Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I

500.A15a3/1523: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State

London, April 27, 1931—6 p.m.
[Received April 28—8:55 a.m.⁹]

123. [Paraphrase.] We received late today copies of two memoranda, one submitted by the British to the French in answer to the French memorandum which you now have, the other from the British Government to the Government of Italy. Texts follow. [End paraphrase.]

I. Memorandum Communicated to the French Ambassador on April 25th, 1931

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have given careful consideration to the memorandum of the 20th instant¹⁰ setting forth the view of the French Government on the difference which has arisen on the naval questions and making certain proposals for the settlement of the difficulty.

(2) His Majesty’s Government appreciate the clear and courteous manner in which the French point of view on this question has been set forth. They regret, however, that on a number of points their understanding of the position remains at variance with that contained in the memorandum, and, before commenting on the contents of the memorandum itself, they propose to explain as clearly and briefly as possible the point of view which has always been held by His Majesty’s Government on the difference which has arisen.

(3) Part III of the London Naval Treaty establishes limits, which are not to be exceeded on the 31st December 1936, in the tonnage of the various categories. The method of determining the amount of new construction which is permissible in order that these limits should not be exceeded is based upon two main principles dealing with—

1. New construction of ships which may be completed by the 31st December 1936.

2. Additional construction for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, which is to be limited (under the last sentence of article 19) to vessels becoming over-age in 1937, 1938 and 1939 (i. e. maximum tonnage which may be under construction on the 31st December 1936).

The effect of these two stipulations is [to] limit the amount of tonnage which a contracting party may lay down during the years 1930 to 1936 inclusive.

(4) Up to a relatively recent date the negotiations with France and Italy have been conducted on the assumption that these two powers would, if the negotiations were successful, accede to part III of the London Treaty, thus automatically limiting their new construction, during the years of the treaty, in the same way as the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America and Japan have already agreed to do. In the later stages of the negotiations, account had to be taken of the possibility that a separate agreement might be found a more convenient method of procedure than accession by France and Italy to part III of the treaty. It was, however, never contended in any quarter that such separate agreement should for this reason cease to be a counterpart of part III of the treaty or to embody the principle mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

(5) The Bases of Agreement accordingly provide in paragraph (C) (a) (2) that France and Italy should accept these provisions of part III of the treaty “which are of general application.” Amongst these general provisions was mentioned specifically, in the course of the negotiations, the last sentence of article 19 which, as shown in paragraph 3 (2) above, restricts automatically the amount of additional tonnage which a contracting party may have under construction in 1936, thus definitely limiting naval construction for the period ending the 31st December 1936. Although it was recognized that the last sentence of article 19 of the London Naval Treaty could not be inserted in the proposed agreement without some drafting amendments, the limitation in question was clearly understood to have been accepted by the French negotiators, subject to the decisions of the Conference, which, under the Treaty of London, is to meet in the year 1935. So far as His Majesty’s Government were aware, this French reservation in regard to the decisions of the 1935 conference was made solely with the object of insuring that that conference should not be held to be incompetent to consider the replacement of the retained over-age tonnage. Up to the time of Mr. Henderson’s and Mr. Alexander’s departure from Paris on the 2nd March no hint had been received from the French Government that, failing an agreement by the 1935 conference, they would consider themselves free to lay down any additional tonnage they thought fit during the years 1935 and 1936.

(6) On the contrary, at the discussion on the 1st March the French representatives proposed the paragraph (C) (a) (2) should be amended by the addition of the words underlined¹¹ so as to read as follows:

“(2) that they will accept, in so far as they are concerned, those provisions (of part III of the London Naval Treaty) which are of general application and which do not conflict with the provision of the present arrangement”.

In advancing their claims on this occasion to the above amendment it was only represented by the French negotiators, firstly, that there were certain general provisions (such as the division of combatant vessels into five categories) which were clearly not applicable to the case of France and Italy; secondly, that the last sentence of article 19 of the London Naval Treaty, if incorporated as it stood into the new agreement, might be held to prejudge the method by which the question of the replacement of retained over-age [tonnage] was ultimately to be settled by the 1935 conference, whereas the last sentence of the Bases of Agreement laid down that no precedent was being created for the final solution of this question. These points presented no difficulties to the United Kingdom negotiators and had no bearing on the issue subsequently raised by the French representatives on the drafting committee.

