500.A15a4American Committee Minutes/8
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boat)7
Admiral Pratt reported on the results of his studies on the size of battleships and caliber of guns that they might carry. He said the General Board were unanimously of the opinion that we must stick to the 35,000-ton battleship and the 16-inch gun. Admiral Pratt said that he differed from the General Board on both of these points, but that he was alone in his opinion. He said that the contention that the 35,000–ton ship would have a greater steaming radius than a 27,500-ton ship, for instance, was not accurate, that the 27,500-ton ship could go as far as the 35,000-ton ship.
The Secretary of the Navy intervened to say that he saw no reason why a 12-inch gun would not do as well for our battleships as a 16-inch gun, if all nations came down to the same caliber.
Admiral Pratt said this was true, especially if our older ships were modernized. He hoped that battleships would be given a 30-year life in the next conference and would be allowed to replace their engines once in the course of this life at the end of the first fifteen years. He felt that our three present 16-inch gun ships must be modernized to meet the Rodney and Nelson. He felt also that a 27,500-ton ship with a 12-inch gun was relatively more efficient against its own type than the larger size with the bigger guns. He said that he would not be prepared to go lower than 27,500 tons. A 25,000-ton ship would be no good for the purposes of our Navy.
The Secretary said that he agreed that our margin of power on the seas must not be reduced.
[Page 497]The Secretary of the Navy said that we are just as well off with 12-inch guns as with 16-inch guns if other nations take the same measures of reduction. Both calibers are equally effective against smaller ships.
Admiral Pratt said that we control our own air, which is a great advantage to our Navy. Our margin of three 8-inch gun cruisers is a very good one for us. Our air force can effectively keep track of and harass 11-inch gun ships and other such types of new construction. Admiral Pratt’s one fear is that if the British were to get us to agree to come down to a 27,500-ton battleship, our people would become unwilling to build any more battleships and that would be bad business from the point of view of an efficient Navy.
The Secretary said that he realized that the present battleship holiday must end sooner or later, that Japan and Great Britain are not willing to reduce the number of battleships and if in 1936 the pressure of public sentiment drives for a reduction of gross tonnage, we may have to come to the construction of smaller units than the present 35,000 tons.
The Secretary of the Navy said that he felt our Navy would desire to keep big ships as long as the dominance of the Rodney and the Nelson lasted. He saw no reason, however, why we should not reduce all ships if the others were willing to do so.
The Secretary pointed out that our Navy would be composed of the newest ships.
The Secretary of the Navy said the Nelson and the Rodney were the newest battleships afloat.
Admiral Pratt pointed out that these go out of commission at the same time that our 16-inch gun ships go out of commission under the provisions of the Washington Treaty.
The Secretary of the Navy said that he was afraid that we would not be able to get the money from Congress to modernize our 16-inch gun ships. In such circumstances, he feels that the Rodney and the Nelson will really dominate our battleship class.
The Secretary said that if we consented to the construction of smaller battleships, we should couple this consent with modernization plans for our 16-inch gun ships so that we can manage the Rodney and the Nelson during the transition period.
The Secretary of the Navy said that the only difficulty in making plans for such concession was that we did not know what Congress would be willing to do.
Mr. Marriner pointed out that if the life of battleships by general consent were extended to thirty years, the question of new construction would only come before a Congress in 1952.
[Page 498]Admiral Pratt said he thought that thirteen battleships of 27,500 tons should be our ultimate and irreducible minimum and that we should have a margin of safety of two, so that we should really expect to have fifteen ships of that size.
The Secretary asked whether we could match the Rodney and the Nelson if Congress would consent to modernize our 16-inch gun ships.
The Secretary of the Navy said we could.
Mr. Marriner said that modernization could be paid for eventually out of the saving which would arise in the construction of ships of 27,500 tons instead of 35,000 tons.
Admiral Pratt said this saving would amount to nearly $8,000,000 on each ship.
Mr. Gibson asked whether the French would be satisfied to have battleships built approximately 5,000 tons bigger than theirs.
Mr. Marriner said he thought the French would not be disturbed about this.
The Secretary of the Navy said that was true, but if the French had retained their 35,000-ton figure for ships, they would have had far less battleships than they could now have.
Admiral Pratt said that our Navy cannot have less than thirteen battleships.
Mr. Marriner pointed out that if we save $8,000,000 on each of fifteen ships, we would have a saving of $120,000,000.
The Secretary said that if we had fifteen instead of thirteen ships, the upkeep on those two extra ships might wipe out a good deal of that saving.
- Of a conversation at which the following were present: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, Ambassador Gibson, Admiral Pratt, Mr. Marriner, and Mr. Boal.↩