893.6363 Manchuria/194
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
[Tokyo,] April 16, 1935.
- 1.
- I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, at his official residence at 9:30 this morning and left with him, after reading it aloud, our note No. 383, of April 15, 1935, concerning the petroleum monopoly in Manchuria.
- 2.
- I then made to the Minister orally the statements appended to this memorandum62 expressing each phrase and sentence slowly and clearly so that the Minister must have clearly grasped every point set forth.
- 3.
- At the end of my oral representations the Minister observed, as he has frequently done before, that he had always taken the position that this whole question was a practical one and should be approached in a practical rather than a theoretic and legalistic way and he implied that the matter could be solved to the satisfaction of the oil companies if they had been permitted to discuss the matter directly with the authorities of “Manchukuo” on a business basis. I said to the Minister that the oil companies had already been in touch with the Manchurian authorities without favorable results. The Minister replied that the trouble was that the representatives of the oil companies were in the habit of referring every step to their home governments and maintained that they were powerless to proceed without the approval of their home governments. I said to the Minister that so far as the American companies were concerned, he must be under a misapprehension because while the American Government naturally supported the interests of American companies doing business abroad, it nevertheless did not dictate their policy. The companies were entirely free to act as they thought best and they had approached this whole matter from a business point of view. Undoubtedly some business questions are dependent upon legalistic considerations and the oil companies in determining their attitude in Manchuria have no doubt been obliged to consider both aspects of the question, but they nevertheless regarded [Page 150] it primarily as a business proposition. The Minister said he felt sure that if the companies would continue to negotiate with the “Manchukuo” authorities, they would obtain favorable results.
- 4.
- The Minister then reread my note and asked what I meant by the assurances mentioned at the end of paragraph 2. I immediately read to the Minister the various assurances given in the reply of the Japanese Government to the identic note addressed by the United States to the Governments of China and Japan, September 24, 1931;63 in the reply of the Japanese Government to the identic note addressed by the United States to the Governments of China and Japan, January 7, 1932;64 in the statement of the Japanese Government of September 15, 193265 and in the protocol between Japan and “Manchukuo”, September 15, 1932.66 The Minister replied that these assurances were given on the understanding that “Manchukuo” would be recognized by the other nations. He observed that by concluding a treaty with “Manchukuo” effecting the sale of the North Manchuria Railway the Soviet Union had accorded de facto recognition, whereas the United States had not even recognized the existence of “Manchukuo”. I inquired whether I was to understand from what he had said that the principle of the Open Door and treaty obligations in Manchuria are not to be held to apply to the United States? Mr. Hirota answered that until the existence of “Manchukuo” is recognized “no dispute whatever can be entertained with regard to that country.”
- 5.
- After some further conversation which was merely supplemental to the points brought out above, I observed that the American Government based its whole case on treaty obligations and past assurances, and then took my leave.
J[oseph] C.
Grew