500.A15A5/321½
Speech Delivered by Mr. Norman H. Davis at London on December 6, 1934 10
There seems to be some confusion of thought with regard to the matters at issue in the naval conversations, arising primarily from lack of clear understanding of the fundamental difference between “equality of security” and “equality of armaments”.
The difficulties in the present conversations cannot be understood without appreciating what took place at the Conference held in Washington in 1922, which was the first successful effort ever made to reduce and limit navies.
The object of that Conference was to put an end to a ruinous naval race that was impeding recovery from the World War, and to establish a sound basis for peace in the Pacific and the Far East.
It was at that time recognized and admitted by the representatives of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States,—the three naval powers most directly concerned,—that it was not possible to reach [Page 270] agreement through an academic discussion of what each country considered its needs to be or what it required to satisfy national pride.
Experience having indicated that a satisfactory solution of the problems of political stability and of relative naval strength could not be expected through a continuance of the naval race, there were sought agreements with regard to political questions together with naval questions, on a basis of which not only could political stability be attained and the naval race be brought to an end but naval strength be reduced. The principle adopted was that of equality of security.
In order that each nation might be warranted in subscribing to qualifications of its sovereign right to maintain such a Navy as it saw fit and at the same time feel reasonably ensured against aggression, there was concluded a group of agreements, the purpose of which was to remove the causes and the incentive for aggression by establishing a collective system for cooperation among the nations concerned in promoting and maintaining conditions of peace in the Pacific and the Far East. These agreements established an equilibrium of political and economic rights and made possible naval limitation on the basis of essential equality of security. The Washington Conference was a success because the nations represented there approached in a broad and practical way the problems that confronted them. No nation attempted to impose its will on the others, but each was willing to contribute something substantial to the achievement of the ends desired. At that time the United States had actually under construction tonnage which would have given her naval primacy but which in the interests of international limitation of armaments and a generally agreed upon policy of cooperative effort was voluntarily relinquished.
The United States does not believe and does not contend that any Power should against its will enter into or renew a treaty the provisions of which it does not consider advantageous to itself or beneficial to the world in general. It would, however, greatly regret and regard as most unfortunate the destruction of this system of naval limitation which has proved generally beneficial and which has not jeopardized the security of any nation. We do not question, in fact we affirm the inherent right of any and every Power to equality of security. This, I am sure, we have made abundantly plain. The essence of the Washington treaty system was equality of security under conditions of cooperation. The provisions of the treaties negotiated and agreed upon in 1922 were worked out by leading statesmen of nine Powers assisted by a large number of political and technical experts, working over a period of several months. They were agreed upon and ratified by nine governments and were later adhered to by five others. The naval treaty was the work of five principal naval Powers, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. None of these could have [Page 271] accepted and agreed to the provisions of that treaty had it felt that its national security was thereby menaced or impaired. Any basic alteration in this system must of necessity alter the security thus established.
The fundamental issue in the naval conversations now in progress is essentially as follows: Is the equilibrium that was established by the system worked out in the Washington treaties to be continued or is it to be upset. The American Government stands for continuance. The only alternative that has so far been suggested is that of a new naval agreement based on the principle of equality in naval armaments, a principle which if adopted and applied would not give equality of security.
The United States favors a progressive reduction in naval armaments in accordance with the principles established in both the Washington and London Treaties, and, under instructions from the President, I have proposed a substantial all-around reduction in naval armaments to be effected in such a way as not to alter the relative strengths or to jeopardize the security of the participating nations as established by these treaties. Failing agreement upon any reduction, I have made known that we would nevertheless be prepared to abide by the Washington Treaty and to renew the London Treaty with only such modifications in detail as circumstances require and as meet the whole-hearted support of the other parties thereto.
We believe that only by maintenance of the system of equality of security, with proportionate reductions downward of naval strength if possible, can there be maintained the substantial foundation for security and peace which has thus far been laid. We believe that the course taken in 1922 was in the right direction; that the supplementary agreements made in 1930 were an improvement; that the system thus established has been of advantage to all concerned; and that abandonment now of the principles involved would lead to conditions of insecurity, of international suspicion, and of costly competition, with no real advantage to any nation.
- At a luncheon given by the Association of American Correspondents in London to the members of the American delegation in the preliminary naval conversations.↩