760C.6215/559
The Ambassador in Poland (Willys) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 13.]
Sir: In despatch No. 1025 of October 20, 1931, I had the honor to inform the Department of the concern felt by the Polish Government over the tenor of recent articles in American newspapers which treated of the question of Polish-German frontiers.
M. Lipski, Acting Political Director of the Foreign Office, took occasion today to discuss the question at greater length with a member of the Embassy. He explained that in addition to the unfortunate effect of such publicity on public opinion in Poland, it was feared that press comment of this kind, if continued, would unfortunately influence the German point of view. This would be particularly regrettable at this time when far-reaching negotiations of the utmost general importance were pending (presumably he had reference to inter-governmental debts, reparation payments and disarmament).
M. Lipski went on to say that Poland has determined on a policy of appeasement and cooperation with Germany. Psychologically, revisionist sympathy from a quarter so influential as that of the United States made the fruition of such a policy more remote.
Recapitulating, M. Lipski explained that the aforesaid policy had found expression in the ratification by Poland of the commercial treaty, in great restraint both in redaction and press comment at the time of the Polish protest over the Breslau demonstration (vide despatch No. 800 of June 10, 193134a) and in respect of the proposed German-Austrian [Page 602] customs union35 and various other concrete instances. Moreover, Poland had exerted all possible influence, but in vain, to prevail upon Germany to continue the joint marketing agreement for rye; an innovation which had demonstrated the feasibility of agricultural cooperation between the two nations.
In respect of Germany, there is, of course, but the one major point of Polish policy: security of the common boundary. From the general nature of M. Lipski’s observations, which covered a wide field, his conception of the Polish attitude toward Germany may be defined as follows: appeasement in the sense of conciliation but not of concession. This may be attributed less to reluctance to yield some minor material advantage to Germany than to apprehension lest Germany on acquiring any such advantage would feel encouraged to demand a “Hinterland” for it.
An Eastern Locarno or a prolonged political truce would solve, at least temporarily, Poland’s paramount foreign political problem. It would do more than anything else to obviate the menace of an enduring and highly perilous sentiment of reconquest in Germany. On the other hand, a bilateral agreement to stabilize the existing frontiers would only be regarded by Germany as submission to an onerous servitude. The prospect therefore, of a facile adjustment on a mutually acceptable basis is indeed remote.
Sentiment is so aroused in Germany over the “Corridor” it is difficult to foresee how any German Government could enjoy sufficient authority to accept without compensation a stabilization of the Polish-German boundary. It is, therefore, to be hoped that Poland will not count on the nuisance value of the Corridor as alone adequate to induce the French Government to insist, without the pill being coated on Germany’s accepting the present status as a condition precedent to Franco-German financial and/or political cooperation.
The Corridor is territorially unimportant. Its value is solely that of a channel of communications. It would seem lamentable if some nonterritorial, largely mechanical or administrative compromise could not be evolved to facilitate a permanent betterment of Polish-German relations. To quote an apt—but private—remark of M. Jules Sauerwein:35a “anything would work in times of peace; in wartime there would be no ‘Corridor’”.
Respectfully yours,