500.A15A5/7
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to
the Secretary of State
No. 520
Tokyo, September 15, 1933.
[Received
September 30.]
Sir: Japanese naval leaders find themselves at
present in a serious quandary. They have, since the ratification of the
London Treaty2
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and especially in the past
year or more, insisted that Japan must demand parity, or at least a
great increase in relative tonnage, at the next Naval Conference in
1935. They have built up a feeling among the people of resentment and
contempt for anything connected with the London Treaty. Premier
Hamaguchi and Premier Inukai were assassinated, and other statesmen live
in fear of their lives, in consequence of the bitter feeling stirred up
against protagonists of the London Treaty. Admirals Takarabe, Yamanashi
and Taniguchi have been retired in consequence, it is generally
believed, of their support of this Treaty. According to the press,
Admiral Taniguchi’s recent retirement put an end to the high naval
influence standing for the maintenance of the present treaty status. His
retirement took place during the conduct of the “May 15th trials”, which
have taken on the character of the Soviet propaganda trials and have
stirred up great patriotic ardor against the London Treaty.
The result of these efforts by military leaders has been the creation of
an intense antipathy for the arms limitation treaties and a universal
demand for revision of the present naval ratios in favor of Japan. This
feeling was useful to the Navy leaders until lately, when American naval
construction has definitely commenced. The Navy now has the unenviable
task of deciding whether to abrogate the treaties next year and start a
hopeless competition with far wealthier nations for naval supremacy, or
else to accept a continuance of the present ratios and to face an
outraged public. Until recently, as the Japanese Navy approached the
American Navy in effective tonnage, many leaders had high hopes of
achieving parity or near parity with America. A short time ago Vice
Admiral Takahashi, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, frankly said
to the Assistant Naval Attaché of this Embassy: “We are going to the
Conference in 1935 with a demand for parity. If our demand is rejected,
we shall return home.”
This hope is now vanishing, as America begins to build toward the Treaty
limits. By 1936 they realize that the situation will be comparable to
that in 1927.
It is obvious from the flood of comment* which has
followed announcement of the American building plans that the Japanese
navy leaders are bitterly disappointed. They expected to have everything
their own way at the conference in 1935 with their own navy built to the
limit and the American navy hardly 75% effective. Their calculations
have been completely upset by this new and unexpected development in the
United States.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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At present the Army and Navy are concentrating their efforts on obtaining
funds for completion of their armament programs. The Navy program was
discussed in brief in the Embassy’s previous despatch on reaction to the
American building program. The American program is being used as
justification for increased demands, and the impression is given out
that the second naval replenishment program has been launched only
because of the need of keeping pace with America. The fact is, of
course, that the second replenishment program was announced in almost
the present form as early as January of this year, several months before
the American program was conceived. Moreover, the Japanese press
invariably remarks that the American program will bring American naval
strength up to Treaty limits, whereas actually it is understood to fall
short of the objective by about 175,000 tons. But anything is used these
days as an excuse for increased armaments for the Japanese Army and
Navy.
There is hereto appended a translation appearing in the Japan Times of an interesting statement by the Minister of
War, General Araki, in regard to national defence and the necessity of
preparation for the approaching crisis in 1935 and 1936.3 There is also appended hereto an account
of an interview given by the Navy Minister to the Tokyo correspondent of
the United Press, which may be of interest in connection with naval
affairs.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Interview Given by the Japanese Minister of
Marine (Osumi) to the Correspondent of the United Press in
Tokyo
1. Q. Is Japan satisfied with the existing naval agreements? Will she
request a larger ratio when the agreements come on for revision in
1936?
