837.00/2912
The Ambassador in Cuba (Guggenheim) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 28.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on the present grave situation in Cuba. In my personal letter to you of October 11, 1930,13 I summarized four serious problems that it seemed to me were the essential factors in averting a crisis in Cuba. These problems were:
“(1) A solution of the fundamental economic problem which is the removal of the surplus sugar.”
The sugar stabilization plan has been enacted into law. The price of sugar has, as a consequence, had a forty to fifty per cent rise. This plan has inspired hope, but its final success is, of course, still not certain. At the present time a Cuban-American Committee is en route to Holland to negotiate an agreement with European and Javanese producers of sugar.
“(2) A restoration of Cuban political liberties.”
The President has sent a message to the Senate, which it is now considering, calling for the restitution of the Crowder Electoral Code in its pristine condition, which, among other benefits, will permit the organization of new parties. The House of Representatives has before it a bill for the prompt taking of a census. Immediately thereafter, it is planned that there be a reorganization of the old parties.
“(3) A further drastic reduction in the budget and readjustment of the Government finances.”
At the time I wrote you my letter of October 11, I was engaged in the study of the Government finances. On October 22, in my confidential despatch No. 403,14 I pointed out this very unsatisfactory condition. In this despatch, which reported a conference with President Machado, I said,—
“It seemed to me there was only one way to avert a (financial) collapse, and that was to settle the political agitation and to win the general support of the country so as to make possible the severe budget reductions.”
The President has reduced the budget as far as expediency permits, but the Government’s financial problem is far from solved, and he has not won the support of the country, although it must be admitted that no one could win its full support under present conditions. (See my despatch No. 408 of October 27, 1930.)14
I hoped, before now, to have come to Washington to discuss the finances of the Cuban Government with you, and to get your instructions on what our attitude should be under the circumstances in consideration of Article II of the Platt Amendment. The political situation has made it impossible for me to do so. Unfortunately, the Government finances are taking the course anticipated in my despatch No. 403. Cuba’s financial problem is so bound up with its political problem that I hesitate at the moment to make any specific recommendation. If President Machado is able to stabilize the country, I should like to come to Washington to discuss with you the merits and demerits of interposing no objection to temporary financial aid to the Cuban Government by bankers interested in Cuba and, if you deem advisable, discussing the Cuban financial situation with American bankers but, at the present moment, I am neither able to leave Cuba, nor am I justified in making recommendations for the solution of this vital problem. In the meanwhile, the Government’s financial status becomes daily worse.
“(4) The immediate prevention of the spread of revolutionary sentiments which are particularly prevalent in this period before election day.”
Immediately after your statement of policy and upon my return here, there was a marked decrease in revolutionary agitation, to such an extent that the election was held without disorder. When the usual election excitement had subsided, it seemed at one time as if my good offices would be helpful in arranging a modus vivendi between the Government and the opposition, since the latter was in a mood for compromise. The situation changed rapidly, however; the student agitation became critical, public opinion was inflamed by the vigorous methods of the Government in maintaining order, and all the opposition groups joined forces, with the avowed purpose of unseating the Machado Government. As soon as I sensed that they would not compromise with this intention, I realized that further efforts on my part would be useless and withdrew immediately from the negotiations. These events have been fully reported to you. At the present moment, due to the suspension of the constitutional guarantees, rioting has subsided. While the Government has as yet failed to reach a compromise with either the students or the press, it holds apparently the position of vantage. All but the Government-controlled Habana newspapers still refuse to publish unless the Government agrees to remove all censorial supervision; but the financial loss which this attitude involves each day makes it likely that they will shortly resume publication. In its mediation with the students, the Government, in an attempt to rid the country for all time of student agitation, has offered autonomy to the University, with Government subsidy—a plan similar to that governing our own State institutions. The student leaders, “taking a leaf from the book of the opposition,” have replied that they cannot deal with an unconstitutional government and now demand the resignation of President Machado. Within the last day or two, however, another more reasonable Student Committee has been found, and there is evidence that the Government will succeed in effecting the desired settlement of student grievances.
In this situation, there are indications that the anti-Machado propagandists will redouble their efforts in the United States to induce an intervention in Cuba, which will put the present Government out of power.
The political history of the Republic of Cuba is a history of periodic conspiracy to overthrow the government. The inevitable means employed is the establishment of a “Junta” in the United States for the dissemination of highly-colored propaganda to the public in general and our Congress, in particular. The recent events in Cuba have been partially due to the successful campaign of these propagandists who have been encouraged to renew their efforts to force our interference in Cuba.
I sincerely hope that these efforts will not set in action forces that will precipitate the thought of an intervention. Intervention has, [Page 676] of course, always been resented by the Cuban people in the past; it would be particularly resented today, however, both in and out of Cuba, and could only have the most harmful consequences for the United States. Even the opposition, which has been privately asking me for a preventive intervention policy solely to unseat the Machado regime and give their own faction a chance at the spoils of power, would strenuously object to any intervention which did not have that result, or which continued after that result was indicated. Nevertheless, this policy is, for the moment, the opposition’s best, and possibly only, chance of success. At first the tactics of the opposition were to create the impression that the Machado dictatorship was maintained in power by the Government of the United States. When your policy of non-interference was announced, these tactics were changed to the promotion of intervention. As I have stated, they have already asked me privately for American interference, and their propaganda has reached the extent of newspaper attacks on you and me personally, threats of violence, and destruction of American life and property in Cuba. Unfortunately, the revolutionary movement is not instigated by inspired leaders, but is born of the misery on the island fathered by aspiring politicians.
Respectfully yours,