500.A15 Naval Holiday/16
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of Conversations With the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Grandi), Rome, July 9, 11, and 12, and With the Head of the Italian Government (Mussolini), Rome, July 12, 1931
Thursday evening, July 9, at the dinner at the Embassy Grandi suggested to me at the table where we sat in adjacent seats that a naval holiday63 be taken by all the great naval nations as an appropriate accompaniment of the Hoover moratorium. I said I thought that it would be a very graceful and appropriate gesture, but did not say anything further. On Saturday evening, July 11, at the Castle at Nettuno, where Grandi spent the night with our party, he and I sat talking after dinner for a long time. The question of Germany’s conduct at the present time in relation to disarmament came up. Grandi said that France accused Germany of not having disarmed. I said, “Do you agree to that?” He said, “No, she has disarmed,” and he told me the matter had been taken up by the recent meeting of the Council of Ambassadors who had investigated the matter and although France made a finding to the effect that she had not disarmed, the others refused to support her and an equivocal or negative finding was made. I told Grandi that I thought Germany’s insistence on building the Deutschland was a piece of folly; that she would have a much stronger case before the General Disarmament Congress if she went before them frankly disarmed and depended on their good faith as her protection. He agreed with me and said that in his opinion she had a perfectly good case for holding the other nations to a reduction in arms, in view of her own helpless position.
In discussing the attitude of France, Grandi twice said that Italy would not stand for French hegemony in Europe, but that the Italian policy would be for a balance of power in which they stood side by side with Britain. When he repeated this the second time, which was during the following evening, Sunday, July 12, I warned him that they should nevertheless be careful that their theory of the balance of power did not lead to another alignment of two groups of nations like the old triple alliance and triple entente, for that would be the surest way of bringing about competition and ultimate war. He asked me for my views. I told him I had not thought out any remedy with which I was satisfied, that I thought the League of Nations had furnished some very useful machinery to the nations of Europe in their relations towards each other of which the two chief instruments were, first, the constant regular meetings [Page 545] two or three times a year between the foreign ministers of the different countries, at which they ironed out difficulties and potential sources of trouble, and, second, the ability in case of an emergency to call the Council together for discussion. I told him of Sir Edward Grey’s64 alleged statement that if he had had available in 1914 machinery by which he could have compelled a conference of the European Powers during the twelve days preceding the war he could have prevented the war.
I told Grandi that the League of Nations furnished a really long step forward in diplomatic relations in respect to European affairs and I spoke of Mr. Root’s65 attitude towards it. I told him that my experience had rather convinced me that the best possible thing for the United States was [to remain?] outside of the League and that we would lose our influence and moral power if we were put in a position where we had to discuss on equal terms with the other nations the routine problems and squabbles of Europe. We were not fitted for that and we would never do it well. I said that I thought our real role was to throw our influence to help in major emergencies, such as the present one, and that we were in a better position to do that when we were aloof from the routine one.
I asked Grandi his views of the different French statesmen who would be likely to succeed Briand. He said that Boncour and Herriot were the two most nearly in line with him and spoke rather well of Boncour. Flandin, the Minister of Finance, he described as an able man, but a follower of Tardieu and opposed to Briand.
With respect to Yugoslavia, he said he rather reserved his troubles with Yugoslavia for another time because he did not want to bother me about it. I asked him whether France was really furnishing Yugoslavia with a navy and he told me no, he did not think she was, but he said that Yugoslavia was rather hard to deal with and that since France had begun to arm, the land forces of Yugoslavia were being armed.
I talked with him about Albania and King Zog, and he told me of the arrangement they had made to pay money, about $2,000,000 a year, to Albania. Garrett afterwards told me that this was recognized as giving Italy virtually a mortgage over Albania. (Note: I talked with our Military Attaché, Colonel Collins, and he told me that he was in Vienna when King Zog was shot at by the assassins and gave me the details of that and how he, Collins, had furnished the first information of it to Albania.) Grandi said that his relations with the Labour Government of England was one of his bright [Page 546] spots; that he had been able to be on better relations with them than with any preceding Government and he said that Henderson got on very well with Mussolini.
We several times talked of the Franco-Italian naval break last March. He did not care to go into details about it. Grandi, however, feels that an agreement was made on the first of March66 and he is ready to take the matter up again whenever France makes the move. He thinks it is up to her to do it. I said I would try to start things up with both Briand and Henderson as I moved on. We both agreed that it was imperative that a solution of that naval problem should be arrived at before the opening of the disarmament conference and Grandi is anxious that it be taken up this summer.
On Sunday evening, July 12, among other things, we had a long talk over the present constitution of Italy and the Fascist program. Grandi frankly recognizes that the present Fascist regime is transitory, is not a permanent solution. He, however, thinks that it is perfectly safe in the saddle and cannot be overthrown by its enemies. He described to me the evolution that they were trying to work out the formation of the eleven corporations of industries and the enrollment of all citizens therein and how it was intended to work out. I learned incidentally that the Italian citizen votes only for his deputy and the member of his local board. The Governors of all provinces are at present appointive; also the mayors of the cities. After a choice of mayors by popular election had been tried, it was abandoned.
In the evening of Sunday, July 12, I told Grandi of the receipt of a cable from the President asking me to sound out the different nations on the subject of a two years’ naval holiday in laying down ships, making it clear that it did not cover completion of ships under construction and the reasons probably why. I asked him if he saw any objection to my going ahead and sounding out other nations and he said no, and he would stand by without doing anything until he heard from me. I told him that we were not seeking to take the lead in this matter, but took the position that we would or would not lead according as it would seem to be likely to produce the best results. I told him frankly that the suggestion had come from him and that if it would seem likely to carry, the suggestion had probably better come from Europe, but that we, as I expressed it, would try to be good soldiers in a common cause and would work it out in a way most likely to be successful. He said that Italy would take the same position.
In the afternoon of Sunday, July 12, while we were in Nettuno Castle, Mussolini appeared alone except for a mechanic in a motor speed boat and invited Mrs. Stimson and myself to go out for a run [Page 547] with him. While I was sitting alone with him in the boat waiting for Mrs. Stimson, I told him that a few days ago Grandi had suggested to me the naval holiday; that I had reported it to Washington and we thought it would be a good thing to do and that I was going to sound out the countries in respect to it in case he saw no objections to such a proposal. I explained to him that we thought the suggestion should be for a naval holiday of two years and might possibly be extended to some forms of land armaments, and I asked him his views on it. He said he agreed perfectly with the suggestion and he thought it would be a good thing for me to go ahead and sound it out. When Grandi came back in the evening I told him I had had this talk with Mussolini.