500.A15a4/335

The Ambassador in France (Edge) to President Hoover

Dear Mr. President: I wrote you on June 9th a general review of the French situation, principally as it related to our interest in armament limitation and reduced budgets, covering the period up to and including the German-English conferences at Chequers. I ventured at that time to suggest the advisability of the United States asserting world leadership in economic rehabilitation, mainly, however, as an [Page 510] aid to disarmament. Your bold and courageous proposal,23 coupled with the readiness of the United States to make the greatest sacrifice, effectively terminated the insinuations and criticisms from abroad of American selfishness and lack of vision and immediately put Europe on the defensive. It appears to me that now is the time to strike the next blow by preparing an unanswerable challenge to those who oppose armament reduction.

In this connection, it might be helpful to you to have my reaction as to the present and possible future policy in France following the momentous happenings initiated by your proposal of June 20th, up to and including Secretary Stimson’s visit and the close of the London conference.

It matters not whether the year’s debt moratorium was or was not designed to be directly related to disarmament: nevertheless, the necessity for reduced budgets in order to help meet the present economic difficulties was naturally emphasized all the more through your action in this regard. Secretary Stimson’s visit to Italy before reaching France, and the generally accepted understanding that his discussions with Mussolini and Grandi were mainly on the subject of disarmament, has naturally had its repercussions in France and it may readily be concluded that the recent French Memorandum on disarmament, which had been in preparation since January but was only published on July 22nd last, was put out at this time as a warning to the rest of the world of France’s position on this subject. Just as we experienced annoying and sometimes irritating delays in securing France’s accord to the debt moratorium,24 so it is inevitable that France will again be the center of opposition to a successful disarmament conference.

One of the initial troubles we faced in our conversations with the French on the debt postponement was the sensitiveness, always apparent in French officialdom. Being the second largest creditor of Germany, they were considerably peeved because they were not consulted before the pronouncement. Of course, this was not entirely correct but, nevertheless, we were compelled to spend much valuable time endeavoring to dissipate this feeling. I hope there won’t be even a partial excuse for a similar attitude in connection with the disarmament conference. Unfortunately, while Secretary Stimson was here, he was necessarily engulfed in the aftermath of German financial difficulties so that all his time, as you well know, was in consultation with officials on that subject. I talked with him as to the possibility of discussing disarmament casually and incidentally but it seemed impossible under the circumstances. (Marriner informs [Page 511] me the Secretary did, however, have some disarmament conversation with Laval in London and I shall write him to find out how that developed). I feel it is most important, if I can have the benefit of your judgment or the possible program you may have in mind, that I or someone representing you frankly discuss very soon the whole subject and its possibilities with both Laval and Briand. By doing this we shall at least escape any future charge of ignoring them. I do not expect to get far in these advance conversations. I well understand that the French will refer to the various arguments they have presented in the Memorandum. Nevertheless, I feel it is the first step and we shall at least have placed them in a position that they must admit their cooperation has been sought.

I don’t know just what your program to bring about reduced armaments will be, although from a word or two with the Secretary in the short time we had to discuss this subject, I gathered the impression that the proposal would be in the nature of a naval holiday for perhaps two years. Whether to this would be added, in order to reach land and air defenses, a reduction of, say, 25% from the totals heretofore appropriated for national defense, or would touch the debt situation, I am likewise uninformed. I mentioned all these possibilities in my letter of June 9th as the basis of a method that I thought might be effectively used in France. It is obvious that at the end of the period of suspension France would have relatively the same strength in comparison with other countries as she has today: that there would be no excuse for France to discuss parity and it would seem that it might be somewhat embarassing for her to refuse to join with other nations in the world where her much discussed security remains relatively unchanged. As to naval reduction, there would, of course, arise technical questions and comparisons of obsolete tonnage but that doesn’t alter the principle of the proposal.

I am convinced from my year and a half’s contact with French officials that we shall not finally get an agreement with them unless they have the acquiescence of public opinion, and in this objective we should try at least to first have their cooperation, which is not impossible. The French are among the most heavily taxed people in the world (although many of them evade their taxes), and any movement to decrease the budget, still retaining relative security, will have a certain support in France. It will not be easy because, in addition to technical objections, along will come the old insistence that they need their present fleet for three unprotected coast lines, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Channel, so forth and so on. I am certain that the only way to bring France to any understanding in this regard, if she can be moved at all, is to place her practically alone and on the defensive, that is, if she resists all reasonable efforts to join in initiating a real disarmament policy.

