Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I
500.A15a3/1631
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received September 5.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose the full text in French with translation of the Memorandum which was forwarded to the Italian Government on Saturday, August 22nd, 1931. The Memorandum was handed to me in confidence by M. René Massigli on the afternoon of August 26, 1931 (see my telegram No. 540, August 26/8 p.m.).32
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum From the French Government to the Italian Government
1. The discussions which took place from March to May of this year brought to light the serious difficulties which the application of the “Bases of Agreement” of March 1st would encounter.
[Page 425]2. Concerning the provisions which specifically relate to capital ships:
- (a)
- The application of these provisions has proved irreconcilable with the interpretation placed by the Japanese Government upon the terms of the Washington Treaty. The final formula which that Government proposed, in the way of a compromise, in Baron Shidehara’s telegram of May 8th to the drafting committee, does not in effect offer a guarantee against Japanese objections when, after commissioning a third capital ship of 23, 333 tons, the French Government, in accordance with the Bases of Agreement, would scrap only one ship of the Jean Bart class. But in the system provided by the Bases of Agreement the scrapping plan corresponding to the building and commissioning of a certain amount of tonnage of capital ships constitutes an essential element.
- (b)
- On the other hand, by modifying the requirements which result, in the case of capital ships, from the Washington Treaty, the Bases of Agreement anticipates the general solutions which will have to be considered when the formulae given in that treaty will be revised. Now, the exchange of views, in the Experts’ Meeting, brought to light the fact that the solutions adopted, whether they had to do with the maximum gun caliber or whether they related to the maximum unit displacement, would clearly not meet with the approval of all the signatories of the Washington Treaty.
3. Under these circumstances—and since, furthermore, the Italian Government saw with regret the capital ship problem introduced into the Franco-Italian negotiations which followed the London Naval Conference—the conclusion must be drawn that it would be better to abandon a system which encounters so many and such varied obstacles. It would seem preferable to confine the problem to finding a solution which, while respecting previously granted rights, resulting from the Washington Treaty and from article I of the London Treaty with reference to capital ships and airplane carriers, would without jeopardizing the future permit an agreement for the next few years upon a modus vivendi eliminating all competition between France and Itaty on construction in other classes of ships. Thus would be developed an atmosphere which would enable both countries to seek at leisure and in the most friendly spirit, a general solution of the naval problem with due account taken of their respective interests as well as those of the other powers.
4. Differentiating from the Bases of Agreement, the arrangement to be concluded would therefore affect neither capital ships nor airplane carriers, the building of which both France and Italy would be at liberty to carry on in accordance with their treaty rights.
[Page 426]Anyhow, nothing would prevent both countries ultimately reaching a special agreement reducing to a figure to be determined the maximum requirements of those capital ships which they would undertake to build. Such an agreement would have the advantage of opening the way to a subsequent general agreement toward the reduction of these requirements.
5. Moreover, a misunderstanding took place within the drafting committee concerning the full sense of the provision in the Bases of Agreement relating to the eventual replacement of tonnage remaining “over-age” on December 31, 1936. The French note of April 20 explained the origin and the sense of this misunderstanding. At the same time it suggested a compromise proposal which neither the British Government nor the Italian Government felt able to accept and which was met with a counterproposal. Under the system resulting from the Bases of Agreement, the latter is not acceptable to the French Navy, and there seems to be no compromise formula capable of meeting with general approval.
This is a further reason to refrain from persisting in the search for a solution within the framework of the Bases of Agreement, to which the Italian and French Governments had each adhered only after interpreting differently an essential point.
6. These considerations led us to examine if it were possible to reach an agreement limited to light surface vessels and to submarines. This search was carried on with the two-fold desire to preserve the character of this agreement as an understanding for the limitation of building, and to take into account the preferences expressed by the British and Italian Governments for a solution regulating the whole of construction that might be started in those classes before December 31, 1936.
It is clear that, in such an agreement, there can be no question of anticipating solutions which will be reached concerning the respective strength of the fleets.
7. The speech delivered before the Italian Senate by His Excellency the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on June 3rd furnished valuable indications. M. Grandi, in effect, emphasized the fact that an agreement, even of a temporary nature, should lead to a reduction of naval armaments and he indicated, in particular, that the annual average building program, authorized under such an agreement, could not exceed that of the previous years.
Although the laying down of ships authorized annually in France has not been inspired by a spirit of competition and has merely represented the application of a general program adopted immediately after the Washington Treaty, France showed, after the London Conference, a disposition to slow up the execution of that program. [Page 427] Therefore, M. Grandi’s speech could not but find a favorable response in France.
8. Since the Washington Treaty, which opened up a new era in questions of naval policy, France and Italy each independently decided upon its respective building program. This treaty constitutes, therefore, the logical criterion in evaluating the efforts which both countries have had to make in order to reconstitute their fleets. The selection of another date, anterior or posterior, would be purely arbitrary.
9. As a result of the programs agreed upon in France and Italy, respectively, from February 6, 1922, to December 31, 1930, the tonnage of light vessels subject to limitation and of submarines, the building of which was authorized in both countries, respectively, during the nine years 1922, inclusive, to 1930, inclusive, is, for France 292, 587 tons, and for Italy 201, 232 tons, or an annual average of 32, 510 tons for France and of 22, 359 tons for Italy.
10. In order to proceed with a program of limitation and reduction of armaments, it is not sufficient that this average should not be exceeded during the next few years; it is necessary to agree upon a percentage of reduction. It is, therefore, proposed that, insofar as light surface vessels of limitable classes and submarines are concerned, France and Italy accept as the annual average of construction either already authorized or to be authorized from January 1st, 1931, to December 31st, 1936, a maximum 25 percent less than the annual average of construction authorized respectively for the same classes of ships during the nine years 1922 to 1930, inclusive.
11. In the same spirit, it would naturally be specified that at the latest when the new tonnage is commissioned, an equivalent amount of “over age” tonnage would be scrapped, this amount to be deducted from the tonnage total of all said classes.
12. It goes without saying that, in order to eliminate any anxiety, particularly of Great Britain, it should be specified (a) that the tonnage of submarines in commission will not exceed 81, 989 tons for France and 52, 700 tons for Italy; (b) that no cruiser bearing guns of a caliber above 155 m/m will be commissioned by France and Italy before December 31, 1936.
This pledge by no means implies that France agrees to limit to seven the number of its modern cruisers bearing guns of a caliber above 155 m/m, in commission after December 31, 1936.
Briefly, France and Italy will conclude an accord on the following bases:
- (a)
- The arrangement shall run for the period from the 1st of January, 1931, to December 31, 1936, subject to the conclusion in the intervening years of a more general accord for the limitation of naval armaments;
- (b)
- This agreement shall only affect future construction in the classes of light vessels limited by the Treaty of London and in submarines;
- (c)
- With respect to these classes, the annual average construction shall be reduced by 25 percent from the annual average construction authorized in the corresponding classes from the 6th February, 1922, to December 31, 1930;
- (d)
- The tonnage of submarines in service shall not exceed 81, 989 tons for France and 52, 700 tons for Italy;
- (e)
- No cruiser with guns exceeding 155 millimeter calibre shall be put in service by France or by Italy before the 31st December, 1936;
- (f)
- On the entry of any new vessel into service in the classes under consideration, there shall be a corresponding scrapping at the date of the commissioning of the new ship at the very latest, of an equivalent amount of over-age tonnage selected from the over-age tonnage of such classes.