Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/2052

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] April 14, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador’s compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador’s compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document^18b handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

We then exchanged some remarks about the general international situation, in which I referred to the fact that it would matter little who wins wars these days unless there is to be a restoration of the principles of justice, order under law, et cetera, which underlie orderly and peaceful international relations, such, for example, as this Government has applied in the upbuilding of the whole fabric of Pan American relations during the past eight years. I elaborated to some extent on the far-reaching improvement in and betterment of all relations between the twenty-one American republics and their respective populations, and concluded by remarking that these same principles could far better be applied in every part of the world, including the Orient than any other doctrines or policies, especially those based on force as an instrument of foreign policy and the intervention in the domestic and internal affairs of one nation or nations by another, and emphasized the view that Japan could well consider the course we had followed instead of the opposite course of force and conquest and arbitrary domination for national aggrandizement. The Ambassador mistook what I said and undertook to go back of the past eight-year period and referred to our difficulties with certain Latin American countries, including Mexico. I soon corrected him and said that this Government had turned over a new leaf, so to speak, especially in 1933 and the following years, in its relations with all nations, including South America. The Ambassador seemed to understand and to get the point. I said that in the present state of world conditions, it was manifest that this war would be followed more or less by chaos and anarchy in international affairs and bankruptcy generally, with the result that new wars would be recurring with increasing frequency in the future. This would be the case unless law-abiding countries should exert every possible effort to prevent wild and reckless groups in every country from dragging the world over the precipice, as was done in many vital respects following the World War when the ablest statesmen in Great Britain, for example, were carrying on a nation-wide campaign on the sole issue of hanging the Kaiser and collecting one hundred billion dollars, or some other fabulous amount, from Germany. I said I desired to repeat that it would not make much difference which way the war goes if such unthinkable conditions of utter destruction are to follow, as is sure to happen, unless safeguarded against by every possible means. The Ambassador commented entirely favorably on this view and emphasized his approval of it.

I then said that today it was reported that Hitler is obliged to keep six or eight hundred thousand troops in Poland in order to hold the population in subjugation in every way, which includes semi-slavery in numerous respects; that the same unquenchable love of liberty that existed in conquered nations throughout Europe still exists; that ninety-nine percent of the people of France, whose liberties have been snuffed out and who have been subjected to every privation and many kinds of ill treatment, are strongly sympathetic with the British cause and its support by the United States as far as is practicable; that all of these conquered peoples are but awaiting the slightest opportunity to throw off the shackles of semi-slavery and destitution, and they can be depended upon to do so, if and when Hitler has some serious reverse or reverses. The Ambassador expressed his acquiescence in this last view without the use of words.

I then said that I had observed every phase of Hitler’s conduct and utterances from 1933, each year, each week and each day, and that I, in common with many others, have absolutely no faith in any statement or promise that he makes, but any world, subjected to his methods and his philosophies, which are rooted largely in barbarism, would be an unthinkable world in which to live; that he has no real friends anywhere and that he is not a real friend to anyone; that he would abandon over-night the most solemn obligation taken the day before, if it suited his purpose in the least. I then added that this Government cannot conscientiously sit still and see this unthinkable brand of government fastened on the world; that it wants nothing whatever from anybody, anywhere, but only seeks to aid in preserving an orderly world based on the principles which I have so often recited. The Ambassador did not take issue with this although he did not in any way indicate his approval.

Near the close of the conversation I suggested that, having cleared up these preliminary phases for which I sent for him, we could, if desired on his part, proceed at any time with certain preliminary discussions with a view to ascertaining whether there is a basis for negotiations; that for the purpose of this preliminary discussion there would really be no occasion for either side to present officially any completed documents. The Ambassador raised some question as to why such documents might not be presented in the next conversation, and I replied that there were certain points that my Government would desire to raise prior to negotiations, such as questions pertaining to the integrity and sovereignty of China, to the principle of equality of opportunity in China, et cetera; that he could then communicate with his Government and ascertain whether it agrees that there is a basis for negotiations. The Ambassador readily agreed to this view. He emphasized that he had not yet presented this document to his Government or consulted it concerning concrete terms of settlement, but stated that, in his opinion, his Government would be favorably disposed along such lines as might be made the basis of an agreement.

I said, in conclusion, that I would communicate with the Ambassador later today with a view of agreeing on a time and place for the next conference, adding that it could be at my office or at the White House or in my apartment, although the President was planning on leaving for Warm Springs within a day or two. The Ambassador referred to the interruptions of the press and suggested that he come to my apartment, which he would be ready to do any day from this day on, and he again emphasized the urgency of the situation, saying that events were moving rapidly and that my country is likewise moving rapidly with the result that clashes would become more easily possible from week to week.

C[ordell] H[ull]

1. Supra.