation but it is to make it permanent for the future. We must be able to hold the step we have taken which is based upon and embodied in the instructions which I gave you on the day you went in and there must be no failure of this conference. The danger was the secret meetings. I could see great probability of danger in the misunderstanding which might occur in Japan. They did not know the extent of your participation during the secret meetings and therefore that was the most important thing. I do not want you to go to any more secret meetings but I have no objection to your going to the open meetings provided you take the attitude of observer only—take the position of observer whenever the Kellogg Pact is not under discussion. You understand that.

Gilbert: Yes, sir. Those are the terms of your telegram which is very clear and precise. As I said in the beginning I must really tell you that it caused the most tremendous excitement here when I told it to Reading, Drummond and Briand. I really feel it my duty to give you the picture. Drummond almost broke down and of course I feel it my duty to tell you what Briand said. Would you like to know.

Secretary: Certainly.

Gilbert: Briand said in the first place he was very deeply concerned. He said in the first place that Japan would feel it to be a great diplomatic victory which they had achieved in response to representations which they had made in Washington. The second thing he said was that it would give the Japanese a new lease on life here and so strengthen their position that the efforts of the Council might prove ineffectual. The third thing he said was that he was even more deeply concerned over what might result at home and internationally. The other views Reading expressed to you have been transmitted to Lindsay.⁹¹

Secretary: I have already talked to Lindsay.

Gilbert: Briand said it placed him in an exceedingly difficult position as President of the Council. He spoke of possible unfortunate repercussions in respect to Laval’s visit and its objects; he feels it might mean a failure here which meant a failure in February. That is exactly the expression he used; and I am just reporting to you.

Secretary: I have envisaged all of those things and I am obliged to follow my own judgment on them after giving them careful consideration. Frankly, I do not see how all of those results can happen from that change in the secret meetings.

Gilbert: He thinks it would be well that I ask you in case that they do not any longer invite me to the secret meetings that as a concession I might remain in the public meetings as I have up to now, until they end. Adjournment is expected in a very few days. They are naturally pressing that request.

Secretary: Do not you understand you have permission now to sit in the public meetings?

Gilbert: But only for the first one?

Secretary: My understanding with Reading was that you could continue in the public meetings provided you changed your seat.

Gilbert: They asked that there be no public comment about my changing my seat.

Secretary: There need not be any comment.

Gilbert: It is hard for you to realize the drama which has been built up around my position here.

Secretary: They ought not to have put you in that seat. They ought not to have staged up that point.

Gilbert: It was nothing that I did, sir.

Secretary: I know that.

Gilbert: I have been very careful about publicity. I have had to have my picture taken once or twice coming out of the building.

Secretary: There is not the slightest criticism of you and I do not criticize them.

Gilbert: I am always afraid you will confuse their views with mine. There probably will be only one more public meeting and two at the most. They felt that if I shifted my seat it would cause the press to come out with endless interpretations. I am just presenting their views—what they feel.

Secretary: I do not see how that could arise.

Gilbert: Briand, after expressing himself as I have told you, then said, “Can you make this one request?” I said, “I will most certainly make it.” I had to say that. They will not invite me to any more secret meetings except within the limits of your telegram, and said my changing my seat would be passed all over Europe by the press saying: “What is the significance of this?” and their making all kinds of interpretations. I mentioned this point in the end of my telegram. I would like to read the last paragraph. “I feel that I should tell you that there is constantly being brought to my attention by members of the Council and by representatives of the American press here that the Japanese are with no small success bending every effort to give the appearance that there is a marked division of policy between Washington and Geneva.” This will be the Japanese position. The American press came to me today and said that you felt evacuation was not necessary. I said “Where do you get this sort of thing?” They replied, “Well you know the Japanese pass it out.”

Secretary: As a matter of fact the Japanese have made no representations to us about your seat there or about your position. You must keep your mind off that. They have made no representations whatever. Their conduct has been perfectly all right. There has been no criticism here and you can take that flat and we have not in any way yielded to any Japanese criticism here. There has not been any made.

