Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/1868

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] September 22, 1931.

I opened the conversation with the Japanese Ambassador by referring to our last talk on September 17th when we had both expressed our feeling that the relations of our two countries were in such a satisfactory condition. I said I had been profoundly surprised and concerned by what was taking place in Manchuria and that I had sent Dr. Hornbeck¹⁴ to see the Ambassador on Saturday and now as the matter had developed I wished to see him myself. He said yes, that he had seen Dr. Hornbeck and he had told him of how surprised he (the Ambassador) had been and how concerned he was and how impossible it was for him to understand the causes of what had taken place.

I explained that as he well knew, I had the utmost confidence in Baron Shidehara¹⁵ and his desire for peace and correct international relations. I told him that I had learned from Dr. Hornbeck’s report of what Debuchi had said Sunday—that there was a sharp cleavage between Shidehara and some of the militaristic elements of his government. He said that that was so. I said that what I was now doing was seeking to strengthen Baron Shidehara’s hand and not to weaken it. The Ambassador said he understood that perfectly. I then took the memorandum which had been prepared (a copy, of which is annexed) and read it very slowly to the Ambassador, paraphrasing the language into more simple words wherever it seemed at all necessary in order that he should fully understand it. He repeated many of the sentences, showing that he did understand. When I had finished I said that this was not to be taken as a formal note or an official action on the part of my government, but as the memorandum of a verbal statement given to the Ambassador for the purpose of enabling him to understand and report to his government how I, with my background of friendship towards Japan, felt towards this situation. I said that the Ambassador was at liberty to send it to Shidehara or not, as he saw fit. He said he understood perfectly and that the memorandum did not represent an official note but that if the situation was not remedied he understood that it might be followed by official action on our part later. He said he would communicate its contents to his government that evening.

I then told him that there was one thing however that I would like to ask of him and that was that he postpone his departure for Japan until this situation was in better shape. I told him I felt confidence in him from our long relations together and that it would be easier to handle the situation if he was here. He expressed himself as very much touched by this and said that he was glad to be able to say that this morning he had, after having purchased his tickets and made all his plans, decided to postpone his departure and had told Madame Debuchi and his daughter to that effect, and had telegraphed out to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to cancel the appointments he had made.

I spent quite a little time after reading the memorandum in pointing out what a serious impression it would make in this country if the situation of Manchuria is not restored to the status quo. He said he fully understood that and he had been surprised at the moderation of our American press thus far and attributed that to the care which I had taken in the press conferences. He begged me that if the time should ever come when I did wish to act officially in this matter I would first inform him. I said I would try to do so.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum

Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied the principal strategic points in South Manchuria, including the principal administrative center, together with some at least of the public utilities. It appears that the highest Chinese authority ordered the Chinese military not to resist, and that, when news of the situation reached Tokyo, but after most of the acts of occupation had been consummated, the Japanese Government ordered cessation of military activities on the part of the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, it appears some military movements have been continuously and are even now in process. The actual situation is that an arm of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria.

The League of Nations has given evidence of its concern.¹⁶ The Chinese Government has in various ways invoked action on the part of foreign governments, citing its reliance upon treaty obligations and inviting special reference to the Kellogg Pact.¹⁷

This situation is of concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine Powers Treaty of February 6, 1922,¹⁸ and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria.

It is alleged by the Chinese, and the allegation has the support of circumstantial evidence, that lines of communication outward from Manchuria have been cut or interfered with. If this is true, it is unfortunate.

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence.

14. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
15. Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
16. See telegram, September 22, 1931, sent by the President of the Council to the Governments of Japan and China, League of Nations, Official Journal, December, 1981, p. 2454.
17. See note, September 21, 1931, from the Chinese Government to the League of Nations, ibid., p. 2453, and the note, September 21, 1931, from the Chinese Government to the United States Government, Conditions in Manchuria, p. 3.
18. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.