(7) It is, furthermore, necessary to bear in mind the following important sentence in paragraph C (b) of the Bases of Agreement:

“No precedent is being created for the final solution of the question whether, and if so in what manner, tonnage remaining over-age on the 31st December 1936, may ultimately be replaced”.

(8) This sentence relates to over-age tonnage, the replacement of which is not provided for in the proposed agreement, and its wording, with the use of the word “ultimately”, creates a clear presumption that a start was not to be made with the replacement of this over-age tonnage before the 31st December 1936. It is in this sense that the Bases of Agreement have throughout been interpreted by His Majesty’s Government.

(9) Apart, however, from this presumption based on the text itself, it was always clearly understood throughout the negotiations leading up to the Bases of Agreement that the question of the replacement of retained over-age tonnage was to be left over for consideration by the 1935 conference.

(10) It was only in the discussions of the drafting committee that it became clear for the first time that the French Government were claiming that the agreement limited only the amount of construction which France and Italy may complete before December 1936, and as leaving open the question of the amount of tonnage which those countries might have under construction on that date.

(11) From the above statement it will be seen that His Majesty’s Government cannot accept paragraphs 2 to 6 of the French memorandum containing a survey of the past negotiations. They reserve the right of commenting on some of the particular statements made in these paragraphs should the need arise, but they are now more concerned with the future than the past, and they accordingly desire to proceed at once with their observations on the proposals for a settlement contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the French memorandum.

(12) The above proposals have been examined with the utmost desire to find some equitable solution of the difficulty, but to their great regret His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom find themselves unable to accept these proposals for the following reasons:

1. Even on the interpretation which His Majesty’s Government place upon the Bases of Agreement, the under-age figures resulting therefrom are, in some categories, considerably in excess of those to which they would have found it possible to agree during the London Naval Conference. Their acceptance of these figures in March 1931 was given solely on account of the high political importance attached to a Franco-Italian naval agreement, and on the understanding that no permanent ratio was being established.

In addition, and in order to overcome certain obstacles which had hitherto stood in the way of an understanding, the right of France to retain certain over-age tonnage during the period of the agreement was accepted. If and when this tonnage were replaced, it would be necessary considerably to increase British tonnage in the cruiser and destroyer categories; accordingly it was laid down that the question whether this over-age tonnage could be ultimately replaced was specifically reserved.

The French proposals now anticipate the laying down of replacement tonnage for these over-age ships in 1935 and 1936. His Majesty’s Government could not approve an agreement the obvious effect of which would be to impose the necessity for invoking article 21 of the London Naval Treaty in order largely to increase the tonnage, built and building, which has been fixed until the 31st December 1936 by the London Naval Treaty.

2. The fact that under an agreement on the lines proposed in the French memorandum the size of the French building programs of recent years would be more than maintained in the building programs of the future constitutes a serious difficulty and might in itself necessitate the invocation of article 21 of the London Naval Treaty.

The French proposal, in fact, gives France an annual construction program of more than 41,000 tons in all categories for the years 1931–34 inclusive, and an unknown building program in the years 1935 and 1936. This is a larger program than is being carried out at the present time by any other power in the world.

3. Acceptance of the French proposals would seriously prejudice the British position at the 1935 conference, since France would have a very large tonnage actually under construction, and, failing agreement at that conference, would regain complete freedom of action in respect of new construction. His Majesty’s Government, on the other hand, would remain bound until the 31st December 1936.

(13) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom desire to make it perfectly clear that they are ready to put into the declarations which have been under consideration by the drafting committee the text of the Bases of Agreement accepted by the powers concerned on the 1st March last. In particular, His Majesty’s Government abide by the clause which lays down that “no precedent is being created for the final solution of the question, whether, and if so in what manner, tonnage remaining over-age on the 31st December 1936, may ultimately be replaced.” In arriving at that agreement they went to the utmost limit in concession, and they greatly regret that they cannot now accept a proposal which would result in France attaining a position relatively more advantageous in regard to new construction than had been contemplated by His Majesty’s Government at any time.