Gilbert: I am sure that that would have been the case. I wanted to tell you just what is being said here. The American press surrounded me today and all said the same thing.

Secretary: You cannot run a great negotiation like this with such undue attention to the press.

Gilbert: I know that, but I fear the Japanese are actually doing it.

Secretary: What you have got to do is to go ahead and insist on it and when the time comes we will back you up. I have just had a talk with the British Ambassador for the benefit of Lord Beading, to reassure him on the whole question, and I believe he appreciates our position better than you can appreciate it in Geneva both with reference to Tokyo and this country. I said we were doing it that we might hold the ground we have gained so that it might not be lost.

Gilbert: In response to Mr. Briand’s question, if they ask can I tell them whether I can sit in the seat I have occupied in the public meetings, provided they do not invite me to the private meetings? They do not believe there will be more than two more public meetings.

Secretary: Let me ask you this question. Are there any other observers there?

Gilbert: No, sir. No other nations have any observers.

Secretary: Are there any seats there recognized as observer’s seats?

Gilbert: They sit in the audience normally. Of course, something might be fixed up artificially. They want to avoid newspaper comment on the change of seat. I will of course not go to any secret meetings.

Secretary: When does your next public meeting come?

Gilbert: It is not scheduled yet. It has been put off from day to day until they reached—

Secretary: Reading promised me it would be held within forty-eight hours.

Gilbert: They do not want to have a public meeting until—you see they are trying to get something to bring into the public meeting to make it a success and naturally they cannot make commitments. When they meet before the public they wish to make it look successful.

Secretary: My impression is that you are running more of a risk to postpone that meeting and to have other secret meetings in the meanwhile, to which you will not be invited, than you would to have that meeting and wind up by having announced openly the withdrawal of the Japanese objection.

Gilbert: I do not know what they will do. I have to express to you what Mr. Briand said. He talked about it a great deal and after a long consultation with Drummond and with Reading made that request.

Secretary: It is now understood you will go to no more secret meetings.

Gilbert: Except the first one, if there is one.

Secretary: Secret meetings?

Gilbert: I will go to no more secret meetings?

Secretary: You have had your last one now.

Gilbert: They did not have a secret meeting today. They had none. It says in your telegram that I am authorized to sit in today’s secret session, but they did not have one.

Secretary: So that you will go to no other secret meetings now at all. They are agreeable to that? They understand that?

Gilbert: My understanding with Reading was that I would go to the next one, probably tomorrow, but I think there will be no difficulty about my not going to any more secret meetings.

Secretary: But don’t you see, the longer they put it off, the longer they hang in doubt.

Gilbert: I will go to no more secret meetings.

Secretary: They have lost their chance by not holding the one today.

Secretary: You can go to the first open meeting and sit at a regular seat, and then I will inform you about what happens after that.

Gilbert: There is one suggestion I feel I should make to you. Under the provision that we do everything possible to help them, this suggestion was made: I might be under orders to return to Washington for consultation in case this went on much longer, that is before the next time I sit at a meeting it would be announced that I would return to Washington for consultation.

Secretary: I can do that, if they would rather have you go. But I may be able to let you go on in the public meetings.

Gilbert: Mr. Everett⁹³ is exceedingly capable. He is able to carry this forward. I can recommend him fully. They said that it seemed desirable I might be ordered to Washington. I would like some kind of an authorization in case it suddenly came up. I would withdraw from the table. At the same time the Japanese would have the impression that my going to Washington kept a very strong contact on information with the League. I thought that if they felt that way you might be able to approve. I can hardly describe to you how they talked this morning. It was very trying.

Secretary: I see the point.

Gilbert: May I then have your authority, if it reaches that point and Briand asks it, to take that step?

Secretary: I will telegraph you on that. I think I can probably meet that.

Gilbert: You see my point is simply trying to meet them.

