793.94/4017
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle) of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi)
The Ambassador, who had evidently had no recent word from Japan, came to tell me what he thought about the joint note presented yesterday to Yoshizawa.13 He said that, inasmuch as the Japanese Government had asked for the good offices of the different nations in putting a stop to the fighting at Shanghai, he felt in the first place that it would not be possible for the Japanese Government to take offense, but it rather should be grateful for the very prompt response. He said that, in his personal opinion in studying the note, it seemed to him that the Japanese Government ought to be able promptly to answer favorably the first four points, that he felt the fifth point to be more difficult for them to accept. I said that I realized this, but that, nevertheless, we believed the fifth point to be of the highest importance because what we hoped might come out of this was a real settlement of the various questions at issue. The Ambassador said that he understood this, but that what he felt to be of immediate importance was the prompt acceptance of the four points which would put an end to fighting, that this would give time for the Japanese Government to consider the fifth point in a better atmosphere than was at present possible. He said that he could not feel that the Cabinet would, off hand, accept the fifth point. I told him that, of course, I could make no comment on this, but that if he was correct I hoped most earnestly that, in making an answer, the Japanese Government would find it possible frankly and fully to accept the four points and that they would not refuse to accept the fifth point, but would state instead that they would be happy to take it under consideration and to discuss the matter with the powers. Mr. Debuchi said that this was what he was cabling or had cabled his Government and that he had come to see me largely to find out whether we really laid stress on the fifth point as I told him we did.
[Page 177]The Ambassador then brought up the fact of the appointment of Admiral Nomura to Shanghai to have general charge of operations there as something very favorable to the whole affair. Admiral Nomura, he says, is a great friend of Admiral Pratt’s,14 who would, he was sure, endorse the Admiral’s competency and fair mindedness. He then said that he himself felt it would be a good idea to have all the Japanese troops go into the Settlement, where they would not be able to fight with the Chinese. I told him that it would seem to me wiser to have the Japanese sailors and Marines, if there were any, get back onto their ships rather than to crowd into the Settlement; that I felt if enormous numbers of Japanese troops went into the Settlement the result might be to bring fighting into the Settlement. He admitted that this might be the case, since, as he put it, “when Japanese troops got anywhere they always seem to feel they have got to do something.” He pointed out also that wherever there were Japanese troops there was likely to be sniping on the part of the Chinese. I admitted this and said this was one excellent reason for the establishment of neutral zones across which there would be no sniping either from one side or the other.
The Ambassador brought up a report that certain Japanese land forces had already been despatched to Shanghai. He said that, although he could not deny this officially, he felt it was premature, that it would have been impossible for Japan to ask for good offices and then immediately despatch an expeditionary force. I told him I hoped he was correct. He said that undoubtedly the sending of a regiment from Manila would make the Japanese feel that, to protect their 25,000 nationals in Shanghai, they also should send land forces. I told him that the only reason we sent land forces was that they were the only ones immediately available and that obviously more assistance was needed in the Settlement. He said he understood this perfectly himself and was trying to make it clear to his Government.
In leaving the Ambassador said that he would, of course, pass on to us any information which came to him and that he in the meantime would again telegraph very urgently to his Government not to throw down point five of the joint note.