Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/4580

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] March 3, 1932.

The Japanese Ambassador came in to give me an announcement of the cessation of hostilities, and he handed me the copy which is annexed. He then handed me a set of the basic conditions of the immediate cessation of hostilities, which is also annexed. He did not make it clear what these represented or who they came from. He said that the Japanese army occupied the line as follows: Kasing, Naziang, Chenju, and that the Woosung Forts were captured at 8:10 a.m. March 3rd. He then said that his Government was very anxious that we should participate in the round table conference mentioned in the basic provision above-mentioned to arrange the details of the truce; that as soon as these were arranged the Japanese army would withdraw. He also said something about a neutral zone around Shanghai.

I then took up the situation and I pointed out that on February 29 the League of Nations, on the request of Japan, had suggested a proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the various steps, including a conference; that this was immediately accepted personally by the Japanese representative, Sato, on February 29, subject to the approval of his Government, and that the approval of the Government was given on March 1 (see No. 95 from Geneva³⁵). The Japanese Ambassador agreed to each of these dates. I said that this having been done, I was greatly shocked and I thought a great many other people were shocked by the fact that after this proposal for immediate cessation of hostilities had been made and accepted, Japan had made the largest attack of the entire Shanghai operation on March 2 and 3, in which a great many Chinese and Japanese had lost their lives. I told the Ambassador that was not the way that we ceased hostilities in the Great War, when, so far as I knew, there was not a shot fired after 11 o’clock on November 11, the time that we agreed to cease. The Ambassador was much embarrassed.

He said first that the Chinese had not accepted the immediate cessation of hostilities at the time of Admiral Kelly’s meeting. I replied that this was contrary to my understanding; that my understanding had been that the Chinese Government had accepted the proposal for cessation of hostilities even before the Japanese had accepted. He then said that it was very hard to stop troops when they were in combat. I referred to the situation in the Great War where it was stopped.

The Ambassador said that when he came in he hoped that I would be pleased by his announcement of the cessation now of hostilities and the firing of guns. I told him that I was glad that the guns had stopped firing, but I begged him to remember that so far as our nationals had been concerned, they had not been in any danger at all until the Japanese troops came to Shanghai on January 29 and got into a fight with the Chinese forces on Chinese territory. I said that I did not enter into the question of the safety of Japanese nationals; that was a matter which I did not profess to know, but I did know that our nationals had been perfectly safe until the Japanese had come here as aforesaid and got into a fight with the Chinese army. The Ambassador was very much agitated and said he hoped that we would join the round table conference because the success would be impossible without the presence of America. I pointed out that I could not allow my Government to be drawn into a position where we might be thought to be seeking extensions of foreign rights at the expense of China; that we did not claim any such extensions and we would not participate in negotiations which might result in getting them; but that I would consider the question of our participation and decide that later. I said that the situation had, however, entirely changed in my opinion since our original proposal.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

[Annex 1]

Japanese Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities

The Imperial Japanese land forces since their arrival in Shanghai and its vicinity had, in conjunction with the Imperial Naval forces, made every effort to achieve the object of protecting Japanese residents by peaceful means. However, proposals based on such a desire were not, to their regret, acceded to by the nineteenth route army of China and at last hostilities were started.

Chinese forces have now retreated to positions beyond the distance originally requested by the Imperial forces, and signs are seen of peace, of the Shanghai settlements being recovered and safety of Japanese residents being reassured.

I have therefore decided to order the forces to halt for the time being at points actually held and to stop fighting, provided, that the Chinese forces will not resort to further hostile actions.

General Yoshinori Shirakawa

Chief of Imperial Japanese Land Forces

Shanghai, March 3, 1932.

[Annex 2]

Basic Conditions of the Immediate Cessation of Hostilities

1. Should China give assurances for the withdrawal of her troops to a certain distance from Shanghai (distance to be determined by the Japanese and Chinese authorities), Japan will agree to the cessation of hostilities for a certain period (to be agreed upon between Japanese and Chinese authorities), and pending subsequent arrangements the Japanese and Chinese forces shall hold their respective positions. Details relating to the cessation of hostilities shall be arranged by the Japanese and Chinese military authorities.

2. During the period of the cessation of hostilities, a round-table conference between Japan and China shall be held at Shanghai, in which representatives of the principal powers interested shall participate, and the conference shall discuss, with a view to reaching an agreement upon, methods for the withdrawal of both the Chinese and Japanese forces on such terms as are set out in the following paragraph, together with measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for safeguarding the International Settlement and French Concession in Shanghai and foreign lives, property and interests therein.

3. The withdrawal of troops shall be commenced by the Chinese troops (including plain-clothes gunmen) to a specified distance, and upon ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese forces, the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas. As soon as normal conditions prevail, the Japanese army shall be withdrawn from these areas.

4. Should either of the parties infringe any of the terms on the cessation of hostilities, the other party shall have freedom of action. Both parties shall have the same freedom of action upon the expiration of the period agreed upon under paragraph I.

35. Dated March 3; not printed. It transmitted the Japanese acceptance, dated March 1, of the proposals made by the President of the Council on February 29, and a communication, dated March 2, from the President of the Council to Sato in response to the foregoing. For texts, see League of Nations, Official Journal, March, 1932, p. 928.