Secretary: I have nothing but satisfaction for your action, so do not worry about that.

Gilbert: From a personal point of view, any kind of newspaper comment here will make future work in Geneva a little more difficult. I hope it will be done perfectly smoothly.

Secretary: I think they make a great deal of unnecessary stress out of a matter which can be easily cared for in other ways.

Gilbert: I have to give Briand and Lord Reading the benefit of their sincerity.

Secretary: I know. Before we get through with this situation they will have no doubt about our cooperation and the Japanese will have no doubt about our cooperation and the world will have no doubt of our cooperation, but they must not try to put me in a position where I have not got a secure footing. I think they are unduly excited about what is a very simple matter.

Gilbert: My being ordered away would not cost us anything.

Secretary: I think they have been very hysterical about it but I do not intend to criticize them because I know they are in a difficult position. You are to go to no more private meetings, but you can go to the first public meeting and take your regular seat, and about your seat in subsequent public meetings I will let you know after I have time to reflect over it.

Gilbert: About the other matter. Could I have some kind of general authority to leave Geneva?

Secretary: Yes. You can have that. But I do not want you to go. I hope it can be settled the other way.

Gilbert: They talked about that so strongly. If you were here you would understand. I have a telegram—

Secretary: I am very busy. I am getting ready for the Laval visit.

Gilbert: I must tell you the very latest situation in Manchuria. Would you like to have that read to a stenographer?

Secretary: She is already taking down everything we say. Go ahead.

Gilbert: I am reporting on meetings of the Council as they occur. That, by no means, however, completes the picture of what is taking place here. It is not expedient to bring forward in the Council which has too large a membership for that purpose, the more important developments. These lie in direct conversations between Briand, Reading, Drummond and Grandi, when he is present, and the Chinese and Japanese representatives, but most of the problem seems to be that Japan is standing on two demands. Safety for Japanese lives and property and more general settlement of questions between China and Japan in Manchuria including in particular, questions relating to the South Manchuria Railway. Japan’s position is that the latter does not involve new demands. In other words, it is not in addition to those embraced in the Council resolution of September 30 which was intended by Japan to mean security in a general sense. The interpretation of security in the September 30th resolution has already long been understood to mean immediate safety for Japanese life and property incident to the evacuation. There is a feeling here, however, which I believe I am interpreting correctly, that the Japanese will insist on their objective respecting these general demands before they retire or at least before they will agree to retire. I understand they have made known these demands to Reading, Drummond, and Briand but that the latter are, for reasons which seem to be compelling, keeping this secret at the present time. Their efforts were in the direction of adjusting these demands to a possible Chinese acceptance. If this can be accomplished the problem regarding Japanese withdrawals and Chinese reoccupation can be easily resolved. Reading and Drummond have told me that they did not regard the Japanese demand as particularly exacting and they were hopeful of an adjustment with the Chinese. The Japanese contended that should an agreement be reached with the Chinese prior to evacuation for undertakings during and subsequent to evacuation, the Chinese might not follow out their undertakings in the premises. In reply, the Japanese were informed that these were commitments on the part of China; and that if Japan fulfilled her commitments and China did not, the role of the two disputants would be reversed and Japan would be in the position of a plaintiff. With respect to the negotiations, indicated above, which took place with the Japanese, I have been informed by Drummond that the following was brought out. Drummond informed Sawada⁹⁴ that with respect to the Japanese demand[s] inasmuch as they have been given to him in the strictest confidence, he was unable to divulge them. They could not, therefore, be used as a basis for private negotiations. Second: Drummond told Sawada that in order that this information could be put to a useful purpose it was important that it should be communicated to the members of the Council and even made public.

Such action might strengthen the Japanese case. Moreover, the Chinese might be able at once to accept and if this took place the whole problem would be easier. Sawada replied that he could not express any opinion on this. He would, however, suggest it at once to Tokyo.

Does that give you some conception of the picture?

Secretary: Yes, go on.

