462.00R296/4700: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State
266. For the President and the Acting Secretary from Stimson. The President’s message of congratulation pleases me very much.73 It would have been quite impossible for Mr. Mellon and myself to have weathered the emergency in which we found ourselves so suddenly placed had it not been for the carefully thought out instructions and advice which we received from Washington.
Although the German situation is very serious and Chancellor Bruening expects further trouble shortly, and although the British also have become pessimistic as a result of withdrawals from the Bank of England, still there is general agreement that our policy of attaining a limited objective was a wise one. The only notable exception to this statement is taken by the London Times. Its objection is based upon the impossible assumption that we should have tackled the problems of reparations and debts. It is my own view that the chief value of the Conference will be found in the direction of political improvement in Europe. There has been a genuine change in the relations between the French and German Governments. It has been possible for me to measure it in connection with the French attitude toward the United States. When I arrived at Paris with the question of the London Conference not yet settled, the French attitude toward the United States Government and toward me was so frosty and stiff as to be almost uncomfortable. Gradually Laval’s attitude has become more friendly, until this morning I had a conversation with him which was friendly and intimate beyond my most fervent expectations. We discussed the Franco-German situation first of all. I indicated to him how we were following that closely as a measure of the success of the Conference. He then told me of his talks with Bruening. The underlying problem which would solve everything else was the question of the Polish Corridor.73a If that could only be solved France would have no other real trouble with Germany. Laval told me of the political difficulties he had faced when the moratorium proposal was first announced. However, he added that the same people who had at first condemned him for yielding to it were now voluntarily coming to congratulate him. The conversation then turned to Italy. Laval [Page 550] said that the naval question was nothing at all and that it could and would be settled in a moment. However, Laval wanted to make a general settlement with Mussolini. He and Mussolini had confidentially agreed that they would meet for a general conference during the long vacation. From my recent experience in Italy I was able to give him encouragement as to Mussolini’s general attitude toward peace.]
Laval then quite voluntarily shifted the conversation to Great Britain. He said that as soon as he had returned to Paris he intended to call in the [directors?] of the Bank of France and urge them and the other large banking institutions as strongly as possible to check their withdrawals of credit from London. He said that he knew perfectly well that unless he did this it would simply mean that the purpose of the London Conference would fail, for the British would otherwise have to withdraw their credits from Germany. When I told him of my appreciation for his remarks, he said that he believed that this was the key to the situation. Our conversation had taken place entirely alone until the French Ambassador, De Fleuriau, arrived. As he is an old friend of mine his entry did not mar the conversations.
Mellon and I dined with Bruening last evening. I had an extended and extremely satisfactory talk with the German Chancellor.74 We discovered that following the battle of Cambrai during the unsettled days of January, 1918, I was patrolling with the British on one side of the Bourlon Woods while Bruening had been a machine gunner on the other side. With that as a point of departure we plunged into the whole matter of disarmament and the future peace of Europe. I told Bruening all I had against Germany since 1864. He convinced me of his sincerity toward peace. He also told me of his conversation with Laval, so I was able to get that picture from both sides. Bruening said that I would find Hindenburg’s attitude toward peace the same as his own.
I am leaving tonight and shall reach Berlin on the afternoon of the 25th. On the morning of the 27th I shall have a conference with Hindenburg and shall return to London that afternoon. Then after a few days of further conferences I am going to Scotland for the rest which the President has so kindly suggested. I wish that the President and the others of you who have been handling these problems from the Washington end could do the same. [Stimson.]