11.94/21333/18
Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the
Secretary of State to the Japanese
Ambassador (Nomura) on May 16,
1941
May 16, 1941
There has not yet been time to study carefully the proposal which the
Ambassador has presented under instructions from his Government. From
such examination as it has been possible to make, however, certain
preliminary comments suggest themselves.
It is understood that the purpose of the present discussions and of the
proposal presented by the Japanese Ambassador is to work out a formula
whereunder Japan and the United States may make manifest their common
desire and definite purpose to refrain from any aggressive act by force
and to pledge themselves in honor and in act to maintain and preserve
peace in the Pacific area.
[Page 429]
Keeping in mind this admirable objective, it would seem advisable to
dispose of certain fundamental points before attempting to consider the
Japanese proposal as a whole.
With reference to the proposed formula in Section II in regard to the
relations of Japan and of the United States toward the European war, the
United States is, as the Ambassador is aware, engaged in an extensive
program of strengthening its national defense, and it regards as an
essential part of its program of self-defense aid to Great Britain and
to other countries which are resisting the present world-wide movement
of conquest and aggression by force. There is annexed a statement28 which defines clearly the position of the
Government of the United States on this subject. The Japanese Government
will naturally wish to give careful consideration to the position of the
Government of the United States as set forth in the statement.
It is believed that on the basis of the fundamental purpose of pledging
themselves in honor and in act to refrain from any aggressive act by
force and to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area a mutually
satisfactory formula defining the relations of the United States and of
Japan toward the European war can be arrived at.
In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador’s
consideration certain suggestions for possible revision of Section II of
the proposal.29
With reference to the proposed formula in Section III in regard to the
relations of the United States and of Japan toward the China Affair, it
is noted that in the “Annex and Explanation” it is stated that in
Section III of the proposal there are exemplified principles of
neighborly friendship; joint defense against communism; economic
cooperation free from economic monopoly or limitation of the interests
of other countries; mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation
cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus
contributing to world peace; withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese
territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan
and China; no annexation and no indemnities; and the independence of
Manchuria. While one or two of the points might present difficulties, it
is believed that, if China and Japan could come to agreement on the
basis of the other points mentioned, the remaining points with some
modification need not present insuperable obstacles.
The principles embodied in the Konoe Statement, as defined in the “Annex
and Explanation” as relating to neighborly friendship, joint defense
against communism, and economic cooperation free from economic [Page 430] monopoly or limitation of the
interests of other countries, could, with some modification, it is
believed, be acceptable.
It is therefore suggested that the Japanese Ambassador might consider
substituting for the present draft of Section III of the Japanese
proposal a draft which would include a recital of the principles as set
forth in the “Annex and Explanation”. Would not such a formula be more
likely to influence the Chinese Government to agree to negotiate a peace
settlement with Japan? Such assent is obviously essential to the
conclusion of an agreement such as is proposed between the Governments
of the United States and of Japan.
In the circumstances, would there not be more prospect of success in a
procedure whereby the President would in advance make known in
confidence to Chiang Kai-shek the fundamental terms (or the definitive
substance thereof) within the framework of which China and Japan might
agree to negotiate a peace settlement?
In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador’s
consideration certain suggestions, based upon the principles set forth
in the “Annex and Explanation”, for possible alteration of Section III
of the Japanese proposal.30
With reference to the proposed formula in Section V in regard to the
economic activities of Japan and of the United States in the
Southwestern Pacific area, it is suggested that the language of the
proposal might advantageously be revised so as (a) to make the provisions of this section applicable in common to
both Japan and the United States and (b) to
emphasize the pledge of both countries to maintain and preserve peace in
the Pacific area.
In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador’s
consideration certain suggestions for possible revision of Section V of
the Japanese proposal.31
[Annex 1]
Extracts From Address by the Secretary of State
on April 24, 1941, Handed to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16,
1941
The position of the Government of the United States toward the
military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth
in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24,
1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic
in relation to the entire situation are as follows:
“… As waged by them (the aggressor powers) this is not an
ordinary war. It is a war of assault by these would-be
conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon
nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and
which are resisting in self-defense. [Page 431] … Such is the movement
which is extending rapidly throughout the world.
