500.A15A5/211: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 24—5:17 p.m.]
6. In the meeting with the Japanese delegation this morning Matsudaira read a brief general statement of the Japanese position following which Admiral Yamamoto read a more detailed statement. The substance of their position is contained in the following synopsis handed us at the end of the meeting.
“To possess the measure of armaments necessary for national safety is a right to which all nations are equally entitled. In considering the question of disarmament, therefore, due regard must be given to that right in order that the sense of national security of the various powers might not be impaired; and any agreement for the limitation and reduction of armaments must be based on the fundamental principle of ‘nonaggression and nonmenace.’
To that end we believe that the most appropriate method in the field of naval armament is for us, the leading naval powers, to fix a common upper limit which may in no case be exceeded, but within which limit each power would be left free to equip itself in the manner and to the extent which it deems necessary for its defensive needs. It is desirable that this common upper limit should be fixed in the agreement as low as possible and that offensive arms should be reduced to the minimum or abolished altogether in favor of essentially defensive arms so as to facilitate defense and to render attack difficult.”
[Paraphrase.] They had made the same declarations to the British yesterday, Matsudaira said.
We limited ourselves to putting questions for the purpose of clarifying the Japanese position particularly with regard to what they meant by “offensive arms” and by a “common upper limit.” It was explained by Admiral Yamamoto that the “upper limit” should be the same for each power and should be fixed as low as possible of course; that while Japan would not build up to this maximum necessarily, the treaty [Page 255] would leave each country, during the treaty period, at liberty to build to any point within that limit which it considered necessary for its security. It was emphasized by Matsudaira that any treaty agreement not to build beyond a certain level within the maximum would constitute, in essence, a disguised continuance of the ratio system and would be interpreted as a perpetuation of naval inferiority by the Japanese people.
Concerning offensive weapons Admiral Yamamoto agreed that, under certain circumstances, all naval weapons partook of an offensive character, but that it was a question of determining which vessels, in comparison with others, were more peculiarly useful for offense; that the Japanese Navy regarded aircraft carriers, capital ships, and 8–inchgun cruisers as peculiarly offensive naval weapons in the order given. Yamamoto added that, owing to their relative unseaworthiness and short range, submarines were regarded by the Japanese Navy as useful primarily for defense, and that the offensive character of submarines vis-à-vis merchant vessels would be ended if the existing agreement in the London Treaty against the use of submarines for attacking merchant vessels were made effective and universal.
At the request of Matsudaira, I summarized briefly our position as we had stated it to the British last summer in favor of continuing to adhere to the bases and principles on which our Navy had been reduced and limited, combined with a relative reduction in total treaty tonnages. Matsudaira pointed out that his delegation was under definite instructions to propose a new basis for continuing naval limitation, and that a continuance of the present system could not be accepted by them.
I then asked the Japanese to indicate exactly what if anything had occurred during the past 13 years to alter the relative equality in security admittedly established by the ratios set in 1922 for each power. Yamamoto explained that the Washington Treaty had established equality of defense in the waters close to Japan but not in the middle of the Pacific. Developments, since that time, in naval construction and technique, particularly in aviation, had overturned the equilibrium and had cast the balance greatly in favor of a potential attacking fleet, so that today the old figures could not possibly satisfy the feeling of security of the Japanese people. The inferior ratio had, in addition, the defect of causing “a certain country”5 to regard Japan with a certain amount of contempt which had produced, in turn, serious complications in the Orient and led to the Japanese people’s insistent demand for a revision of the system in effect at present. Ambassador Matsudaira referred also to the troubled political situation in the Far East as well as throughout the rest of the world, stating that European [Page 256] events had a disturbing psychological effect on Japan and increased the Japanese public’s unwillingness that the present treaty principles should continue.
I stated to Matsudaira that they had employed general phrases about equality of rights, etc., which were capable of meaning quite different things to different nations, and that, before determining whether or not the Japanese proposals could be taken into consideration as furnishing a basis for discussion in the future, it would be necessary to determine exactly what they meant; that, in the event there should be no objection to discussing a different basis for continuing naval limitations and reductions, it would appear that the Japanese suggestions might involve such fundamental alterations in principle, policy, and theory as to necessitate a reopening and reexamination of all the questions which had gone into the formulation of the present naval treaties. I expressed doubt of the practicability and advisability of this, particularly at this time. It had been our hope that it would not be necessary to bring up political questions, in the preliminary conversations at least, which might be involved by some of their proposals. Matsudaira recognized that this was one difficulty which we faced, but indicated that the Japanese proposals did not envisage a change in the status of any of the present political agreements or of the nonfortification provisions in the Pacific area. It was then agreed that it would not be advisable to continue further today our discussions, inasmuch as each of us would desire time carefully to consider what had been said, including the further elucidation of the Japanese position which Matsudaira had announced he wanted to make.
The understanding was that the conversation would be treated as confidential and that nothing would be said to the press except that a general exchange of views had taken place and that no documents had been exchanged between us. [End paraphrase.]
- China.↩