711.94/21333/18
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa,32 was received by the Secretary at his apartment at 8:30 this evening by arrangement at the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador.33
The Secretary asked the Ambassador how in the opinion of the Ambassador the prospects now looked in regard to the proposal under consideration. The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Army and Navy as well as the Foreign Office had approved the matter; that the whole Cabinet had approved it; that it had been referred to the Emperor—in fact the matter was one which would have unanimous support in Japan. He went on to say that if now we should fail to carry the proposal through, he would be in a very embarrassing position vis-à-vis his Government. (The implication of this statement was that he had indicated to his Government that agreement of the American Government was assured.) The Ambassador hoped that we would not be disposed to dwell upon technicalities but would look at the proposal from the point of view of its broad spirit. He observed that it would be a pity if we failed to reach an understanding through disagreement on words. The Ambassador endeavored to emphasize that there was no essential difference in substance between the draft proposal which he had first submitted to his Government and the draft which he had been instructed by his Government to present to us.
The Secretary then observed that there were two points in regard to the section dealing with China which he would like to bring up. One was in regard to the joint defense against communism and the other was in regard to the stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Chinese territory. He said that he was not discussing the merits of the two points to which he referred but he felt that if and when this Government should approach Chiang Kai-shek on the [Page 435] matter of negotiating with Japan he would have to tell Chiang the basis on which Japan would propose to negotiate; that this basis should be one on which Chiang could carry his country with him; and that if the Chinese Government should be unwilling to proceed with negotiations on the basis proposed the Secretary would be in a very embarrassing position. He therefore wished to ask whether it would not be possible to cover these two points under some broader provision, such as a provision which would call for special measures of protection for Japanese nationals and property interests against lawlessness in areas where special measures for safeguarding the rights and interests of nationals of third powers were necessary.
Colonel Iwakuro said that it was a matter of surprise to him that we had brought up these points, as it was his conception that the central objective of the proposal which we were discussing was the peace of the Pacific between Japan and the United States and that the settlement of the China affair was incidental and concerned China and Japan.
The Secretary agreed that the central objective was the peace of the Pacific between Japan and the United States but that a peaceful settlement between Japan and China was an essential element in the situation.
Mr. Hamilton commented that in dealing with a proposal such as the one before us it was necessary to consider the general effect upon the public of any arrangement that might be entered into, as the success of such an arrangement would depend upon the broad sweep of the support it received from the public. If, for example, there was in one part of the agreement a provision that Japanese troops would be withdrawn and further down a provision for joint defense against communism, critics might say “Ah—here is the joker; Japanese troops will be retained after all under cloak of the provision ‘joint defense against communism’”.
Colonel Iwakuro hastened to renounce any idea that Japanese troops would be retained all over China for joint defense against communism but only in north China along the northern border. He said that in his opinion as between Japan and China the point under discussion would present no difficulty, that Chiang Kai-shek himself was alive to the danger of communism and that, while he could not speak of most recent developments in Chinese governmental attitude toward the subject, his earlier experience in China convinced him that China would be only too ready to collaborate with Japan in this matter.
Colonel Iwakuro then went on to say that the term “joint defense against communism” had become a slogan which had been impressed upon the Japanese public as an essential requisite for some years past, that it had become a cardinal objective in Japan’s conflict with China, [Page 436] and that it would be impossible for the Japanese to abandon it. He suggested that it might be possible to cover it under some broader language in an agreement as between Japan and the United States, but he wished to make it clear that Japan would have to retain the term in its negotiations with China.
After some further discussion, the Japanese apparently came to see that the problem presented a real difficulty and they agreed to give the point further study.
The Secretary then said that a problem was presented in drafting the wording of Section III in regard to the China affair, for if we enumerated the Konoe principles, as the Japanese desired, we were confronted by the fact that “joint defense against communism” was the second of the Konoe principles.
Colonel Iwakuro pointed out that if we referred to the Konoe principles without specifying which ones we had in mind we should be endorsing Konoe’s exhortation for the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek and the “new order in East Asia”.
There was then some discussion of whether the Japanese term which was ordinarily translated “joint defense against communism” was not susceptible of some other translation, and reference was made to the term “inimical foreign ideologies” used in recent Pan-American instruments as a possible suggestion. The Japanese agreed to study this point.
The Secretary suggested that the Document which the Ambassador had presented on May 12 marked “Oral Explanation for Proposed Amendments to the Original Draft” be marked “Annex and Supplement”.
The Secretary next took up a suggestion in reference to Section V “activities of the two countries in the Southwestern Pacific area”. He asked whether it would not be helpful from the Japanese point of view to insert phraseology recognizing the right of a country to take action to protect itself under international law but qualifying this right in such a way that it would not be used as an occasion for acts of aggression.
Colonel Iwakuro expressed the opinion that to do this would be merely confusing and suggested that it would be unwise to inject any new principles into the proposed agreement. The Secretary then said that he had made this suggestion with the sole idea of being helpful to the Japanese. He then suggested that it would strengthen the proposed agreement very much if language could be put in which would make clear that the central purpose of this agreement was the peace of the Pacific. The Japanese pointed out that this point had already been brought out in the first section of the Japanese proposal “The Concepts of the United States and of Japan Respecting International [Page 437] Relations and the Character of Nations”. The Secretary then suggested that references to the peace of the Pacific in the proposal be assembled together in one place in the document where it would be given special emphasis. He pointed out that in this way the public would become impressed with the fact that it was the purpose of Japan and the United States to bring about an era of peace in the Pacific. This would bring about fresh hope in the world and vitalize the proposed agreement itself. He pointed out also as an illustration of how such emphasis would operate that the proposed agreement would appeal to businessmen and develop their confidence and interest in financial and commercial cooperation in the Far East. The suggestion was well taken by the Japanese who said that they would give the matter study. It was agreed to meet again the following evening.