711.632/54
The Minister in Austria (Washburn) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 16.]
Sir: Referring to my telegram No. 1 of February 7th, 11 a.m., and to the Department’s telegrams No. 2 of February 8th, 1 p.m.,3 and No. 3 of February 12th, 6 p.m., I have the honor to report that the news that the Senate had given its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Austria subject to a reservation caused a visible, if temporary, annoyance in the Austrian Foreign Office. The proposal to limit the term of the sixth paragraph of Article VII in a manner similar to that in the Commercial Treaty with Germany was not at first understood here, especially as it was immediately recalled that Article XXV in the draft form as agreed upon provided for the special termination of the sixth paragraph of Article VII in accordance with the German Treaty precedent. The amendment to Article XXV was made at the last moment, it will be remembered, at my suggestion pursuant to instructions received in the Department’s telegram No. 29 of June 5th, 1928, 4 p.m.,4 where, inter alia, it was said:
“Department has altered policy toward Senate reservation to Article VII of German Treaty and is signing treaty with another country including provision for the national treatment of shipping obligatory for full term of treaty. Department would prefer to have all treaties submitted to the Senate the next session uniform in this respect.”
The Foreign Office here, including the Chancellor, with whom I talked yesterday, now understand and appreciate the situation fully.
There were two factors that contributed to the Government’s discomfort: (1) the necessity of laying this matter de novo before a Cabinet Council and going to Parliament again to receive sanction for the alteration, inasmuch as under the Austrian constitutional system no change can be made in a treaty without parliamentary sanction, just as with us the advice and consent of the Senate are required; (2) there has been some apprehension that the Opposition may criticise the Government for not having anticipated this difficulty. This fear still exists and if it proves to be well founded, the Government can only answer that the difficulty was foreseen and provided for; that the Treaty was altered at the last moment at our suggestion; and that apparently the State Department and the Senate were not in full accord on this matter. The point is not overlooked here that one-third of the Senate can defeat ratification and that [Page 849] concessions must be made to a very considerable minority. It has been pointed out to me that if the original provision had been retained it would probably have passed through Parliament without attracting the slightest attention or comment. Now attention must be focused upon this exception and there may be some unpleasantness. It is hoped however that the ways may be smoothed before hand, but much will depend upon the parliamentary temper at the moment. At all events there is likely to be a delay of some weeks which the Government would have preferred to have avoided. I fear the disposition may be in future to await action by the Senate before taking parliamentary action here. In any case the necessity of embroidering the Treaty effected through an exchange of notes is deplored here. It was referred to by one of the Ministers at the Foreign Office as a “Schönheitsfehler”—in other words, a blemish.
Awaiting the more definite instructions forecasted in the final paragraph of the Department’s before-mentioned telegram No. 3,
I have [etc.]
- Neither printed.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 994.↩