Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume I

793.94/3970

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] January 30, 1932.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me at his own request upon his return from Cuba. He said that he was instructed by his Government to make representations to me in reply to our representations the other day in regard to avoiding military occupation of the International Settlement.² The Ambassador then repeated substantially the instructions which had come to me already through Tokyo.³ He said he presumed that I had received them from Tokyo and I said I had. I then told the Ambassador that the matter had progressed far beyond the time when this message in reply had been given; that I was informed by our representatives in Shanghai that the night before last, after the Mayor of. Shanghai had made a favorable reply to the demand of the Japanese Consul General and after the Japanese Consul General had told the Board of Consuls that he deemed this reply favorable, and after a promise of ample warning had been made by the Japanese Commanders, the Japanese troops, without warning, in the middle of the night had forcibly seized Chapei and had fired on the civilian population not only with rifle and machine guns but with airplanes and bombs. I told the Ambassador that he must have seen from the press what a serious reaction this had made in this country. He said he had seen it and it was very, very serious. The Ambassador suggested that a change of the situation had occurred, after the Consul General’s announcement as to the favorable reply of the Chinese, in the fact that the Municipal Council had declared a state of emergency. I told him I did not see how that could affect the situation in the least and he did not press the point. The Ambassador said that the Japanese landing body, consisting only of sailors as they had no marines in Shanghai, had proceeded to the neighborhood of the defense line which had been allocated to the Japanese and that these men had been fired on by snipers, and that this was the report he had received. I told the Ambassador I did not think it was necessary to get into a discussion as to who fired the first shot or who applied the match to the powder barrel. The gist of the situation was that, by bringing this strong naval force into the port of Shanghai at this time and threatening a landing, the Japanese had created an explosive situation which was bound to result in an explosion and I regretted to say that I could not look at it in any way except as due to the fault of the Japanese. The Japanese Ambassador shook his head and said that I must recognize that he agreed with me on the general principle. I went on to say that I was very much concerned about the present condition in the International Settlement; that it was one which was almost certain to result in a major disaster. I told the Ambassador that five minutes before he came in I had received a press flash to the effect that a mob consisting of Japanese, including Japanese military, were looting the houses in a portion of the International Settlement; that I could not vouch for the accuracy of the report but it was in the press. I pointed out how difficult it would be to protect life and property in the Settlement in a situation which was created now by the conflict between the two large forces of China and Japan in that immediate neighborhood. Finally, I told the Ambassador that in this situation representations would undoubtedly have to be made on the subject by my Government to his. I did not tell him that they had already been made.⁴

At the close of his talk with me, the Ambassador handed me the annexed statement issued by Mr. Murai, Consul General of Japan at Shanghai. I asked him whether it was the one issued by him to the Board of Consuls on January 28th, and he said no, it was issued the following day. I did not read it while the Ambassador was present.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

[Annex]

Statement Issued by Mr. Murai, Consul General of Japan at Shanghai, on January 29, 1932

It is true that the Mayor of greater Shanghai conceded late on January 28th to all demands contained in my note of January 20th and we were anxiously watching for the development in view of various rumors and questionable ability of the local Chinese authorities to control the situation, particularly the undisciplined soldiers and dissatisfied elements. By four o’clock the Shanghai municipal council declared a state of emergency, meanwhile the excited refugees, most of whom were Chinese, poured into the settlement from all directions. The rumor of surreptitious entry of the “plainclothed corps” gained wide circulation. To make the situation from bad to worse, all the Chinese constables fled from the Chapei district where about 7000 Japanese reside. The excitement of the populace grew to fever-point. As an emergency measure of protecting the Japanese lives and property in Chapei, a Japanese landing force was despatched in accordance with a previous arrangement with authorities of the municipality and British, American and other forces and in conformity with former precedents of similar cases. (The territory in question is a strip of land in Chapei on the east side of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway which by the abovenamed agreement was assigned to the Japanese). No sooner had the Japanese landing force appeared on emergency duty near its headquarters than the Chinese soldiers in plain clothes attacked them with hand grenades in the neighborhood of the Shanghai-Woosung railway. This attack served as a signal for the Chinese regulars to open fire on the Japanese force, whereupon the latter was forced to return fire. At about the same time, these disguised outlaws commenced shooting at the Japanese at random in the area mentioned above. They have already claimed a number of Japanese lives in the same area. I made it a special point to ask Mr. Yui, Secretary General of the municipality of greater Shanghai, to withdraw the Chinese troops from the section in question when I received the Mayor’s reply yesterday to which he gave his ready assent and assured me that it would be done. Had the Mayor been able to bring the military to coordinate speedily with him we might have averted the unfortunate incident. I am demanding again for an immediate withdrawal in view of what took place and is now taking place. If the Chinese authorities are unable to stop the assault and complete the withdrawal from that section, I see no other alternative but to enforce it by force. I should like to make it clear that this clash is to be distinguished from the question contained in my note of January 20th which was solved for the time being at any rate. I would also like to point out that the wild story about the Japanese attack on the Woosung Fort is groundless. This Chapei incident is entirely a matter of self-defense in emergency in an effort to protect Japanese life and property and indeed those of other nationals including Chinese themselves. I am hoping for a speedy cooperation of the Chinese side to avoid any further conflict or sacrifices and to that end to withdraw its troops.

2. See telegram No. 25, Jan. 27, 1932, to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 161.
3. See telegram No. 26, Jan. 28, 1932, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 163.
4. See telegram No. 28, Jan. 29, 1932, to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 165.