Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2246: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, October 20, 1931—noon.
[Received October 21—3:40 a.m.⁸⁷]

My October 18, 10 a.m.

1. Following is identic text of telegram which I, with the British, French and German Ministers, am sending reporting conversation yesterday with President Chiang Kai-shek.

2.

“President invited me and my French, American [British] and German colleagues to meet him again on October 19. In course of general discussion he invited our observations on a proposal which he understood to be under consideration at Geneva that Council should fix a time limit for withdrawal of Japanese troops, that within this time limit negotiations without observers regarding details of evacuation should be opened between Chinese and Japanese representatives, and that neutral observers should be attached to Chinese side only to watch transfer. In reply to our inquiries he said that without observers present at these evacuation negotiations such an arrangement would not satisfy China as there would be no guarantee that withdrawal would be completed in time specified, and he referred to failure of Japanese to withdraw by October 14 as promised to Council on September 30. He requested us to impress following three points on our respective Governments.

(1) That everything possible should be done to expedite withdrawal, further delay in which was fraught with grave dangers;

(2) Neutral observers should be present to watch arrangements for withdrawal and after; and

(3) China trusts Council will not adjourn until withdrawal has been completed, as Japan is playing for adjournment re infecta as had happened on September 30.

He also emphasized with usual arguments, difficulties and dangers with which Chinese Government would be faced in regard to internal situation, especially from the Left, if Council failed to find a solution.”

3. [Paraphrase.] Pursuant to action taken at Geneva and acting under instructions from their Governments, my British, French, and German colleagues yesterday presented identic notes to the Chinese Government inviting its attention to article II of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

4. Today the situation may be summarized thus: The Japanese effectively occupy South Manchuria. In this area they have succeeded in paralyzing the Chinese administration. They have carried out a systematic campaign, including the bombing of Chinchow, calculated to destroy the confidence of the people in this area in the Chinese administration. The reports from Hanson and Salisbury and those to the British Minister from his observers in Manchuria indicate that the Japanese occupation forces have no present intention of withdrawing from their present positions. Thus far the Chinese have shown an admirable control of their people who are getting increasingly inflamed against the Japanese. The latter state they will not alter their present positions until the Chinese have started negotiations and afforded adequate guarantees. In short, the Japanese intention apparently is to hold South Manchuria in pledge until the Chinese are obliged to negotiate for its restoration.

5. The Chinese, on the other hand, insist they cannot negotiate with the Japanese so long as they occupy areas outside those previously held.

6. To my British and French colleagues and to myself conditions seem to be nearing a crisis. We feel the situation is urgent and some action is necessary to enable both sides without either losing face to work out a solution of their troubles. With conditions as described above, we find it extremely difficult, however, to determine what suggestions to make. The Japanese seem to have so worked themselves up that the mere suggestion of their withdrawing their forces preparatory to negotiations is taken by them as an insult and as an undue interference in Japan’s domestic policies.

7. Suggesting to the Chinese the burying of their pride and the beginning of negotiations while Japan still occupies Chinese territory, we feel, would amount to telling them they must accept whatever terms the Japanese wish to impose upon them.

8. To me it has seemed that the best thing all around would be if both parties might be persuaded to propose discussing the matter under the Nine-Power Treaty relating to principles and policies, article 7. There would certainly seem to be no question of a Japanese loss of face should this convention be availed of, since it does not call for anything new in the way of a set-up. In my opinion, the only question in article 7 is the interpretation of the phrase “nations concerned,” which would appear to limit discussion to the two countries involved, whereas in the present situation it seems desirable for all parties to the Washington treaty to meet for the purpose of facilitating a settlement.

9. President Chiang Kai-shek is showing fairly frequently a desire to consult with us, and we do not see any harm in meeting him. Rather we believe the meetings offer us an opportunity here for good counsel. [End paraphrase.]

Johnson

87. Telegram in three sections.