[Page 512]

Only in partnership, accompanied by long and tedious conversations, can they possibly be induced to materially amend their position clearly stated in their Memorandum of July 22nd. It must be admitted that the desire for security is not alone a feeler for trading purposes but is a sentiment deeply ingrained in the French people and means to the average Frenchman something tangible: no more invasion; no more devastated regions; no more chateaux burned and life-long collections destroyed; no more farms and basse cours razed. If the average Frenchman is determined about anything, it is that the experience of 1914–1918 shall not be repeated. He wishes his protection to be derived from actual and potential military strength and he is determined to become involved in no international bargain which will in any way imperil his material defenses. Therefore, to make real progress with the French in the disarmament field, a modification of French policy must be brought about through a change in the popular state of mind in France. In carrying this out, it is imperative (1) to allay the suspicion which is always just below the surface that an ambush is being prepared against France, that, in other words, the French Government is being kept in abysmal ignorance of the preparations which are being made for its downfall; (2) to dispel the fear that disarmament is synonymous with the disarmament of France and the rearmament of rival Powers.

To dissipate the feeling that France is not to be admitted to the magic circle of “the disarmers,” I repeat it is essential to prepare [for] the General Disarmament Conference in a series of frank interviews with the leaders of the French Government. They must be taken into the confidence of those Governments which are actively seeking disarmament so as to be in a position to meet, and in fact to influence, public opinion which is without any doubt suspicious of the entire disarmament movement. It is only the part of wisdom to proceed on the theory that the French Government leaders, notably Laval and Briand, are disposed within the limits imposed upon them by the French Parliament and public, to further the arms limitation cause. But they must be furnished the ammunition with which to meet the popular attack and the preparation which will enable them to embrace a wider field of concession. Witness the encouraging change in French public opinion regarding Germany after the Brüning-Laval conversations in Paris and the latter’s strenuous efforts to retain the negotiations in this city.

I have already referred to recent events when Premier Laval and his associates were forced, despite their willingness to accept your proposal, to bow to the pressure of parliament and public opinion to the extent of bargaining for seventeen days before an agreement could be reached. Much of this was to appease the press and public opinion.

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Never for a moment must the French fear of German revenge be dismissed as a “mere smoke screen.” Frenchmen, while thoroughly hopeful of preserving the peace, are convinced that peace can be maintained only as a result of large armed forces or political and economic guarantees binding Germany down to a definite policy.

Only time will tell whether France can be talked out of the two types of security she constantly presents: first, the mutual pact of assistance (which should not directly concern the United States since it would probably take the form of a second and more comprehensible Continental Locarno); and, second, the many times suggested anti-aggressor article with which the French have always hoped to complement the Kellogg-Briand pact for the outlawry of war.

I did not intend to go into this lengthy review but when facing a crisis as important to world’s peace and prosperity as will be the result of the Geneva conference, it is well to fully appreciate the view of the other fellow and the background supporting it. In no other way can we organize to meet it.

While writing this general letter, I cannot refrain from expressing an opinion which may cover territory outside of my jurisdiction; nevertheless, the view has been developed through experience here. I notice in all the press, and it is generally accepted as correct, that the representatives of some of the Governments, before adjourning in London last week, rather indicated that they regarded a further conference in the autumn upon financial situations and the governmental relations thereto as essential. I would be very much afraid of such an adjourned conference. Through the insistence alone of France and the United States—in this instance we were for once partners—the agenda of the London conference was confined to the immediate financial needs for Germany. It is reasonable to assume that any adjourned conference in the autumn could never be so confined. There are too many other countries (Germany, Great Britain, etc.) interested in revisions of the Versailles Treaty, United States debts, reparations and what not to restrict such deliberations. In fact, in the very nature of things, another conference on this subject would be compelled to enlarge its jurisdiction or there would not be an accepted reason for such a conference. If the situation remains a banking problem, the Committee to be set up by B. I. S.25 should handle it.

In my judgment, much more can be accomplished through bi-lateral conversations between the countries involved. I have hope that the conversations initiated between Laval and Brüning will finally help to dissipate the unfortunate feeling existing between these two countries. Anyhow, other countries would confuse rather than help in [Page 514] this regard. I am sure the Secretary agrees that Laval is honest and sincere, but at the same time he is a politician and wants to retain power. Nevertheless, his activities with Germany will be along the lines of ameliorating rather than adding to these misunderstandings, so that some benefit must eventually ensue. At any large conference no such opportunity is possible. In fact, in my judgment, most all of the work to be taken up by the disarmament conference at Geneva in February should be done in these quiet conversations about Europe long before anyone goes to Geneva, or I am afraid, with the large gathering that will be convened there, the chance of success will be greatly decreased. The history of most international conferences establishes the fact that great results are not to be expected unless the main outlines of agreement have been settled beforehand.

As you can plainly understand, I have just rambled along with these thoughts, hoping that some of them might serve a useful purpose.

At this time may I also thank you most deeply and sincerely for your kind letter of July 7th written immediately after the signing of the accord in Paris. As I told you over the telephone, the experience of the last month has been the most interesting I have ever engaged in and I feel most appreciative to you that I have had this opportunity.

Sincerely,

Edge

P. S. Just as an indication of the French press point of view and what we must overcome, I am enclosing a copy of yesterday’s press summary,26—W. E. E.

  1. The moratorium proposal of June 20, 1931; for text, see telegram No. 262, June 20, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, p. 33.
  2. See pp. 42 ff.
  3. Bank for International Settlements.
  4. Not reprinted.