793.94/4502
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador came to my house at Woodley at 12:15. He told me, first, about troop movements. He had told Mr. Castle that one new division was being sent, but he now said that instead of sending the divisions one by one, they were sending two, the 11th and the 14th, so that they will have in all at Shanghai 3½ divisions.
He told me that he was instructed by his Government to assure me that Japan had no intention to obtain any exclusive Japanese concession [Page 202] at Shanghai; also that Japan appreciated the great step of civilization that had been made by the British, the Americans, the French, and the other nations in the creation of the International Settlement and desired to preserve that. He then spoke of the representations which had just been made by the foreign governments, and I explained to him that those had been made in order to remove the danger which was caused by the Japanese fleet lying immediately opposite the middle of the International Settlement, so that when it was fired at by the Chinese across the Settlement, the Settlement was likely to be injured, if shots fell short, and I pointed out that the same thing had happened when the Japanese were landing troops. He said that he appreciated that, and that he had word that the Japanese Government would do everything they could to avoid that danger. He did not, however, say specifically that they would remove the ship[s].
He said that all the Japanese were trying to do was to move the Chinese back 20 kilometers, and that they thought now that the Chinese morale was getting low and this could be done without much fighting. I told him that they might be mistaken in this as they had been before, and that the thing to do was to stop the blow rather than to trust that it would be a light blow. I told him that I believed that if the Japanese would stop their attack, the Chinese could be induced to withdraw a safe distance, which would be sufficient so as not to endanger the Settlement, and that in such case both faces could be saved. This point came up several times in the conversation, and I always repeated it, and he always said that he agreed with me that the thing to do was to stop the blow. But it was evident from his attitude that he knew that his Government was insisting upon going ahead to deliver the blow. I told him that I was not making any offer, but that if ever the Japanese Government wanted our good offices or assistance, they knew that they could have them. Our friendship for Japan remained. He said he knew that.
He then brought up the question of boycott and the movement started by President Lowell,28 and he said that it was necessarily very dangerous and if persisted in might cause great irritation in Japan. I said that that movement had not been in any way encouraged by the Government; that I, myself, whenever people spoke to me about it, pointed out the danger of such a movement; but that he must recognize the fact that public opinion in this country had been greatly shocked by the action of the Japanese, and when people of the standing of Dr. Lowell, who was one of our foremost historians, and Mr. Baker29 started such a movement, they had great influence and it meant that the country was greatly shocked.