Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I
500.A15a3/1652
The Chargé in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 21.]
Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 198 of October 9, 11 a.m.35 regarding the Franco-Italian negotiations for a Naval Accord, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of the Italian memorandum submitted by Signor Rosso to M. Massigli on September 26, 1931, which is referred to therein.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum From the Italian Government to the French Government
(1) In his letter of August 21, 1931, M. Massigli communicated to M. Rosso a memorandum giving the general lines for a provisional agreement which the French Government would be disposed to consider for the settlement of the naval question between France and Italy.
After setting forth the reasons which led the French Government to submit a proposal radically deviating from the Bases of Agreement of March 1, 1931, the memorandum suggests that the building programs which have been voted respectively in France and in Italy between the signing of the Washington Treaty and 1930 be taken as the basis for establishing the building programs for the 6 following years. According to the figures indicated in the memorandum, the average annual construction for France would be 32, 510 tons, and for Italy 22, 359 tons. The memorandum proposes that for the period January 1, 1931, to December 31, 1936, the annual average of construction of light surface craft and submarines be set in the proportion resulting from a 25 percent reduction of the above-mentioned figures. On the other hand, the agreement would not affect the construction of battleships and airplane carriers, which would continue to be governed exclusively by the provisions of the Washington Treaty and by article I of the London Treaty.
[Page 433]Furthermore: (1) the tonnage of submarines in service would not exceed 81, 989 tons for France and 52, 700 tons for Italy; (2) no cruiser with guns exceeding 155 mm. in calibre would be put into service by France or by Italy prior to December 31, 1936.
(2) With regard to the proposals contained in the French Memorandum of August 21, it should be pointed out in the first place that after all the work and all the efforts which have been put forth to reach the agreement in principle consecrated in the Bases of Agreement of March 1, the Italian Government could not regard with favor, nor without a certain scepticism, the opening of new negotiations deviating in so marked a fashion from the above-mentioned bases.
Nevertheless, in the same conciliatory spirit in which the Italian negotiators have unfailingly approached the study of the naval question, the Italian Government did not neglect a careful examination of the new French proposals, and it arrived at the following conclusions, showing the very serious difficulties which oppose the application of these proposals on the part of Italy;
(a) According to the Bases of Agreement France and Italy were authorized to construct, during the 6 years of the agreement, an annual tonnage which was approximately equal (this in the case that the 12 French torpedo boats of the Algériens type should be considered as exempt, in conformity with article 8 (a) of the Treaty of London and the displacements indicated in Document L. N. C. 6 of the London Conference). If, on the contrary, it should be admitted that the question of the Algériens might be construed in conformity to the French viewpoint, France would have been authorized to build during the course of the 6 years 6, 800 tons more than Italy.
According to the new proposals, this difference of 6, 800 tons would be changed into a difference of 45, 680 tons, which would mean that the comparative strengths of the French and the Italian navies would be radically altered in favor of France. This result would be in open contradiction to the principle which had been established by common accord prior to undertaking the negotiations which led to the Bases of Agreement of March 1, since it was understood that the agreement to be concluded was not to affect questions of principle nor to modify the comparative situations of the naval forces of the two countries. While the Bases of Agreement of March 1, through the interplay of reciprocal concessions, on the whole respected these two conditions, the project contained in the French memorandum would imply a disavowal of the above-mentioned principle, marking at the same time a very considerable advantage in favor of France.
It is true that according to the French interpretation of the Bases of Agreement the superiority of 6, 800 tons would have been applicable only to the first 4 years of the agreement. But even if this period [Page 434] of time alone is considered, the difference in construction envisaged by the new French proposals would reach the still very outstanding figure of 30, 450 tons. Thus, while on March 1 the French Government declared itself satisfied with an agreement giving it a superiority in construction of 6, 800 tons during the first 4 years, in its new proposals it asks of the Italian Government an agreement giving France, during the same period of time, a superiority in construction approximately four and a half times greater.
(b) The figure of 10,151 tons which the French memorandum gives as the difference between the annual averages of French and Italian constructions during the last few years was obtained by including in the basis for calculation the years 1922–1924 during which time Italy, who was going through a period of political crisis and economic reorganization, had laid down only 8,563 tons as against 75,225 tons laid down during the same period by France. If the starting point for the calculation of the constructions of the last few years was really such as to show—according to the words of the French memorandum—“the efforts which the two countries have considered necessary to put forth in view of the reconstruction of their navies”, it would seem much more equitable to calculate the average of constructions upon the basis of the last 6 years.
(c) According to the Italian interpretation of the Bases of Agreement, the annual average tonnage of all categories which France could lay down was 26, 350 tons (not including the Algériens) or 27, 550 tons (including the Algériens). According to the new proposals the annual average of French constructions would be 24, 383 tons for light surface craft and submarines alone. In view of the fact that according to the Washington and London Treaties France is authorized to construct during the next 6 years an annual average of 17, 975 tons of battleships and airplane carriers, the total of French constructions in all categories would amount to about 42, 358 tons annually, or more than the tonnage envisaged by the proposals which had been made by France last April and which Italy was not in a position to accept.
Thus the French plan, although at first glance apparently contemplating a 25 percent reduction in the construction of the last 9 years, in reality involves a potential increase of about 30 percent in this same construction. In the category of light surface craft alone there would be an increase of about 85,000 tons in French constructions during the period 1931–1936, in comparison with the constructions envisaged by the Bases of Agreement as interpreted by Italy.
(3) In paragraph 2 of the French memorandum mention is made of two specific difficulties in putting into execution the provisions of the Bases of Agreement concerning battleships. The Italian Government recognizes these difficulties, but it does not consider them insurmountable.
[Page 435]The French memorandum is entirely correct when it observes that the Italian Government regretted that the problem of battleships should be connected with that of the limitation of tonnage which is not governed by the Washington and London Treaties. During the course of the negotiations which led to the Bases of Agreement of March 1 it had, however, been led to accept the provisions concerning battleships because they appeared to be a necessary condition to an understanding among the three powers directly interested in the agreement. Having at that time renounced, in a spirit of conciliation, the attempt to have its viewpoint accepted, the Italian Government prefers not to revert to this question now and not to run the risk of destroying an agreement which, taken as a whole, represents a fair compromise resulting from reciprocal concessions made by the three interested powers.
(4) For all the foregoing reasons and as a result of consultations which it has had occasion to exchange with the British Government, the Italian Government is of the opinion that it would be deeply regrettable to abandon the Bases of Agreement of March 1, thanks to which the very divergent viewpoints of the three Governments upon a particularly complex problem could have been to a great extent reconciled. It is, on the other hand, persuaded that the best chance for further progress lies, not in the abandonment of the results already attained with such great difficulty, but rather in the effort which can still be made to eliminate the remaining difficulties in the way of a complete agreement.
If the French Government and the British Government should see the utility of resuming the negotiations broken off at London at the end of last April, in order to seek a means of reconciling the Bases of Agreement of March 1 with the difficulties which have arisen since that date, the Italian Government, ever desirous of arriving at a complete understanding with the other two powers on the settlement of the naval question in harmony with the London Treaty, declares that it is ready for its part to lend to this last effort of conciliation its most cordial and solicitous collaboration.