Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/2112

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] April 16, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment in accordance with a previous mutual understanding.

I asked him what news he had and he proceeded to say that from all he could see and learn, the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact,^18c announced two days ago, was not really undertaken because of Germany or for Germany’s benefit. I remarked that I had not become unduly concerned about the matter because for some time I have acted on the view that the Soviet policy was not to have war with any country unless in actual self-defense, and that, on the other hand, I did not see wherein Japan could have a policy based on the disposition to attack the Soviet Union. It was one of those circumstances in which I felt that the written document merely reduced to writing the relationships and policies already existing between the two Governments.

I then said that I would speak off the record of the fact that, according to official information of today, the British believe that they will safely hold the Egyptian-North African area from German attack. Another item of information coming to me today was that the people, that is the public, in Denmark, are unanimously in favor and support of the action of this Government and their Minister with respect to Greenland.^18d

With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

“I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

“You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later. You tell me that you have not submitted the document in question to your Government, but that you desire to do so. Naturally, you are at the fullest liberty to do this, but, of course, this does not imply any commitment whatever on the part of this Government with respect to the provisions of the document in case it should be approved by your Government. I do, of course, recognize individually that, as stated, if the Japanese Government should approve this document and instruct the Ambassador here to propose it to the United States Government, it would afford a basis for the institution of negotiations, with the result that this Government would offer any counter-proposals desired and any independent proposals desired, which, in conjunction with the Japanese proposal, would be fully discussed and talked out to a conclusion in one way or the other in the spirit that unquestionably should and would characterize the conversations.”

The Ambassador studied for a few minutes the four points which I handed to him. He then suggested that the principle of equality might well be discussed in connection with the negotiations. I replied promptly that this would be impossible since we could not think of entering into negotiations if his Government should even hesitate in agreeing to this point; that no country in the world would get more from the doctrine of equality, politically, economically, socially and everything worthwhile, than Japan; that the Ambassador knows how successfully this doctrine has operated between the United States and the South American countries, and how successfully this hemisphere has greatly improved the relations between the American republics and improved the conditions of their respective peoples by observing the eight-point program adopted at the Lima Conference,^18e the development of the program having been initiated at Montevideo.

I thereupon handed to the Ambassador a copy of the eight-point program adopted by the Lima Conference and said that this Government, of course, stands for these principles for the betterment of international relations and is opposed to the doctrine of conquest by force and the seizure and the taking of title by the conqueror which results in the exclusion of all other parts of the world from the conquered areas except by the giving of a preference to Japanese citizens wherever preference would be of any use. I said that throughout any preliminary conversations we have, it must be understood that the foregoing is the well-defined attitude of the United States Government.

The Ambassador remarked that this country has special relations with South America which Japan in a similar way would not be permitted to have in the Orient. I replied that there was a great misapprehension and misunderstanding about this phase. I said that the truth is that the chief South American countries produce large surpluses of wheat and corn and meat, such as we produce, with the result that we have never had a real trade relationship except to a limited extent; that the total commerce of this hemisphere until lately has only been twenty percent of the world commerce between nations; that eight years ago when I went to Montevideo I sought to institute a system of closer relations between our countries, politically, economically, socially and culturally and otherwise, for all worthwhile purposes … Then I added that Japan could carry on any and all social, educational, economic and political relations with nations in the Pacific with a view to cultivating them, but that it would get nowhere if she should undertake to segregate and surround herself and them by preferences or assert zones of special controlling influence or movements such as are not dreamed of in this country or this hemisphere and which are utterly inimical to the eight principles which were adopted at the Lima Conference.

The Ambassador then remarked that the status quo point No. 4 would interfere with the Manchurian situation. I replied that the question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at that stage, and that this status quo point would not, therefore, affect “Manchukuo,” but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement.

The Ambassador then inquired about the immigration provision. I replied that immigration is considered more of a domestic question in this country; that he would recall my former statement to him to the effect that one of my ambitions when I came to the State Department was to confer with the people of California in particular and undertake to bring about a situation which would make possible the establishment of a reciprocal immigration arrangement with Japan that would be reasonably acceptable to both countries, and that, therefore, Japan would have to accept our good faith in this respect rather than to attempt to make it a part of the proposed negotiations.

I was not sure whether the Ambassador fully understood each statement I made in regard to the four points laid before him, and I sought to illustrate by saying to him that the principles underlying a good portion of the proposals in his doctrine were similar to the principles contained in the four points I had handed to him, and that they were an essential part of the eight-point program, which we had recently emphasized in our South American conferences. I added that, if his Government should make up its mind to abandon its present policies of force and invasion, et cetera, and to adopt a peaceful course with worthwhile international relationships, it could find no objection to these four points reasonably applied, nor to the eight points contained in the Lima resolutions; and that, therefore, he could judge the United States attitude toward a Far Eastern settlement in the light of these practices and principles.

The Ambassador desired me to indicate whether I would to a fairly full extent approve the proposals contained in his document, and I again replied that there would be ready approval of several of them while others would have to be modified or eliminated and this Government would offer some independent proposals, but that if his Government is in real earnest about changing its course, I could see no good reason why ways could not be found to reach a fairly mutually satisfactory settlement of all of the essential questions and problems presented. I illustrated what I meant by the modification of some of the proposals in the document by referring to the fact that the navies of the two countries would not menace each other and adding that the proposal should be broadened to the effect that no navies of any countries should menace each other in the Pacific or anywhere else, but in this particular instance especially in the Pacific. I said that the doctrine of equality should be very easily agreed upon and inserted in the proposals regarding China, as contained in his document. I referred to the clause in regard to the economic cooperation between Japan and China and said that to avoid the possibility of special preferential arrangements between the two countries, the doctrine of equality should be inserted in that connection. I referred to another proposal in which the two countries would assure each other of supplying such commodities as are available, and added that during the war period this country would be obliged to embargo many commodities from export to any country, but that it would expect to supply the pre-war volume in any event.

I said that in connection with the proposals referring to Singapore and Hong Kong, there should be a broader provision to the effect that no nation should construct or operate any agency for the purpose of conquest and aggression.

These were illustrations of our wholly informal conversation, in which I sought to get the Ambassador to see what I meant by the statement that some of his other proposals in his document could be accepted, some modified, some rejected, while some new and independent proposals would be made by this Government. The Ambassador seemed not to understand why I could not now agree to some of these proposals in his document. I sought repeatedly to make clear to him, in the first place, that we have not reached the stage of negotiations, he himself agreeing that he thus far has no authority from his Government to negotiate; and in the second place, that if I should thus out of turn agree to a number of important proposals in the document and these proposals should be sent to Japan and the military or extremist groups should ignore them, I and my Government would be very much embarrassed. The Ambassador finally said he fully understood the situation and made clear, I thought, that he would proceed in his own way to consult his Government regarding the four points in the form of a question which I laid before him inferentially with respect to the approval by the Government of his document, by which is meant the document prepared by the group of Americans and Japanese here with the admitted knowledge and more or less cooperation of the Ambassador himself.

The Ambassador then arose and left and I said that if and when he heard from his Government and should then desire a conference, I would be glad for him to advise me at any time.

C[ordell] H[ull]

1. Signed at Moscow, April 13, 1941.
2. For text of agreement signed at Washington, April 9, 1941, see Department of State, Bulletin, April 12, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 94), p. 445.
3. For text of declaration of American principles of December 24, 1938, see Department of State, Press Releases, December 31, 1938 (vol, xix, No. 483), p. 494.