“If experience shows anything, it shows that no nation
anywhere has the slightest reason to feel that it will be
exempted from attack by the invader, any more than, in a
town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citizen might expect
to be free from attack.
“… Every thinking man can answer the question for himself by
simply calling the roll of the wretched victims of world
aggression who are now in a condition of semi-slavery, and
whose every hope of again enjoying the blessings of
civilization depends only on the defeat or failure of the
movement of conquest. So it is in Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania,
Luxemburg, France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia.
“… The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations
have lost everything that makes life worth living, it is
high time that the remaining free countries should arm to
the fullest extent and in the briefest time humanly possible
and act for their self-preservation.
“… Events have shown beyond possible question that the safety
of this hemisphere and of this country calls for resistance
wherever resistance will be most effective. In my judgment
our safety and security require that, in accordance with the
declared policy of the legislative and executive branches of
the Government, aid must be supplied without hesitation to
Great Britain and those other countries that are resisting
the sweep of the general conflagration. This policy means,
in practical application, that such aid must reach its
destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity.
So—ways must be found to do this.
“… Those nations that are making resistance are primarily
seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties.
Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own
safety. The United States both in its direct defense effort
and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is
likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for
the nations that are offering resistance means security for
us, aid to them is an essential part of our own defense.
Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater
resources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our
aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a
world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that
every free nation anywhere is a bastion of strength to all
the remaining free peoples everywhere.
“… Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British
defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact
that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader
would create colossal danger to our own national defense and
security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time.
It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our
ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to
prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high
seas.
“… Some among us, doubtless with the best of intentions,
still contend that our country need not resist until armed
forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of
this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be
no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United
States, until the invading countries had acquired complete
control of the other four continents and of the high seas,
[Page 432] and thus had
obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to
the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicapped
defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely
dangerous view.”
The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the
Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures
of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made
unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is
directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no
area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental
consideration—that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The
only other attitude this Government could assume would be the
suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also
were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be
molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their
own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with
having assumed the offensive. A similar course by this nation from
the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of
world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the
standpoint of reasonable precautions for its safety.
In the light of the existing situation, Hitler is the one person who
can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective
self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated,
whereas for any other nation to request that the United States
desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the
country making-such request on the side of Hitler and his movement
of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be
addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is
attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete
subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.
“Yes, it makes a difference who wins—the difference whether we
stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents
against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free
territories on earth—or whether we keep our place in an orderly
world.”
[Annex 2]
Draft Suggestion A Handed by the Secretary of
State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941
II. The Attitudes of the United
States and of Japan Toward the European War
The Government of Japan declares that the purpose of its Axis
Alliance was and is defensive and is designed to prevent the nations
which are not at present engaged in the European war from
participating therein, and declares that its obligations of military
assistance [Page 433] under the
Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy come into force
only if and when one of the parties of the pact is aggressively
attacked by a power not at present involved in the European
hostilities.
The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward
the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined
solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and
self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.
The Government of Japan further declares that it is under no
commitment under its Axis Alliance or otherwise which is
inconsistent with the terms of the present declaration of policy and
intention agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the
Government of the United States.
[Annex 3]
Draft Suggestion B Handed by the Secretary of
State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941
III. China Affairs
When this declaration of policy and intention, including the
provisions of this section, is agreed upon and both Governments have
given it their approval and commitment, the President of the United
States will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of
China that those Governments enter into a negotiation for a
termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations on a
basis as follows:
- a.
- Neighborly friendship.
- b.
- Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
- c.
- Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in
accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon.
- d.
- No annexation.
- e.
- No indemnities.
- f.
- Equality of commercial opportunity in terms of and with
conditions of fair treatment for all concerned.
- g.
- Parallel measures of defense against subversive activities
from external sources.
- h.
- The question of the future of Manchuria to be dealt with
by friendly negotiations.
[Annex 4]
Draft Suggestion C Handed by the Secretary of
State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941
V. Economic Activity of Both
Nations in the Southwestern Pacific Area
On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activity and American
activity in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried [Page 434] on by peaceful means, the
Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to
cooperate each with the other toward ensuring on the basis of
equality of opportunity equal access by Japan and by the United
States to supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin,
nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and
development of its own economy.