(14) They remain, however, prepared to advocate the middle course mentioned in paragraph 10 of the French memorandum which lies between the Anglo-Italian conception of the Bases of Agreement and the interpretation which the French Government now invite them to place upon the document. For this purpose they invite the French and Italian Governments to consider carefully whether a fair solution of the present [difficulty?] could not be reached incorporating in the proposed declarations the provisions of the last sentence of article No. 19 of London, in accordance with the following formula:

“Subject to any further agreement limiting naval armaments which may be reached at the General Disarmament Conference of 1932, or at the Naval Conference which will take place in 1935 in accordance with article No. 23 of London, the additional tonnage which France and Italy may lay down before the 31st December 1936, shall be the replacement tonnage of vessels which will become over-age in 1937, 1938 and 1939.”

(15) This formula makes it clear that, in the words of paragraph 10 of the French memorandum, “it would be for the conference (of 1935) to consider whether authority could not be given for the laying down of a certain tonnage from 1936 onwards”. But it is the earnest hope of His Majesty’s Government that the annual construction accorded France up to 1936 under the agreement as it stands, which falls short only by 5,000 tons a year [of] the annual construction contemplated by this country during the same period in respect of a much larger fleet, will be found in the end¹² to be sufficient for French needs.

(16) It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that the French Government, by accepting the compromise now proposed, may thus range themselves with the other principal naval powers in limiting their naval construction and so paving the way for the success of the General Disarmament Conference on which so many hopes are centered. If the proposal now made to the French Government may involve a retardation in the rate of naval construction originally contemplated by them, this sacrifice, together with the similar sacrifice made by the other naval powers, will set a most valuable example at a time when preparations for the conference are being undertaken in every capital. They make a most earnest appeal to the Government of the Republic to consider the question in this wider political aspect and so enable the powers concerned to reach that friendly settlement for which all have striven so hard.

II Memorandum Communicated to the Italian Ambassador on April 25th, 1931

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have had under their consideration the memorandum of the 20th instant in which the French Government have set forth their view on the difference which has arisen on the naval question and made certain proposals for a settlement of the difficulty. They understand that this memorandum was communicated simultaneously to the Italian Government, and they accordingly desire similarly to communicate to the Italian Government a copy of the reply which is being returned to the Government of the Republic.

(2) It will be seen from this document that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, while unable to accept the proposals in the French memorandum for a settlement of the present difficulty, have put forward a proposal of their own which is designed to secure a settlement following that middle course mentioned in paragraph 10 of the French memorandum as lying between the Anglo-Italian conception of the Bases of Agreement and the interpretation which the French Government place upon the document. For this purpose they suggest that the present difficulty could best be overcome by incorporating in the proposed declarations the provisions of the last sentence of article 19 of the Treaty of London in accordance with the following formula:

“Subject to any further agreement limiting the naval armaments which may be reached at the General Disarmament Conference of 1932, or at the Naval Conference which will take place in 1935 in accordance with article 23 of the Treaty of London, the additional tonnage which France and Italy may lay down before the 31st December 1936 shall be the replacement tonnage of vessels which will become over-age in 1937, 1938 and 1939”.

(3) The formula makes it clear that, in the words of paragraph 10 of the French memorandum “it would be for the Conference (of 1935) to consider whether authority could not be given for the laying down of a certain tonnage from 1936 onwards”.

(4) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom fully realize that, in making this suggestion, they are asking the Italian Government to depart from the attitude which they have hitherto adopted and to adopt the intermediate thesis to which reference is made above. As expected nevertheless they desire to express the earnest hope that in the interests of the settlement which all parties have so much at heart the Italian Government will see their way to make the concession which is now suggested.

Dawes

9. Telegram in four sections.
10. Memorandum delivered by the French Government on April 23; text printed infra.
11. Printed in italics.
12. Words “by the French Government” inserted here by agreement between the British and the French (500.A15a3/1550).