Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

394.115 Panay/303: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, January 21, 1938—7 p.m.
[Received January 21—11:20 a.m.]

46. Our 27, January 14, noon.

1. Prince Tokugawa’s personal advisers, who have been considering for several weeks the question of his taking over the Paviay sympathy contributions, met yesterday evening and after long discussion recommended to Tokugawa that he should not undertake to dispose of the funds under the conditions which the Department laid down in its 361, December 18, 6 p.m. Tokugawa, who had given me reason to believe that he was disposed to undertake the disposal of the fund, called on me this evening and said that he must accept the recommendations of his personal advisers, who are representative of the best and most substantive elements in the country.

2. Two of these advisers informed us last night after the meeting that their decision had been most reluctantly reached, as they did not wish to see Tokugawa, who is in the very forefront of those working for friendly relations with the United States, appear to be unwilling to promote a project the very purpose of which is to further such relations. Nevertheless they felt that the motives of the contributors and the spontaneity with which the contributions were made were matters of the utmost delicacy and that they deserved to be considered with the greatest circumspection. It is the general custom in this country for friends to give money when death has occurred and in cases of loss by fire or from natural calamities. I had occasion myself recently to subscribe to a fund to replace the home of a Japanese friend which was recently destroyed by fire. As indicated in my 645, December 16, 7 p.m., the customary method of expressing sympathy in this country is by making gifts of money. Tokugawa’s advisers feel certain that if the money were to be taken over by him under the conditions laid down by the Department the contributors would strongly resent the diversion of the contributions from the object for which they were made, namely, to help those who suffered from the attack on the Panay. In these circumstances there are left but two alternatives, as follows.

3. The first alternative, against which I strongly recommend, is for me to return the contributions with the explanation that it is the view of the American Government that American citizens should not benefit from them. The fund, now amounting to something over yen 17,000 with additional substantial amounts in prospect of which I have just heard, was made up not only of gifts from some of the leading people in Japan but in large part of donations of trivial sums by children and by persons in humble circumstances who would be unable to comprehend why gifts made in line with a universal Japanese custom should be refused. Such refusal would seem to them a grave offense and would not fail to be interpreted as indicating intention on the part of our Government to deny the Japanese people at large an opportunity to make atonement by giving expression to their sympathy toward the Panay victims. I would have to obey instructions to return the contributions with the utmost regret and misgivings.

4. The second alternative is that there be simultaneously a nominal acceptance of the fund by the Panay survivors and a contribution by the survivors in their turn of the fund to some deserving project in Japan. Under this procedure I would inform each of the contributors that the survivors are appreciative of the good will and sympathy which animated the donors and that the survivors after acceptance have authorized me to apply the fund to some purpose in Japan which would promote friendly relations between the two countries. Such contribution would be in the Japanese view a “return present” which also is customary and would therefore be eminently proper in the Japanese scheme of things.

5. The Department will probably have difficulty in appreciating the importance of these hairsbreadth distinctions and may view this matter with impatience, but I hope that the Department will understand that when a number of intelligent Japanese have spent a month in study it means that questions of form are of extraordinary importance to these people. The course I have recommended cannot be followed without modification of the Department’s position but I agree with Tokugawa’s advisers when they state that this matter is capable of doing “serious harm unless the American Government can see its way clear to compromise.” I realize that the Department has already considerately accepted one compromise. A second compromise seems to me in every way desirable.

6. Should insurmountable legal difficulties stand in the way, would the Department be disposed to recommend Congressional action?

Repeated to Shanghai.

Grew