Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/4968

Memorandum by the Secretary of State^3a

[Washington,] April 4, 1932.

The Japanese Ambassador came to say that last Thursday he had received a communication from his Government which was very important but not so urgent as to require immediate delivery; that he therefore waited until I recovered and brought it to me today. The communication was to the effect that if the Assembly of the League of Nations, which he understands is going to meet before May first, should insist upon going into the question of Manchuria further than is already provided by the Council resolutions of September thirtieth and December tenth, Japan will be compelled to withdraw her delegates from the Assembly meeting. He explained that this did not mean that Japan was going to withdraw from the League of Nations; that he recognized that that required two years, but that the present nineteen power commission which had been appointed by the Assembly contained some very radical members. He mentioned Madariaga of Spain and I think Motta of Switzerland, although I was not quite clear of the last, and Japan feared that under these influences steps would be taken to press action in Manchuria which would conflict with Japan’s policy. He said that this notice had already been given by Japan to Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Belgium.

He then went on to point out points in Japan’s favor: first, that she had been very loyally cooperating with the League in respect to Chinese affairs and in particular had been lending technical assistants to China. He then brought up Japan’s peculiar position in regard to Manchuria and her interests in Manchuria and said that this prevented her from permitting outside intrusion into those questions; particularly that Japan could not permit the application of Article XV of the League Covenant to questions in Manchuria.

Then followed a little discussion between us as to what he meant by the Japanese position. I said that I recognized that Japan had always claimed certain important economic interests in Manchuria under certain treaties with China. He corrected me by adding economic and political interests in Manchuria. I denied the latter and asked whether he meant the Japanese claimed to exercise political control over Manchuria. I read him Baron Shidehara’s statement⁴ in his reply to our note of November fifth⁵ and called his attention to the demand which was being made by the agents of the new Manchurian state for moneys from the customs and post office, accompanied by Japanese officers, and asked the Ambassador if that could be reconciled with the promise of Baron Shidehara in the third paragraph of page thirty-seven of that note.⁶ He admitted it could not. I asked him if Japan’s desire not to discuss matters in Manchuria was going to prevent her from fulfilling her obligations under Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty in which she promised to communicate frankly on those subjects, and he said that it would not prevent that, but he was able to give no justification for the difference between that and the attitude of Japan toward Article XV of the Covenant of the League. He finally was reduced to an admission that promises had been broken but said that chauvinist conditions were so acute in Japan that the Government could not take any other position. I pointed out to him the seriousness of the situation when treaty promises began to be broken; I reminded him that the Nine Power Treaty was one of a group of treaties mutually interdependent. He admitted that that was so, saying that he remembered that perfectly well because he was a delegate here in Washington at the time. I asked him what was left on which we could rest for the stability of the world when treaty obligations began to be broken; I reminded him of the many times I had spoken of Japan as a stabilizing influence in the world and asked him if he thought I could do so now. He said he remembered very well the encouraging words I had spoken at the time of the Emperor’s birthday,^6a but he could only ask me to be patient with his people and try to think of some constructive view of the situation that they were in in Manchuria; that criticism only further inflamed the situation and played into the hands of the chauvinistic elements.

My purpose was to take a pretty stiff position with him so that he could not report to his government that I had shown any signs of yielding to the step that they were taking or the arguments they were putting up, and I think my object was fully complied with.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

1. For a previous conversation with the Japanese Ambassador regarding recognition of the new government in Manchuria, see second paragraph of memorandum by the Secretary of State, March 15, 1932, p. 214.
4. Ante, p. 39.
5. See telegram No. 217, Nov. 3, 1931, to the Chargé in Japan, p. 34.
6. See fifth paragraph of note, p. 39.
7. April 29, 1981; Department of State, Press Releases, May 2, 1931 (weekly issue No. 83), p. 361.