740.0011 European War 1939/14438
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request. The Ambassador said that Japan now found herself isolated and that for that reason the chief responsibility as to the future of Japan rested upon the Japanese Navy. He said that if the Japanese Navy could have the cooperation of the navy of the other great power of the Pacific, Japan would not feel that her situation was really one of isolation. He said that under the Tripartite Pact, so long as the Trans-Siberian railroad remained open there was at least the possibility that Germany could give assistance to Japan, but that now with the Trans-Siberian railroad closed for a period no one could predict, Japan could get no assistance in that way.
I inquired of the Ambassador whether it was not true that Japanese foreign policy during the past year or so had been based upon the belief that Germany and Russia would not be at war. The Ambassador said that this of course was the fact and that he knew positively that Mr. Matsuoka had had no knowledge that Germany was going to attack Russia and had even at the last moment attempted to mediate between the two powers. I expressed to the Ambassador my surprise that Japan, as a member of the Tripartite Pact, should not have been given prior notice by Germany of the latter’s intention to attack the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the fact that only a short time before that Japan had entered into a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador replied that so far as he knew, no prior notification had been given.
I inquired whether this was not in fact the second time that Germany had omitted to notify Japan of her intentions, since, if I remembered correctly, in 1939 when Japan and Germany had been members of the Anti-Communist Pact, Germany had suddenly entered into a far-reaching non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union without prior notification to Japan.
The Ambassador said that of course this was true and that Baron Hiranuma, then Prime Minister, had resigned because of this action on the part of Germany.
I said that it was exactly for this sort of reason that more than ninety-nine percent of the people of the United States didn’t believe that any pact that Hitler signed was worth the paper it was written on. I said that this Government felt that it could only undertake negotiations with a power which kept its obligations and whose word could be regarded as sacred.
[Page 516]I said, however, that the policy of this Government had been so fully set forth to the Ambassador, and through him to the Japanese Government, by the Secretary of State during recent months that I felt sure there was nothing I could add.
The Ambassador thereupon immediately said that he felt more sanguine with regard to the improvement of relations between our two countries in view of the installation of the new government than he had felt previously. He said he had immediately telegraphed his new Government, as soon as it had been constituted, asking urgent instructions with regard to the informal conversations he had been having with the Secretary of State. He expressed the belief that he would soon receive full instructions with regard thereto.
As the Ambassador left I said that in view of the new situation which he told me had arisen by reason of the creation of the new Government in Tokyo, I earnestly hoped that no new developments would take place in the Pacific which would bring about any disturbance in the maintenance of peace. The Ambassador said he also earnestly hoped so.