500.A15A5/211: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
186. The developments in London since October 25 are as follows:
On October 25 Davis and the Prime Minister5a exchanged views regarding the Japanese proposals. The idea of a common maximum [Page 258] limit will not be accepted by the British. It was their hope that when the Japanese perceived that the British and the Americans would not agree to fundamental changes, the Japanese would become more reasonable and would be content with a statement in the preamble to the treaty voicing equality of sovereign rights, the treaty itself fixing respective relative limits approximately according to the present ratios. Before coming to grips, the British wished to have further explanation from the Japanese. In order not to unsettle unity of British-American views regarding the Japanese position, Davis avoided raising technical questions.
The London press on October 26, under information from the Foreign Office, deprecated the views relative to the Anglo-Japanese alliance which were expressed in Tokyo by spokesman for the federation of British industries mission in the Far East; the press emphasized the close approximation of British-American naval policies.
At the American-Japanese meeting on the morning of October 29, Matsudaira stated that his Government would denounce the Washington Naval Treaty before the end of the year. Matsudaira also said that the same common upper limit proposed by Japan would apply to France and Italy. In regard to a possible meeting of the technical experts of the two delegations, Davis told the Japanese that we were willing to listen to their technical views only if it were understood that neither side would make any commitments in principle. Admiral Yamamoto saw little value in technical meeting unless we were prepared to state the technical details of our program. Davis replied that we had no technical details, as the American program was a percentage reduction within the existing system, although as to carrying it into effect in individual categories we were open-minded. The two delegations agreed that the matter be taken up at a subsequent meeting.
In the afternoon on October 29 the British and the American delegations met and the Prime Minister raised question of increased cruiser tonnage. Davis stated that technical discussions would lack reality in view of the fundamental changes proposed by the Japanese and their intention to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty. The Prime Minister said that the Japanese position was more serious for Britain than for the United States and that the British were determined to meet the situation with a fleet that would be adequate for defense in the Pacific as well as at home; they would do this either by building a fleet of sufficient size or by seeking a political agreement that would cover the Pacific for the requisite security there.
MacDonald reiterated that the British did not agree to the Japanese idea of a common upper limit, which would apply also to France, [Page 259] Italy and probably to Germany and to Russia as well. The Prime Minister felt that for the present a patient attitude toward Japan should be continued, but that if a tripartite agreement became impossible he did not question British parity with America based on the British conceptions of their own risks. Davis stated that we had no desire to impose on the British a treaty incompatible with their national safety, but that we must consider joint adoption of a course by which a naval race with Japan would not be invited. The suggestion was made by the British that when the Americans next met with the Japanese they should urge the latter to contemplate the situation which would result from no treaty. The British had set before the Japanese a face-saving device, but they had adopted an unreceptive attitude toward it. When the Japanese situation should have definitely cleared up, the British agreed on the desirability of tripartite meetings; and they also agreed that for the time being British-American technical discussions would be inadvisable. It is Davis’s belief that the British view policy of the Japanese with deep concern, and that in their own minds the British have reached no solution.
- J. Ramsay MacDonald.↩