Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I

033.1140 Stimson, H. L./142

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of Conversations With the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Grandi), Rome, July 9, 1931, 12 noon and 4 p.m.

Rome, July 9, 1931, noon to 4 p.m.

Ambassador John W. Garrett took me to Grandi’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is in the old Austrian Embassy to the Quirinal, and we were met by Vitetti⁵² who took us into Grandi’s room. The conference took place, Vitetti acting as interpreter, and the Ambassador sitting in.

I began by telling him of my appreciation of the kindness and courtesies we had been shown. I spoke of my appreciation of the comforts of the voyage on the Conte Grande, mentioning specifically the Captain. We talked for about three-quarters of an hour.

I brought up first the debt moratorium.⁵³ He was very enthusiastic about it and characterized it as a fine gesture of the President taking great courage, and he said he thought it would end the depression and repeated this several times. He expressed regret over the slowing down which had occurred from the French delay, but said he thought that would be obviated now that it was settled. He said Italy was wholeheartedly with us. I described to Grandi the difficulties which the President had encountered in making it and told him why it had been impossible not to give more notice to our brother nations, telling him that the President did not know until Thursday afternoon whether he would have the assent of Congress and then it began leaking so fast that he had to make his announcement on Saturday evening, earlier than he had expected. Grandi said the very fact that it had been unexpected added to the good effect of the message. I explained to Grandi that our diagnosis of the situation in Europe had been correct, that Germany was living on borrowed money necessarily borrowed on short-terms on account of her lack of credit, and that we found that the situation was made no better by the lack of confidence which made people withdraw their credits from Germany, although our saving banks were full of unused capital. We felt the thing was to restore the confidence and set aside the psychology of fear which was upon everyone and that we felt our act would do that. He very cordially agreed.

I took up the question of disarmament. He expressed his great interest in it and how much Italy was for it and brought up the question of whether the General Disarmament Conference would go on on time. I told him it would be a catastrophe if it did not and explained that I had been quoted as desiring a postponement, but that that was not true. I explained to him in detail exactly what my position had been since last Autumn when I was sounded out by the British and the French as to an American official of the Conference. He had already expressed himself as to the importance of doing what we had learned in the London Conference,⁵⁴ namely, of solving the preliminary political problems before the Conference and stated that the London Conference would not have been a success except for the work done between Britain and America. He told me how he himself had tried to get France to solve their problems before the London Conference but had failed.

I told him that I thoroughly agreed with him on that and went on to tell him how I had urged upon Britain and France last Winter the necessity of doing similar work for the General Disarmament Conference. I pointed out that even if America abolished its entire army and navy it would not alter the problems existing between France and Germany and France and Italy, to which he agreed. I told him that I felt we must meet on the day set in February and go on, and we would be there even if we knew that no result could be expected until after the French elections, to which he thoroughly agreed. I asked him the direct question how he felt about postponement and he said he agreed with me that it would be a disaster.

In the course of our talk he said he was coming to see me in the afternoon and asked me when I would be in. I said I would be at his service whenever he wanted me and he then moved forward his appointment from 5 to 4 o’clock in order to have more time with me and when he came in the afternoon he remained for one and three-quarters of an hour until it was time for me to go and see Mussolini.

In the afternoon conference he brought up the Franco-Italian naval disagreement,⁵⁵ which we merely touched on in the morning and I emphasized the importance of getting it settled before the Disarmament Conference. I told him that I thought the success of the Hoover moratorium would make the atmosphere easier for the Franco-Italian naval agreement, to which he agreed. He told me of his disappointment at its failure in March. I told him I thought the British in their disappointment had perhaps lost their temper a little and that it would be easier when they all met again which he said he had noticed himself.

