711.94/2216
The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark)60
Washington, July 21, 1941.
Op–12–CTB
(SC)EF
Serial
083412
Memorandum
- 1.
- On July 20, 1941, about 3 P.M., Ambassador Nomura called on me at my residence. After some general conversation, he informed me that on Friday or Saturday61 he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs [White Sulphur Springs] to call on Mr. Hull, but the latter’s physician had not permitted an interview. Subsequently, as I understand, Ambassador Nomura had a conversation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming to my residence, he had called at Admiral Stark’s house, but he had not found him in. He did not say whether he had then tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll;62 I understand the latter was not at home at that hour.
- 2.
- Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have a conversation with Admiral Stark as soon as convenient; he intended to go to [Page 517] New York the 21st or 22d but will return shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey his request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter would be glad to talk with him.
- 3.
- The Ambassador then explained at considerable length what he proposed to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that he is not a professional diplomat, and is occupying his present position because none of the trained diplomats in whom the government had confidence had been willing to accept the Washington Mission; he had demurred for a considerable period, and had accepted the duty only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Admiral Toyoda, now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that he accept the Mission; it was evident that he felt he had a greater measure of Toyoda’s confidence than of Matsuoka’s. He stated that he particularly wished to discuss the international situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that a devastating naval war would ensue.
- 4.
- Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100% agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by treaty to Germany, and this treaty could not be denounced at this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan’s hands, and that these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it seemed to be to Japan’s interest to do so. Japan’s future acts will be dominated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.
- 5.
- He then talked at length on the points which Japan considered essential for an agreement between the United States and Japan. The fundamental basis of such an agreement necessarily would be that either Power would be free to take such steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against Japan by the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a reduction in shipping tonnage available for trade, Japan’s present economic position is bad and steadily getting worse. It is essential that Japan have uninterrupted access to necessary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron [Page 518] products, oil, rubber, cotton and food. There are other important items as well.
- 6.
- The second point is that the United States is constantly providing greater support to China. If China is left without industrial and military support, it will not be long before the Chungking regime will be unable to continue the present “China Incident”; Japan will then be able to withdraw from the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted that the United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supplying airplanes and pilots to be sent to Chungking. He understands that there are over a hundred American pilots now en route, who have been supplied from the armed forces of the United States. Japan must make some arrangement through which support of this nature will be reduced, rather than increased. The British are also contributing more and more to measures designed to sustain the Chungking regime.
- 7.
- The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as essential for Japan’s security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China, and in order to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that general region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Ching Wei which will permit Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia; how long such measures will continue necessary can not be foretold. I inferred that, were this agreed to, Japanese troops would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.
- 8.
- He then informed me that within the next few days Japan expects to occupy French Indo-China. How the occupation would be made he is not informed; presumably, it would be chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but on this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from the south and for a better control over the activities of Chungking, this occupation has become essential.
- 9.
- It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some apprehension that the United States would take further action against Japan, either economically or militarily, as soon as Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indo-China. He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign against Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did not so state categorically, that Japan contemplates no further move to the south for the time being. He made no mention of possible activity against Siberia.
- 10.
- Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were essential to any informal agreements which might be made between the United States and Japan. Rather cautiously he conveyed the impression that were the United States to accept these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic would not be a matter of great concern to Japan. [Page 519] The one great point on which agreement might be reached, he again emphasized as the inherent right of self defense.
- 11.
- The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without interruption on my part. I informed him that I would present these points to Admiral Stark’s attention. However, I desired to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to another, on a certain broad strategic aspect of the situation which I envisaged. I agreed that there would be a decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese occupation of Indo-China. Entirely aside from matters of policy, it would be evident to him that this move had an important bearing on the strategic position of the United States.
- 12.
- I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany. The United States has been able to live in peace because powerful military nations in Europe have checked each other and prevented a military penetration by any of them in the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain were to collapse, German military power might very well be directed against South America, and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United States. So long as the United Kingdom continues to exist as a military and naval power, the problems of the United States as regards its security will not be very great. Therefore, aside from racial and social ideals, it is decidedly against the military interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany. For this reason any action which the United States could take against Germany is necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered as aggression. Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.
- 13.
- The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern portion of the Far East.
- 14.
- I suggested that Japan really has very little to fear from American, British or Dutch activities in the Far East. It might well be, were these Powers to be displaced, Japan would find Germany facing her in that region, which would put an entirely different complexion on the military situation there.
- 15.
- Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own personal opinions in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic to the above point of view) he was bound to support the policies of his government, which at present include collaboration with the Axis.
- 16.
- The interview then closed after the Ambassador again reiterated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.
R. K. Turner