A. In the treatment of armament limitation problem the security and
the limitation of fighting power are invariably bound together. From
this fact it would be apparent that the position of naval armament
is always closely dependent on international surroundings. If that
is the case, there is no reason why a nation should remain forever
content with a treaty which it had once signed. Only out of regard
for the welfare of humanity, we signed the London Naval Treaty, but
we did not do it unconditionally. As regards the Washington
Agreement, it was signed twelve years ago and in our opinion is no
longer adequate to guarantee the security of this empire as the
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international situation
has thoroughly altered in that period of time. Furthermore from the
standpoint of true armament limitation it is doubtful if the present
ruling is really most rational and economical. At any rate we are
not satisfied with the present arrangement, and we will demand the
change of ratios at the next conference.
2. Q. Have the existing naval agreements served a useful purpose from
the viewpoint of Japan? Does the Japanese Navy favor making new
agreements cover additional categories of ships including
submarines?
A. From the standpoints of all nations participatory to it, I will
not deny that the existing treaties have served some useful purpose.
For example:
- (a)
- They have to some extent effectually checked the
competition in armament building, as far as the capital
ships were concerned.
- (b)
- They have ushered in a building holiday as regards the
capital ships and to that extent lightened the burden on the
tax-payers.
- (c)
- Through the limitation of the types and guns they have
precluded the chance of new ships becoming suddenly
incapacitated as the result of a new invention in fighting
machineries, and thus prolonged the life of fighting vessels
consequently enabling the participants to economize
expenditures.
I think these are the benefits common to all nations.
3. Q. Does the Minister apprehend a so-called “naval construction
race” between Japan and the United States?
A. As far as the present situation is concerned, Japan and the United
States are building only within treaty limits. Hence in my idea the
term “naval race” is a sheer misnomer to describe the building
position between these two countries.
4. Q. Why do Japanese naval publicists refer to the Mandate Islands
in the South Seas as Japan’s naval lifeline? Of what value are these
islands from a viewpoint of defence?
A. The South Sea Islands are separated from the southernmost islands
of Japan by a narrow strip of water. Parts of Japan are situated
within the cruising radius of a heavy bombing plane from the South
Sea Islands, which possess therefore a great strategical value for
the defence of the empire. If they should fall in the hands of a
hostile power in war time, it will constitute a direct menace to the
safety of our defence. This is why we call it the life-line of our
sea defence. Some preach the idea that Japan is going to utilize
these islands for an attack on the Pacific coast of the United
States and the Hawaiian Islands. But just a look at the map will
convince the public of the fallacy of such a doctrine. Can these
islands be used as a base of attack on Hawaii which are lying as
much as 2,000 miles away beyond the ocean, and this with a navy of
lesser strength?
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The sheer
impossibility of such idea will be apparent to anybody who knows
something about naval warfare.
5. Q. Does the Minister believe the purchase of a 45 percent interest
in the China Aviation Corporation by American interests is a matter
of interest to the Japanese Navy? Does Japan consider American
participation in Chinese aviation development as connected with
China’s defence plans?
A. I am in no position to answer the question 5 except that we have
as yet no reliable information in this respect, and that between the
civil and the military aviation there is no hard and fast line of
distinction, and this circumstance gave rise to embarrassing
complication at Geneva whenever the problem was brought up for
discussion.
6. Q. What does the Minister consider to be the mission or objectives
of the United States and Japanese navies in contrast? Should there
be, or is there, any clash in these objectives?
A. Secretary of the Navy, Swanson recently stated that the United
States means to hold a navy strong enough to defend the country and
its oversea dominions, and to this end will build, maintain and
operate the first-in-the-world navy following the provision of
existing treaties. If such is the case it can by no means clash with
the mission of the Japanese navy which consists in the maintenance
of the peace in the Far East and the defence of the empire’s
position in the Far East. To the Japanese Navy the idea of crossing
the Pacific Ocean in order to attack our neighbours is quite alien.
Its mission is strictly defensive and legitimate.
7. Q. Does the Minister see any possibility of Japanese-American
War?
A. I am positive in the belief that unless Japan’s national existence
is menaced to the extent that the use of force is the only way to
defend it, the world will never find Japan involved in a war with
other countries.