Speaking in the afternoon of the debt moratorium, he told me of his interview with Mr. Garrett in which he brought up the outside question (meaning the Customs Union).⁵⁶ He spoke of this rather apologetically, telling me that when he afterwards saw Mussolini and informed him of Hoover’s proposal Mussolini was most cordial about the effect of the settlement and the necessity psychologically of an immediate acquiescence of Italy. I told him that we appreciated the difficulties between the European nations politically, but that it was impossible for us to have America go into them and appear to take sides in them, and therefore we felt they must be kept out of the moratorium question altogether except possibly the disarmament problem which affected all nations alike.

I asked him his views about the Customs Union, saying that I hoped to get a more impartial view from Italy than from either France or Germany. He said he appreciated the difficulties of the tariff barriers in Central Europe, but felt that there must be a settlement not between Germany and Austria alone but between all of those countries. He seemed to feel that the Customs Union was more in favor of Germany than Austria or any of the other countries; that this was shown to have been so by the less enthusiastic attitude of those countries towards it. He also indicated that he was afraid of having the pressure of combined Germany and Austria upon his country at Trieste at the head of the Adriatic. I told him that I appreciated all that, but, on the other hand, I could not altogether blame Germany; everybody knew that the tariff situation in Central Europe had been intolerable since the end of the war and yet nobody had done anything. Germany had now acted at a bad time and had by her act evidently prevented an agreement which was being reached on the navies between France and Italy, but that nevertheless I could see their point of view. He agreed that their action at that time had prevented an accord.

I then asked him about Communism in Italy and the effect of the depression on Italy. He told me the trouble was mainly with their agricultural products; that Italy had not suffered as much as the more highly organized countries and only in the more northern part. He said that they had suffered most in their manufacture of fertilizers, that they had saved their automobile industry and their marine industry, as well as their textiles, but their agricultural products had suffered. He said they were not afraid of Russia. Communism was not making any great progress among their laborers, although there was some unrest. We talked of the Russian problem. He told me of a meeting he had had with Litvinoff⁵⁷ at Milan, and while the meeting was going on the Chief of Police had come to him and told him that he had had to handcuff some Communists and Grandi had told him to go ahead and treat them as severely as necessary and had told Litvinoff to that effect. I then told him the story of my issuing a passport to a Russian naturalized citizen named [omission] because I rather believed in the different policy of not giving them the advertisement of a grievance. I told him that America’s chief defense against Communism was the satisfaction of the American citizens with their own Government and that our American Federation of Labor was our chief barrier against Communism; that every American laborer wanted to be a capitalist.

I asked him what he thought Mussolini would want to hear about when I met him and he said he thought he would like to hear about the debt moratorium. He was very deeply interested in that. He brought up again the Franco-Italian naval conferences and wanted to know whether we had better not take it up before Autumn. I told him we did not like to butt in in a matter between France and Italy and Britain, but that I would tell Briand very vigorously how important I thought it was to settle this before the General Conference. He seemed very much pleased with that.

Our whole interview was most frank and he expressed himself as very appreciative of what I had said about Italy’s attitude. I asked him directly whether Italy and France had made any progress on their side political questions. He said no, that prior to the Naval Conference when he brought it up France would not take them up before the Naval Conference was settled and now she seemed to think that Italy, having come on to her side on the Customs Union matter, there was no use of going ahead with these other things. On the other hand, he himself thought the very fact that Italy had been friendly to France in the Customs Union matter ought to make it more easy for France to come to an agreement on the Navy. He spoke warmly of Briand and said he appreciated it was necessary to support Briand against the French marine. He said the African question could be settled very easily. I asked him what progress they were making in the development of Tripoli and Libya. He said they were making good progress, but it was a big affair and required a lot of money and he thought it would take at least thirty years, as France had spent almost double that time in her development of Africa. He impressed me as having developed in maturity and confidence since I had seen him in London.⁵⁸

52. Leonardo Vitetti, head of the Office for the Study of Political Questions in the League of Nations section of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
53. See pp. 1 ff.
54. For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference of 1930, see Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
55. See pp. 358 ff.
56. See telegram No. 101, June 22, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Italy, p. 219; for correspondence concerning the proposed Austro-German Customs Union, see pp. 565 ff.
57. Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
58. At the Naval Conference of 1930.