793.94/2203: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
1. Following is message which is being sent in identical wording by myself, British and French Ministers:
2.
“President invited me and my French and American [British] colleagues to meet him today privately on October 17th. Following is our joint report on interview.
(2) President opened the discussion by inquiring whether we had yet received replies from our Governments regarding despatch of troops to Shanhaikwan to watch acts of Japanese there. On our replying in the negative, he told us that he had just received telegraphic information from Chang Hsueh-liang that Chinese troops were being withdrawn westwards to avoid contact with Japanese but indicated that he still feared that Japanese intended to provoke an incident with a view to occupying the city and pass and thus cutting off Manchuria from the rest of China. He then referred to situation at Shanghai where according to his reports Japanese were similarly to provoke an incident. Japanese Consul had twice called on Mayor in connection with securing supplies for Japanese (which Mayor had agreed to arrange) and had on both occasions given a vague warning that trouble was to be expected in a few days. President begged that attention of our Governments might be specifically drawn to both Shanhaikwan and Shanghai during the next few days.
(3) Referring to general situation President developed the argument that it was essential to deal firmly with Japan in this crisis. It was due to the weak attitude of the Chinese especially in Manchuria that the crisis had arisen. China was now determined to see the thing through. He hoped that the League and America would equally realize the necessity of dealing firmly with the situation. Only thus could Japan be induced to see.
(4) His Excellency then referred to the difference in the psychology of the Chinese troops inside and outside the Wall. The latter were traditionally afraid of and cowed by the Japanese Army. The former had no such inferiority complex.
On the contrary they were spoiling for fight with Japan. He mentioned in illustration of this point the Tsinanfu incident of 1928 [in?] which he had to restrain his troops from continuing hostile attitude. If, therefore, the Japanese Government took any hostile action inside the Wall a clash was unavoidable. He wished us clearly to understand that this was in no sense meant as a threat but that in such circumstances hostilities would be inevitable.
(5) The President referred to the Nine-Power Pact and the incompatibility thereto of the 1915 agreements which had been wrested from China by force. Did we not think they should have been brought up for general discussion? We referred to a well-known attitude of Japan as formulated at the Washington Conference and on other [Page 229] occasions that she would not permit these agreements to be called in question, and we expressed the view that it would be a mistake to bring them into the picture at the present time when the League and America were concentrating on the immediate problem of preventing serious hostilities.
(6) In conclusion the President made the following observations which he asked might be regarded as an official declaration and communicated to our respective Governments. The Japanese Foreign Office might be to some extent susceptible to the public opinion of the world. This was not the case with the Japanese general staff. The latter had taken advantage of the preoccupation of the foreign powers with the Great War to extort from China the 1915 agreement. They were similarly now seeking to take advantage of the preoccupation of the foreign powers with the world-wide economic crisis to repeat this maneuver.
But the National Government and the China of 1931 were not the same as the Chinese Government and the China of 1915; nor was he, Chiang Kai-shek, the same as Yuan Shih-kai. Under no circumstance would China now yield to threats of force nor negotiate in any shape or form until the Japanese troops had been withdrawn and the status quo ante September 18 restored. His Excellency repeated this statement with the greatest earnestness and speaking with a vigor and intensity of purpose which convinced us of his sincerity requested that we would report his words to our respective governments.”
3. Reference to despatch of troops by foreign governments. Such a request was made of the British, French and Italians. I was also approached but replied that we had no forces at Shanhaikwan, implying that we had none to send. I made inquiry at Peiping as to truth of report that Japanese had landed or intended to land troops. No reply has been received.
4. President expressed belief that Japanese were deliberately laying the ground to provoke an incident at Shanghai or at Shanhaikwan.
- Telegram in two sections.↩