793.94 Commission/292½
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 6.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: If a brief resume of the situation as we see it here would be helpful to you from time to time, I will send you such a statement by the fortnightly pouch when there is anything to report.
The important event during the past two weeks was, of course, the visit of the League of Nations Commission which has just ended. General McCoy,10 on arriving, volunteered on his own initiative to talk to me of the information and impressions of the Commission and when I asked if he saw the slightest embarrassment in so doing he replied in the negative on the ground that all the Commissioners, by mutual consent, had agreed to talk freely though in strict confidence to their respective Embassies. The results of our talks will be found in my despatch No. 60 of July 16.11
In a nutshell the Commissioners are unanimous in finding that Japan’s action in Manchuria is based on two false premises: (1) the argument of self-defense and (2) the argument of self-determination for Manchuria. Neither argument is considered sound. The [Page 94] Commissioners have proved to their satisfaction that the blowing up of the railway and every subsequent incident in Manchuria since September 18, 1931, were carefully planned and carried out by the Japanese themselves. They consider that the setting up of this puppet state, far from tending to pacify the Far East, will result in a festering sore which will inevitably lead to future wars with China and Russia and a case of irredentism much worse than that of Alsace-Lorraine. They realize that the Japanese may supply a more efficient government in Manchuria than did the Chinese but that this fact in no way weakens the element of irredentism. They consider that the action of Japan runs directly counter to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations and that discussions with the other signatories should have been held before action was taken. They still recommend such discussions and delay in extending recognition to the Manchukuo régime. They feel that the case against Japan was made perfectly clear in their conferences by the Japanese themselves, even if they had talked with no Chinese at all. All of the foregoing, with the exception of the last sentence, was made clear to Count Uchida12 in their two interviews with him. Count Uchida, on his side, stated unequivocally that Japan had made up its mind to recognize Manchukuo and that he could not consider any counter arguments nor enter into any discussion of the matter.
I do not of course know whether the report of the Commission to the League will clearly embody the foregoing points nor what its tone will be, but there seems to be no doubt that the five Commissioners are unanimous in their findings.
As regards the Japanese now carrying on the Manchukuo régime, I understand that all of the Commissioners feel that these officials are in fact directly subservient to the Japanese Government and that any evidence to the contrary is “window dressing”. Some members of the Commission’s staff are however inclined to believe the contrary and feel that these officials are “feeling their oats” and decline to be dictated to by Tokyo.
Whether the findings and opinions of the Commission, as expressed to Count Uchida, will have any influence on the Japanese Government and will lead to any modification of its attitude, it is impossible to predict. Probably not. At present it looks as if recognition would be extended to Manchukuo in the not very distant future, but if the step is taken, the Japanese Government will be doing it with their eyes fully open to western opinion.
In my telegram No. 188 of July 7, 11 a.m.,13 I said that from the point of view of purely practical results, as distinguished from the [Page 95] legal aspects of the matter, I believed that American representations against Japanese recognition of Manchukuo at the present time would be unwise. The press, which at present largely represents the point of view of the military, would under present circumstances be quite capable of magnifying such representations by the United States in a manner out of all proportion to their significance and an outburst might well occur which would afford the military a pretext for earlier action than the more conservative members of the Government may desire. That this risk exists is the opinion of every member of my staff. Naturally it is not for me to determine the wisdom of such representations from the legal point of view, or from the point of view of world public opinion and history which you brought out in our talk in New York in April. Apropos of this, a prominent peer recently said to a member of my staff, referring to the military: “I hope they will change their minds before they wreck the country”.
The matter of the customs in Manchuria has, I believe, been fully covered in reports from here and from the various American Consuls in Manchuria. We have also covered the reaction in Japan to the President’s disarmament proposal.13a
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Respectfully yours,