[Gilbert:] In other words, they intimate to me that these demands did not seem to be something that could not be gotten around. The Japanese were given to understand that these demands had the appearance of something new. When they were asked, “You are backing away from your September 30th resolution?” They said, “Not at all; we must have security.” When told that security was only supposed to be in connection with evacuation, the Japanese said they required security in a more general sense, and had always meant that.

Secretary: Don’t go into that. That is a matter for the Council to iron out there. I am familiar with everything you have said except for the fact that it is now under discussion. I know of those two points because they have been before me for some weeks, and I have formed the same impression of the feasibility of the Japanese demands.

Gilbert: May I ask one direct question? Do you know the exact demands?

Secretary: I think I do. Of course, I can not tell until I compare them with what you have. But I have had in my possession what the Japanese say are their ultimate demands, for some time.⁹⁵ That is confidential to you and the matter is that it seems to me that that is a matter which is well within the bounds of negotiation and compromise.

Gilbert: That is the way they feel here.

Secretary: That is the way they ought to settle it.

Gilbert: The Japanese still insist that this can not be made public and they will not come out in the open and state the limit of what they want. In that way they do not like to leave it to direct negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese, and have the Japanese make excessive demands which might bring on war with China. They feel that the Japanese should commit themselves in public to do something definite.

Secretary: Can’t they commit themselves? Would it not serve the same purpose if the Japanese committed themselves in private to those demands in the Council? But the Council must remember that if there is one thing an Oriental negotiator dislikes to do it is to make his demands public, and they do not care at all to negotiate in public. The Council will have to find some way of permitting them to negotiate their own way and yet protect the other fellow against oppression.

Gilbert: I see your point. That is very helpful. I consider that this conversation will not make a cable necessary.

Secretary: Send your cable just the same. I have just sent you a telegram⁹⁶ in answer to your cable I received this morning reporting on the situation and I have just said the same thing to you. I have commented on the facts you gave me in that cable and I have asked you to send more cables like it and I will comment on those. We have been talking long enough on this now. You go ahead and send that cable and keep me informed up to date as rapidly as you can on everything that takes place and I will answer as fast as I can.

Gilbert: I am doing that to the utmost of my ability.

Secretary: It meets my full approval and I will try to get you my comments back as soon as your reports come in.

Gilbert: You do not wish a cable on this?

Secretary: I do wish it sent me. That would be helpful.

Gilbert: I think your suggestion about Orientals working in private will probably interest them very much.

Secretary: You do not have to code your own telegrams do you?

Gilbert: No, sir.

Secretary: You have someone else to do that?

Gilbert: We have three men who have been coding from two o’clock in the morning until six o’clock at night.

Secretary: I will see if I can get you any further help. I do not want you to have to do it yourself.

Gilbert: There are a great number of telegrams to go out in these confidential codes and sometimes it takes two or three hours for a couple of pages.

Secretary: You need not send that one then if it is going to throw that extra burden on you. The stenographer probably got it. This conversation has come in very clearly.

Gilbert: Lord Reading said that yesterday it was very bad. Will I hear from you on that other point? May I not sit at the table a second time, if necessary?

Secretary: You can sit there the first time. I am going to telegraph you about the second time.

Gilbert: About my coming to Washington, have I that permission?

Secretary: You have permission in case it becomes material.

Gilbert: Otherwise, if Briand says I wish that you would do this, as it would help me enormously, I will say yes.

88. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. Gilbert in Geneva, October 20, 1931, 12:30 p.m.
89. No. 103, October 19, 6 p.m., p. 259.
90. See memorandum of trans-Atlantic telephone conversation, p. 248.
91. Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador at Washington.
93. Curtis T. Everett, Consul at Geneva.
94. Setsuzo Sawada, Japanese delegate to League of Nations Assembly in 1931, with rank of Minister.
95. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 14, 1931, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 24 (793.94/2175).
96. See telegram No. 107, October 20, noon, to the Consul at Geneva, p. 263.